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Abstract 
 
Belarus and Russia entered simultaneous transitions as the Soviet Union broke down at the 
end of 1991. As most other former Soviet republics Belarus and Russia did not end up with 
democratic regimes as a result of transition. However, the Russian regime can be regarded far 
more liberal in character than the Belarusian. The main question to be answered is why one 
can observe this difference in regime type in two otherwise similar countries. This question is 
addressed by applying actor-oriented transition theory and game theory to analyse the 
interaction about regime type during transition.  
 
I conclude, by focusing on actors, that the main explanatory factors for this observed 
difference can be found in the variation in the games of social interaction about the issue of 
constitution occurring during transition. Belarus experienced a lower pressure for change 
amongst elites and the population than Russia. Furthermore, Belarusian elites hindered the 
impact of the phase of liberalisation, leaving the country worse prepared for transition than 
Russia. Due to various reasons no compromise which could have secured democracy or a 
liberal regime was reached in either of the countries. This left them with sub-optimal conflicts 
outcomes as a result of transition. 
 
None of the countries managed to escape the sub-optimality of the transition through 
cooperation or pacts. In Belarus an inconclusive compromise about national independence 
hindered cooperation about regime type resulting in a situation of nested games. In Russia a 
compromise was hindered by disagreement about the threatening power of the ruling fraction 
during transition leaving the actors in a situation of sub-optimality. 
 
Key Words: Belarus, Russia, Transition, Liberalisation, Democratisation, Actors, Game 
Theory, Threats, Pacts, Sub-Optimality and Nested Games. 
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1. Introduction 
Two decades have passed since Mikhail Gorbachev opened the Soviet Union for change. His 
politics in the late 1980s led to the largest wave of roughly simultaneous regime changes seen 
so far. Few scholars had predicted the collapse of communism and the events came as a 
surprise upon most observers as the dictatorships of Eastern-Europe broke down when people 
in country after country rose against injustice and suppression. Yet, these simultaneous 
transitions have produced a large variety of outcomes with regard to regime type. Countries 
have ended up with regimes varying from closed dictatorships to new democratic regimes. 
Only seldom, compromise and democracy have been the outcome of post-Soviet transitions. 
These simultaneous regime changes in over two dozen countries, with relatively 
similar contexts, constitute a “unique laboratory to isolate causal patterns” as McFaul (2002: 
212) puts it. This unique data which has been created by these transitions opens new 
possibilities to apply transition theory in order to gain further knowledge, empirically as well 
as theoretically.  
 
Research questions 
The central task which I have undertaken is to explain the variety of regime type as outcomes 
of transition in Belarus and Russia. For this purpose the phase of transition is closely analysed 
in order to uncover the factors which have contributed to the outcomes of transition. The main 
focus is upon actors, their engagement in social interaction about specific conflict issues and 
the effect these factors have on the regime type which is seen as a result of this interaction. 
The similar context of the chosen cases makes it useful to de-emphasize, but not ignore, the 
impact of structural and historical variables.  
 The central questions I ask in this work are; what games were played and how are they 
influenced by differences in context? As argued by Larsen (2000: 480-81) similar games arise 
from similar transition contexts, which again are “structurated” in the same way. By choosing 
cases with a similar macro-structural context it is possible to point to the circumstances and 
the variety which are believed to have influenced the variation in regime types. Despite the 
similarity of context and structures Russia and Belarus differ in size, in historical 
circumstances and they have different identities. These factors and their effect upon the 
micro-level decisions taken during the social interaction are firmly elaborated before the 
transitions are discussed. From these discussions, actors, conflict issues and actors’ position 
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towards these conflicts are derived. This again produces different games. In time this study is 
defined by the interval of transition in the two countries, which starts with the breakdown of 
the Soviet Union and ends by the founding elections in respectively late 1993 for Russia and 
in 1994 for Belarus. 
 When studying the regime outcomes several other question arise as being of interest in 
connection with the main research question. These are of interest both theoretically as well as 
in order to understand the empirical outcomes in the two countries. 
Transition theory has been claimed by area specialists such as McFaul (2002) or by 
Melville (2000) to be inadequate as a theoretical framework to understand post-Soviet 
transitions because of the lack of empirically observable pacts. I will in this thesis contradict 
their assumptions. Attention will be devoted to the possibility, functions and need for pacts in 
relation to the outcomes of the games. Contributions are added to the understanding of the 
concept of pacts in transition theory both as formal or informal, known or unknown 
agreements amongst the relevant actors. But it is important to bear in mind that pacts are 
neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for application of transition theory. 
Rustow (1970) points to a single pre-condition for transition to democracy. This is that 
the majority of the population in a given country recognises the present state-formation as the 
only legitimate entity for their statehood. A similar argument is made by Linz and Stepan 
(1996) who also claim that the former Soviet states possess particular challenges due the 
problem of “stateness”. I discuss the challenges which are created by simultaneous processes 
of state-building, nation-building, economic reforms and democratisation. Challenges created 
by the conflicts which arise from these processes can re-enforce and further complicate 
situations in which the actors have conflicting interests. Multiple conflict issues can create 
situations of nested-games and leave actors with sub-optimal outcomes as results of 
transitions. The challenges arising from these conflicts are brought into the analysis in order 
to further enlighten the background of the sub-optimal choices of actors. Furthermore, I 
contribute to the theories on democratisation by introducing these challenges in a genuine 
actor-approach and not only as contextual or historical macro-structures. 
I apply Tsebelis’ (1990) framework of nested games to the case of Belarus in order to 
enlighten multiple arenas of conflict, the way they are nested together by the actors and the 
challenges created by decision making on one conflict dimension when decisions cannot be 
taken independently upon this dimension alone. Apparently irrational or sub-optimal 
behaviour of the Belarusian actors can be explained by this approach. In the case of Russia I 
have introduced the framework of Hovi (1998) on the efficiency of threat to bring further 
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insights to the discussion of the Russian transition and the apparent sub-optimal outcomes 
produced by the interaction. In addition to enrich the theoretical framework of transition 
theory this approach also unites aspects of international relations with aspects of comparative 
politics in order to unite the knowledge build in both disciplines and thereby accumulates 
further theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
 
Choice of cases and motivation 
By comparing Russia and Belarus I have chosen a most similar systems design with regard to 
selecting cases. As mentioned earlier the two chosen countries are relatively similar with 
regard to contextual and structural factors. Both Russian and Belarus are former Soviet 
republics, they are major east-Slavic countries and have shared historical experiences. This 
makes it possible to de-emphasize several structural and historical factors and instead turn the 
intention towards the choices of actors and differences in conflicts.  
During the 1990s a difference in the development in regime type can be observed in 
both countries. Neither country can be said to fully comply with democratic standards. The 
regime in both countries manipulates the political game to such an extend that they cannot be 
classified as democracies. However, Russia grants a considerable larger degree of freedom to 
its people than Belarus. On the Freedom house survey of 1996 Belarus was classified as “not 
free” while Russia was classified as “partly free”.1  
 Belarus is often referred to as the last dictatorship of Europe. With regard to regime 
type Belarus shares more similarities with its former union partners in Central-Asia than with 
it neighbouring countries. Aleksander Lukashenka has established himself as a charismatic 
dictator with powers which echo the past. This sole position of Belarus as the least free 
country in Europe makes it especially interesting for a comparison with regard to regime type 
and transition to uncover if the games during transition can help to explain the movement 
toward dictatorship which is observed. 
 Furthermore, very little attention has been devoted to the study of Belarus by western 
scholars. Also in politics in general, Belarus seems to be the forgotten country of Europe. 
According to Silitski (2003) little attention have been devoted to the study of the role of actors 
in the Belarusian transition. The few studies conducted have mostly been oriented in the 
                                                 
1 www.freedomhouse.org 
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structural approach. Therefore, a bit more attention has been devoted to Belarus than to 
Russia in my study. Amongst the few actor-oriented studies conducted are the studies of 
Silitski (2003) and Mihalisko (1997) which I build upon and develop further. The limited 
amount of literature on Belarus in English and Scandinavian languages has restricted the 
number of sources available and therefore I build upon a few main sources, while taken other 
relevant literature into consideration when available. However, I have not found this 
restriction to be a hinder for my work on Belarus. 
 The second case which I have chosen for comparison is Russia. The development with 
regard to regime type seems still un-finished in Russia today. The development in Russia has 
had and still has an important influence on its neighbouring countries. Russia has recently 
shown that they have greater ambitions for their political influence in both Europe and the 
world in general. Through its huge amount of natural recourses Russia has again gained 
considerable influence, something which has been experienced not only by countries as 
Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus but also by EU members as Poland and Estonia. Also Norway 
has experienced the Russian use of trade links as political pressure. Russia is without doubt 
the most important and influential country in the former Soviet Union. 
 Understanding the political development and the political system of Russia is of 
decisive importance for the future political interaction with Russia. The political system in 
Russia today is largely inherited from the Yeltsin era and the political games played during 
transition have had profound influence on how Russian politics are conducted today. It is 
therefore important to build theoretical well founded knowledge about the events during 
transition to understand the authoritarian tendencies which can be observed today and which 
are of growing concern to western observers. The formal and informal institutional design of 
present day Russia, which opens for these tendencies, is a direct result of the outcome of 
transition with regard to regime type. 
 When visiting both Russia and Belarus I have found these countries and their post-
Soviet development to be of great interest. I believe that by truly understanding the 
transitional development in these two important countries we can add valuable knowledge to 
transition and regime theory. 
 
A framework for understanding democracy and its alternatives 
For a study of democratisation and regime change it is important to have a clear and useful 
definition of the concept of democracy. There exist several different suggestions on how 
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democracy is to be defined. When one defines democracy in a study one should in addition to 
providing conceptual clarity also bare in mind that the definition is to fulfil a purpose in the 
study. Different definitions may fit different purposes. In large-N studies minimal definitions 
are often found to be most useful as in the study by Przeworski et al. (2000). On the other 
hand an expanded definition can be useful in case studies which seek to classify a regime in 
accordance with a number of characteristics of democracy as in the case of McFaul et al. 
(2004) who follow an expanded definition given by Diamond (1999). 
 I define democracy in accordance with the definition set forward by Dahl (1971) in his 
classical work of Polyarchy. Dahl sees democracy to be an ideal type which might not be 
found in the real world, but which functions as model of a regime which allows the citizens to 
formulate their preferences freely, to signify these preferences to other citizens and the 
government by individual or collective actions and finally to have their preferences weighed 
equally in the conduct of government (Dahl 1971: 2). From these three assumptions two 
dimensions are formed. These create a scale in which it will be possible to order different 
political systems. The two dimensions which constitute the framework for defining political 
regimes are the dimension of contestation and the dimension of participation (Dahl 1971). 
 Contestation reflects to what extend a regime allows the citizens to compete, through 
elites, freely and without limitations about representing the citizens. And it also reflects to 
what extend a regime secures institutions and procedures in order to equally allow publicly 
the creation and distribution of opinions. Furthermore it displays to what degree the 
procedures and institutions secure equal representation of the preferences and opinions which 
the citizens formulate. The dimension of contestation measures to what extend a regime has 
allowed the development of an arena for public competition, organised or not, in which elites 
can compete for the support of the citizens on an equal basis. This includes, amongst others, 
therefore rights of freedom speech, freedom to organise, equal access to information and 
channels of information. However, this dimension alone is not sufficient to define political 
regimes.  
 Participation reflects on the other hand to what extend a regime allows the citizens to 
equally take part in the political process. This does not only include to what extend the regime 
allows the citizens to participate in voting or the right to run for offices but also to what 
extend a regime allows citizens to fully and equally participate in all arenas of the public 
contestation. Within this framework for defining political regimes developed by Dahl (1971) 
democracies are regimes which to the largest extent grants both contestation and participation 
to its citizens. 
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Outline of the thesis 
In the following chapter I briefly discuss different theoretical approaches to the study of 
democratisation and regime change. Then I undertake the task of constructing the theoretical 
model to be used further on. Here the concepts of nested games and threatening power as 
tools to understand multi-dimensional conflict situations during transitions are introduced. In 
chapter three I point to the strength of applying a formal model to the study of transitions and 
the most important game theoretical concepts used are discussed. 
 Chapter four, five and six are the analytical chapters. In chapter four I start by 
discussing the historical and contextual features of Belarus which I believe to have influenced 
the formation of actor’s preferences during transition. Relevant conflict issues are also 
discussed in this chapter. Chapter five builds upon chapter four when modelling the games of 
social interaction during transition in Belarus and it discusses actors, preferences and effects 
of multi-dimensional conflicts upon the possibility of escaping sub-optimality. 
 Chapter six follows the frame of the previous two chapters. Here I discuss historical 
and contextual backgrounds of the Russian transition before turning to modelling the games 
of social interaction during the Russian transition. This includes a discussion of relevant 
conflict issues, actors and their preferences. Finally, this chapter applies the framework of 
threats as a tool to understand the possibility to escape from sub-optimality. 
 To conclude I sum up major findings, draw comparative conclusions and implications 
to theory. Furthermore I discuss the theoretical implications of this work and outline future 
challenges.  
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2. Theory 
In the beginning of this chapter I discuss different approaches to the study of democratisation. 
Following this the model applied to this study is discussed. This includes the core concepts of 
transition theory, proposal of hypothesises and introduction of the challenges created when 
democratisation occurs concurrent with economic transition and state- and nation-building. 
Approaches which I apply to study these challenges will be discussed at the end of this 
chapter.  
 
Approaches to the study of democratisation 
Study of regime change and democratisation often distinguished between two basic 
approaches, a structural and an actor oriented. The structural is emphasising structural, 
socioeconomic and cultural requisites for democracy. Most attention is given to change in 
long-term macro-processes to explain regime change (Colomer 2000). The actor-oriented 
approach gives attention to the actors and their choice of strategies during social interaction. 
The choices are stressed as explanatory factors for regime changes. In this approach political 
regimes and regime change are seen as the outcome of strategic interaction. 
 The role of socioeconomic and cultural structures as explanatory factors for the 
stability of political regimes were suggested after observation of contextual differences 
between the stable Anglo-American democracies and the failure of many continental 
democracies during in the interwar period (Colomer 2000: 133). These studies became the 
dominant approach in the 1950 and 1960. Lipset (1959: ; 1960) made an important 
contribution to this approach in which he suggested some requisites and conditions for the 
survival of democratic regimes. This led to the conclusion that the break down in the 
continental regimes in the interwar period was due to backward socioeconomic structures 
(Colomer 2000). Similar structural approaches have been made by Huntington (1968), 
Almond and Verba (1963: ; 1989), Skocpol (1979) and Moore (1967) stressing classes, 
political culture, modernisation and social structures as determinants of regime change, 
regime stability and regime breakdown.  
However, the relationships deducted from these studies have showed to be neither 
sufficient nor necessary conditions for establishment, consolidation or breakdown of 
democracies (Colomer 2000: 134). Empirical cases such as India, Portugal or the Eastern-
Europe communist regimes have shown that democracies can come about despite 
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unfavourable social and economic conditions. Furthermore, countries as Norway and Holland 
remained politically stable in the interwar period despite economic depression also in these 
countries (Colomer 2000). Linz and Stepan (1978) shows that the unsolvable problems of 
regimes are the work of the regime elites and not the work of financial instability. Moreover, 
Przeworski (1991: 96) says that in such structural approaches the formulation of the outcomes 
are uniquely determined by conditions, and history goes on without anyone ever doing 
anything.  
This thesis builds upon the actor-oriented approach and holds that the democratisation, 
liberalisation, transitions, regime change and regime breakdown are a consequence of 
different constellations of actors interacting in specific strategic situations. Actors represent 
different interests or segments in a country either this is specific elites, classes or groups. The 
actors will act rationally according to their preferences in order to maximise their utility. By 
interaction in strategic situations during a process of democratisation the actors will seek to 
maximise their utility according to their preferences, relative position and strength. This does 
not mean that actors act in a structural and historical vacuum. The preferences, the position 
and strength of the actors are formed by the historical and structural situation which they 
interact within. On the other hand the period of transition and liberalisation are in the longer 
perspective rather short term processes in which the normal rules of the political game are 
altered for a period. It is clear that democracies or dictatorships are not created by invisible 
macro structures, but by people (McFaul 2002: 214). Hence, the role of actors is particularly 
important to explain the outcome of democratisation, especially in cases with relatively 
similar contexts. The outcome reached as a result of transition whether it is democracy, 
dictatorship or some kind of a mix of these is the direct result of the actors’ social interaction 
about specific conflict issue, primarily the issue of constitution of a new framework for 
political interaction. The key to achieving a democratic outcome of this interaction lies 
therefore in actor’s ability to compromise upon the implementation of democratic reforms.  
The main theoretical concepts of liberalisation, transition, opening of the regime, 
regime deviations and pacts which create the foundation of theoretical tools for the analysis 
are based on the seminal work of O'Donnell, Schmitter, Prezeworski and Whitehead.2 I also 
bring into the theoretical model the work of Przeworski (1991: ; 1992) and Colomer (1991: ; 
1995: ; 2000) who apply formal game theoretical model to the strategic interaction of both the 
phase of liberalisation and the phase of transition. Micro-oriented studies, including the 
                                                 
2  O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986a: ; 1986b: ; 1986c: ; 1986d) 
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application of game theory, have also been applied to the study of democratisation by Geddes 
(1991) in South-America, Tvedt (2000: ; 2004) in the case of DDR, Altermark  (1998) in the 
Russian transition, Batty and Danilovic (1997) to the Russian liberalisation and Colomer 
(2000b) to the Polish transition. 
 Finally this thesis takes into account the work of Rustow (1970) and later on Linz and 
Stepan (1996: ; 1996b) as well as the methodological framework of Tsebelis (1990) and Hovi 
(1998) in an attempt to construct a model which takes into account the challenges created by 
simultaneous democratisation, state- and nation-building and economic reforms. The 
democratisation of non-democratic regimes can be divided into two distinct processes or 
periods.3 The first process is the opening and liberalisation of the former regime. This process 
is followed by the period of transition. However, the two processes are closely connected and 
the transition depends on the developments during the time of liberalisation. I will proceed by 
first discussing the concepts of liberalisation and transition followed by the actors and their 
possible strategies. Finally I will focus upon potential challenges of simultaneous multiple 
conflict issues during transition.  
 
Liberalisation 
The process of liberalising a dictatorship “takes off” when the authoritarian regime for some 
reason or another starts to tolerate that civil society organises outside the official channels 
which the regime previously has established4. New actors are granted the possibility to 
organise without meeting random suppression by the regime or its sympathisers (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986: 7). It is this change in politics that often is referred to as the opening of 
the non-democratic regime.  
The opening is often being regarded as a signal of a fractionalisation of the elites 
within the regime (Przeworski 1991: 55-6). The fractionalisation is a result of the fact that 
parts of the ruling elites start to recognise that the regime is facing some sort of a crisis. This 
crisis can be of political, social, ideological or economic character and will of course depend 
on the context. The fractionalisation of the regime is the reflection of a situation in which 
parts of the regime recognises this crisis, while other fractions do not recognise the condition 
                                                 
3 After these two distinct phases follows a phase of consolidation of democracy if the outcome is the result of a 
democratic compromise.  
4 This phase somewhat corresponds to the “prepatory” phase in Rustow (1970) 
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of the regime as being in a crises. The regime crisis clarifies and expedites the fragmentation 
of the regime. The fractions can be divided in two main groups. These groups are the 
hardliner fraction and the softliner fraction (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Hardliners is the 
group within the regime who believes that it is possible and desirable to uphold the status quo. 
By taking this position they do not recognise that the regime is facing some sort of a crisis. On 
the other hand the softliners believe that the ruling regime cannot survive the forthcoming 
crisis without expanding the social bases of the regime, reforming society and the economy 
and by obtaining legitimacy through more or less democratic procedures and elections 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 16; Przeworski 1991: 59-60; Colomer 2000). Without this 
fragmentation the regime will not be opened and therefore not tolerate an opposition. The 
softliners must also to some extend dominate or control the hardliners before they are able to 
open the regime. The hardliners are in favour of status quo and do not recognise the need for 
change. Hence, the softliners must be the dominating fraction within the regime or be able to 
reach some sort of compromise with the hardliners to be able to open the regime.  
 By these measures the regime hopes to be able to increase the regimes legitimacy, be 
able to survive the crisis and thereby uphold the regime. To expand the social basis of the 
regime the softliners want to open for organising in the civil society. If they manage to control 
the hardliners in such a way that they are able to promote an opening towards the civil society 
the regime will start liberalising from above (Przeworski 1991). The motivation for granting 
the possibility for organising autonomously from the regime to new groups can be found in 
the wish of the softliners to be able to cooperate with them at a later stage and over time 
integrate these new organisations into the regime. By doing so, they will be able to expand the 
social basis of the regime by including new segments of society into the ruling elites. When 
including new segments they also hope to be able to increase the legitimacy of the regime. 
This process of liberalisation does not have to start from above, but can also be initiated from 
below. If starting from below, segments in the civil society will start to organise and 
experience that they are no longer being repressed by the regime (Przeworski 1991: 56-7). 
The fact they are allowed to organise reflects that a fractionalisation has occurred in the 
regime and that the regime hopes to be able to interact with the autonomous elites. No matter 
how the liberalisation starts it is a process of the interaction between more or less organised 
autonomous actors in civil society and fractions of actors with the regime (Przeworski 1991: 
57).  
This interaction will presumably increase the expected utility of actors on both sides. 
The civil society actors get the opportunity to promote their preferences, goals and ideas 
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during the interaction with the regime actors. During the same interaction the softliners can 
alter the balance of power between the actors within the regime to their advantage by allying 
with the non-regime actors (Przeworski 1991: 57). Doing so they can get the opportunity to 
promote the reforms they believe is necessary to secure the survival of the regime and 
overcome the crisis they are facing. The fragmentation of the regime and an alteration of the 
balance of power give the autonomous organisations an increased scope for organising and a 
better opportunity to pursue their goals even through cooperation with regime fractions.  
When the regime chooses to open and liberalise this gives civil society the possibility 
to organise. If the regime allows this it must be because they believe that they have the 
possibility and capability to control the organising in the civil society. If they have this 
capability it is possible for them to incorporate the autonomous organisation into the regime 
and thereby to create a broadened dictatorship5 (Przeworski 1991). The outcome of 
liberalisation does not have to end with the expansion of regime legitimacy, the strengthening 
of the social basis and regime survival. The process of liberalisation is in itself an unstable 
process (Przeworski 1991: 58). It sparks several unforeseen processes that can lead to the 
breakdown of the non-democratic regime. The opening sparks organising in different 
segments of society. If the regime is not able to incorporate the newly formed organisations 
into the formal regime structures this opens the possibility to continue organising outside the 
regime and to pursue their goals without the regime being able to control the process 
(Przeworski 1991: 59). When the organisations stay autonomous and continue to promote 
their goals outside the regimes channels the softliners of the regime will not achieve their goal 
of increased legitimacy and increased social basis. In stead the organisations will, through 
their continued mobilisation, challenge the regime’s authority and legitimacy. By continuing 
to organise instead of being incorporated the autonomous organisation has the opportunity to 
create a real and possibly more legitimate alterative to the ruling regime. 
The creation of a political opposition that promotes alternative political ideas and 
which has an alternative political regime, than the present non-democratic regime, as its first 
preference opens for the possibility of the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. But only 
when a present regime is challenged by a real alternative with a larger degree of legitimacy 
and the incumbent regime no longer is willing or capable to use force to suppress the 
alternative the present regime may break down (Przeworski 1986: 52). The breakdown of a 
regime will lead to a regime transition. On the other hand it is possible for the regime to cling 
                                                 
5 A broadened dictatorship corresponds to a large extend to the result of the hybrid regime strategy 
 12
to the power by confronting its opponents by the use of force. This will lead to a violent clash 
in which the outcome is determined by the relative strength of the involved parties. To avoid a 
confrontation or a transition the regime therefore has to incorporate certain groups into the 
regime structures and suppress all other groups that do wish to be incorporated or that the 
regime does not wish to incorporate (Przeworski 1991: 60).  
Przworski (1991: ; 1992) presents a game model for analysis of the phase of 
liberalisation. The model shows four possible outcomes of a started liberalisation, when status 
quo no longer is an option. All outcomes mark the end of the first phase of democratisation, 
the liberalisation phase. If the regime manages to incorporate certain groups into the regime 
structures and at the same time suppresses other groups denying them the possibility to 
develop a real alternative to the current regime the liberalisation ends with the outcome which 
was intended by the softliner fraction. The result of this is referred to as a broadened 
dictatorship (BDIC) (Przeworski 1991: 62). 
Status quo 
dicatorship
BDIC
NDIC Insurrection Transition
Liberalisers
Civil Society
Liberalisers
OpenStay with hardliners
OrganiseEnter
Turn into reformers
Repress
r 1-r
The Game of LiberalisationFigure 2.1
 
If on the other hand the new organisations do not accept this strategy of being 
consumed by the regime or the regime does not repress them sufficiently the opposition can 
answer this attempt by organising and mobilising for further rights. In this phase it becomes 
possible for autonomous organisations to form a real alternative to the existing regime. The 
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more democratic the alternative is the greater is the legitimacy. If a further mobilisation is 
chosen by the autonomous organisations the regime can respond to this action in two ways. 
They can either attempt to repress the mobilisation or accept the demands for a new regime. A 
repression will mean the use of force by the regime. This action will therefore lead to a direct 
confrontation between the regime and its opponents. The outcome of a repression will be 
uncertain and dependent on the relative strain of the two parties. If an oppression of the 
challengers is successful (r<0.5) a narrowed dictatorship (NDIC) will be the result as the 
regime removes its opponents (Przeworski 1992: 111). If the challengers are the stronger 
party (r>0,5) the confrontation will lead to an insurrection with an uncertain outcome with 
regard to regime type (Przeworski 1992: 111). If the regime is not willing to or not able to 
oppress such a mobilisation by civil society the outcome of the liberalisation will be a regime 
transition (Przeworski 1991). If this strategy is chosen by the regime actor they have changed 
from liberalisers to reformers. The transition is the next process of democratisation and will 
be described in greater detail in the next section.  
The period of liberalisation of a non-democratic regime lays the foundation for the 
processes which are to come about later during the transition. It is in this period that the 
relevant actors for the transition process manifest themselves. The number of actors can be 
limited by the character of the liberalisation and the character of the previous regime. It is 
believed that totalitarian regimes which to a large extend control all segments and spheres of 
society, including private, economic and public spheres, as well as heavily limit the 
contestation can have a negative effect upon the numbers of actors who are relevant during 
the transition period. This implies that in transitions from totalitarian dictatorships, as in the 
former Soviet Union, one cannot expect to have interaction between all actor categories 
described in the transition literature. The transition games produced as a result of the 
liberalisation therefore often have a limited amount of the actors to be described in greater 
detail later in this thesis. As a further consequence, as this thesis has argued earlier, this will 
have an effect upon the outcome of the games, because the actor constellation is decisive for 
the outcome of transition. 
 
Transition 
The transition phase, which is the second part of democratisation that follows liberalisation in 
time, is defined by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 6) as the interval between one regime and 
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another. 6 This definition clearly defines the process is in time. The transition starts when a 
non-democratic regime breaks down as a result of the liberalisation. The transition ends when 
the rules, institutions and procedures of a new regime have been established and starts 
functioning. The period of transition is characterised by the absence of rules and 
predictability. The rules of political interaction are not defined during transition (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986: 6). But the rules of the game are constantly changing and are often 
contested by the actors in the transition. Hence, the actors in the transition are now acting in 
an undefined interval characterised by extreme uncertainty. The uncertainty of transition 
reflects that it is not possible to predict the outcome of the transition and the position of 
actors, classes groups or the future institutional framework ex ante to the phase (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986: 4-5). Hence, the phase of transition takes place under great uncertainty 
and as well as the suspension of the normal rules of the political interaction.  
In this process the actors do no longer only represent segments of society or specific 
elite interests but they are also going to define the further rules of the political game. By 
participating in this process they are deciding who are to be the future political winners and 
losers in the process that is yet unknown. During the interaction between different actors in 
the transition it is decided which actors are to be allowed to enter the political game as well as 
which means and resources are to be legitimate to employ to the political process. In the phase 
of transition the outcome of the interaction as well as the future political rules are not yet 
known to the actors. Hence, it is not possible for them to know with certainty their own 
position in the future regime. This assumption is valid for all actors in the transition, but if 
there is any actors that can alter the distribution of uncertainty during the transition this must 
be in the hands of those controlling the state structures, hence the incumbent or former 
authoritarian rulers. These actors have due to their control over the state structures, the 
possibility to use these structures and the power they thereby possess to attempt to control, 
reverse or limit the transition. This does not mean that they will succeed in such an attempt, 
but it gives them a lager degree of influence than their opponents outside of the regime. 
Karl and Schmitter (1991: 274-7) identify four modes or paths of the Latin-American 
transitions, by pact, reform, imposition or revolution. They specify the modes by 
distinguishing between actors as elites or masses as well as outlining two different strategies 
as either compromise or force. In other words the actors can choose between a multilateral 
strategy as opposed to an unilateral strategy. If the dominant actors in the transition are elites 
                                                 
6 This phase somewhat corresponds to the “decision” phase in Rustow (1970) 
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who follow a multilateral strategy, this will produce a transition which is labelled as pacted. 
This happens when elites cooperate and reach a compromise among themselves. If they on the 
other hand choose a unilateral strategy the transition will be an imposition from above in 
which some elites dictate their preferred outcome upon the other actors. When the actors are 
masses that decide to follow a multilateral process of non violent mobilisation they thereby 
impose a reformed transition. If the masses decide to follow the unilateral strategy in a violent 
uprising this will lead to a revolutionary transition. These four different modes of transition 
are ideal types. It is possible to have transitions which follow mixed strategies as well as 
transitions that consist of both elite and masse actors. The pacted mode is suggested by Karl 
and Schmitter (1991: 280-1) to be most favourable to a democratic outcome of the transition 
while mass actors with a unilateral strategy are the least likely one to lead to a democratic 
outcome. The approach suggested by Karl and Schmitter falls into the same fallacy as 
Przeworski (1991: 91) criticises the O’Donnal and Schmitter approach; while focusing upon 
actors, elites and strategies they are being stuck in the macro language of modes, classes and 
“pacts of dominations”. By doing so they fall short of adopting a genuine micro-perspective 
and an ahistorical approach to transitions, even though it seems to be the intention to form a 
micro-approach distinct from the structural approach.  
Pacts are defined by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 37) as an explicit agreement 
among a selected set of actors that seek to define rules governing the exercise of power on the 
basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those actors entering into it. Even though 
pacts are to be explicit in form they need not to be known to the public. This thesis will argue 
in the later chapters that pacts can be important and in some cases necessary in order for 
actors to reach compromises. This is because pacts can secure the vital interests of some 
actors and thereby help actors to move from sub-optimal conflict situations to optimal 
compromise solutions. Pacts can help actors to reach a compromise of democracy. Even 
though pacts in transition theory are suggested to have a positive impact upon democratisation 
they are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democracy to appear. And thereby 
pacts are under no circumstances a necessary condition for the application of transition theory 
which seems to have been imagined by some area specialists such as McFaul (2002) or 
Melville (2000) who claim that transition theory cannot be applied to post-Soviet transition 
due to the lack of public known pacts in these transitions. 
These suggestions reflect that elite interaction and cooperation during the transition 
are most likely to give a positive outcome with regard to democracy. In other words 
democracy is thought to be a result of a compromise between competing elites interacting 
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under great uncertainty in the phase of transition to secure the best possible outcome for the 
actor who ends up in the worst position under the new rules of the political game. Tvedt 
(1994) has shown how it is rational for actors to take this position when interacting about the 
future rules of the game under the Rawlsian veil. The Rawlsian veil suggests that the actors, 
due to uncertainty, are not able to predict their future position in the political system and are 
also unable to know their future strength or support. In this situation each of the conflicting 
rational actors will seek to establish institutions that provide some sort of guarantees against 
temporary political adversity, unfavourable tides of opinion and contrary shifting alliances 
(Przeworski 1991: 87). And thereby they secure their vital interests even if they end up in an 
unfortunate position after the transition. Such an outcome is believed to be a democracy. If the 
transition leads to the establishment of a democracy then the transition period often ends up 
with what is known as the founding election. The founding election marks the agreement on 
new rules of the game and new framework for political interaction. New institutions will then 
be in place.  
Przeworski (1991) discusses two distinct conflict issues which can be identified in a 
transition to democracy, one concerning extrication from the authoritarian regime and another 
concerning constitution of democracy. The conflict of extrication arises between the 
supporters and the opponents of democracy. To bring about democracy the supporters of 
democracy must unite against segments that support authoritarianism (Przeworski 1992: 116). 
Hence, actors who support democracy whether they are reformers from the former regime or 
segments in civil society must put their differences aside and unite in the struggle against 
authoritarian forces. This becomes especially important if authoritarian actors possess power 
over institutions of repression such as the military, the secret police or the other groups that 
possess power used to repress political opponents. During the process of extraction these 
groups are put under effective civilian control and are no longer used to suppress political 
opponents. This can either be the result of a failed military adventure or a failed coup d'état 
that was supported by some of these segments or as a result of actors reaching a compromise 
where guarantees are given to groups from the former regime to secure their position after the 
transition. Such agreements on protection of certain actors’ positions and privileges as well as 
agreements on how to constitute the institutions are often described as pacts (O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986). The existence of pacts are widely agreed upon to have a positive impact of 
the establishment of democracy as well as the later consolidation of democracy. 
The second process during transition that are mentioned by Przeworski (1991: 79-80) 
is the constitution of the institutional framework for the post authoritarian political system.  
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During this process the actors which are present during the transition engage in cooperation 
about the rules and structures of the future political game. Decisions are made about questions 
such as to choose between a presidential, a semi-presidential or a parliamentary system, 
whether to choose a proportional representation or majority representation in elections, how to 
divide electoral districts and to define the role of institutions such as courts and the role of 
interest groups and political parties. Constitution also includes the democratisation of the 
regime (Przeworski 1992). A democratic outcome resulting from a transition always involves 
negotiations between segments of the former regime and segments of the newly formed civil 
society organisations about which form of system that are to become the outcome of the 
transition (Przeworski 1991: 80).  
The actors in the transition do know the effect that the different political institutions 
can have on representation. It is no secret to them that single member districts and first past 
the post systems tend to produce two party systems. Or that proportional representation in 
large electoral districts with a low threshold will give small interest groups the possibility for 
representation. It is therefore possible for the actors to form political goals and ideas about the 
outcome of the transition process. They can also rank their preferences about possible 
outcomes. Political institutions and arrangements can alter the distribution of both economic 
and political resources. Hence, the design of institutions and procedures that are the outcome 
of the transition can alter the relations between actors by making some actors better off than 
others. What determines the outcome of the interaction of the actors is suggested by 
Przeworski (1991: 81-2) to be the degree of uncertainty and the relative position of the actors 
during the transition. Hence, it is a matter of whether the balance of power between the actors 
is evenly or unevenly distributed and if this distribution of power is known or unknown to the 
actors. 
From these assumptions tree hypotheses can be derived about how democracies come 
about during transitions. If the distribution of power is known and uneven this will lead to the 
establishment of institutions and procedures that are custom-made for the actor who is the 
most powerful actor during the phase of transition (Przeworski 1991: 82). This will lead to a 
regime that clearly favours one party over the others, and puts this actor in a position to 
widely use the power apparatus in his favour. On the other hand this design is believed only to 
be stable as long as the distribution of power remains stable in favour of that actor or actor 
group. Instability will occur when the distribution of power is altered and its relations become 
known to the actors. (This hypothesis can explain both the transition and revolutions in 
Georgia and Ukraine). A second condition happens when the balance of power also is known 
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but evenly distributed. Przeworski (1991: 83) describes this as the most complex situation. 
With actors having strong preferences about alternative ways of organising the political game 
the situation has no equilibrium in pure strategy and the interaction is therefore locked into a 
constant conflict between actors. An outcome is only possible when the actors observe that no 
solution can be obtained unilaterally. Then actors can solve the conflict situation by accepting 
suboptimal compromises (Przeworski 1991: 84). The third situation that can be derived from 
the assumptions is a situation in which the relations of power are not known to the actors 
during transition. This situation reflects the one earlier described in which a transition is 
characterised by great uncertainty in which actors make decisions under the Rawlsian veil. 
This situation is believed to be the most favourable for a democratic outcome of the transition. 
The two conflicts that are described above are not necessarily the only two conflicts 
present in a transition. Conflicts about economic reforms or the future structure of state can 
also be present or even be dominate issues during transition. I will return to this later when 
discussing the possibility for nested games in the post-Soviet transition.  
 
Outcomes of transitions 
Outcomes of regime transitions have shown not to be uniform. Even though the third wave of 
transitions has lead to significant more political freedom in the world far from all transitions 
ends up with a democratic regime. It is therefore fruitful to divide the outcome of transitions 
into several groups. This thesis will argue for a tripartition for classifying political regimes as 
outcomes of transitions. Within these groups there are a great variety of institutional designs 
or political procedures. Within a group of democracies it is possible to identify several 
subgroups such as parliamentary democracies, presidential democracies or consociated 
democracies. Also non-democratic regimes can be further divided into for instance 
authoritarian, totalitarian or sultanistic regimes.7 To classify the countries specifically into 
different subgroups of regimes are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to reflect the 
recent findings and theoretical discussions about regimes which seem to have ended in a 
“gray zone” between democracy and dictatorship this thesis will adopt tree broad categories 
of regimes types as outcomes of transitions and possible strategies for actors. 
 The first category of regime outcomes is the establishment of a democratic regime 
according to the definition adopted from Dahl (1971) and discussed in an earlier section. 
                                                 
7 See for instance Linz (2000), Linz and Stepan (1996), Rose et al. (1998) or Chehabi and Linz (1998) 
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Democracies, no matter how they are organised with regard to institutions, elections or 
procedures, all allow a large extend of both participation as well as contestation. At all times 
democracies has to some extend violated this assumption. But what is characteristic of such 
violations of either participation or contestation in a democracy is that they are random, non-
systematic or unintended as well as regarded by all significant players to be unacceptable 
incidents in general. 
 On the opposite end of the scale we find classical non-democratic dictatorships as the 
Soviet regime. Such regimes do significantly limit the dimensions of participation and 
contestation. Even though some regimes may allow a certain degree of participation in 
election or organisation this is always in control of the regime and without sufficient choice of 
alternatives. Other regimes have tried to imitate contestation by allowing supposedly 
alternatives to exist but without ever being able to constitute a real and independent alterative 
to the incumbent rulers. 
 In the last years still more attention has been turned to the outcomes of transitions that 
does not fit into the classic concepts of non-democratic regimes. Regimes which holds 
elections, tolerate some pluralism and competition, but at the same time severely and 
systematically violates and manipulates the dimensions of democracy has appeared as a result 
of transitions (Schedler 2002a: 36). The systematic way that the rules of the game are 
manipulated, often in advantage of the incumbent rulers, makes it difficult to classify them as 
democratic. At the same time these regimes do not regularly use repression to stay in power. 
In stead they try to attain legitimacy by imitating democratic institutions and procedures, such 
as elections, without seriously allowing the uncertainty of the democratic procedures that are 
a premise for democracy. By doing this they effectively alter the rules of the game in favour 
of the incumbent rulers. Regimes which fit this description have been given different names 
by different authors often reflecting specific features of specific regimes. These regimes can 
as authoritarian regimes or democratic regimes be divided into several subgroups by 
describing the specific way that or to what degree the dimensions of contestation and 
participation are manipulated. An example of how this is done can be found in Schedler’s 
(2002a) article on the “menu of manipulation”. For the purpose of this thesis it is found useful 
to group the regimes matching the above description into one category. I have chosen to label 
this group by the typology first used by Karl (1995) and later by Diamond (2002) and name 
them “hybrid regimes”. This reflects that they draw upon features from both democratic 
regimes with regard to attaining legitimacy from democratic procedures and from non-
democratic regimes when showing that they are willing to systematically manipulate and alter 
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the rules of the game. 
 
 While the democratic regimes aim to maximise the degree of both the dimensions of 
participation and contestations non-democratic regimes score poorly on either one or both. 
The group of hybrid regimes places themselves in the “grey zone” in between the regimes 
classified as democratic and the group of regimes that falls into the category of non-
democratic regime. They score significantly lower on both dimensions than democracies due 
to the willingness of system manipulation. But at the same time they score significantly higher 
than authoritarian regimes since they attempt to gain legitimacy by imitating democracy. The 
liberal character and higher tolerance of contestation and participation of these hybrid regimes 
make them more vulnerable to further regime change which has been experienced in Ukraine, 
Georgia, Yugoslavia and Kirgizstan. Within this framework of regimes I expect Russia to 
possess the characteristics of a hybrid regime while I expect Belarus to have turned towards a 
more non-democratic regime type.  
The specification of three categories of regime outcome of a transition makes it 
possible to differentiate between strategies available to actors when engaging in social 
interaction about the future character of a regime. This thesis argues for the availability of 
three broad strategies to actors as alternative strategies to the conflict issue of constitution of 
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new institutions during a transition phase. These three strategies reflect the three outcomes 
which have been discussed previously. A similar approach have been made by Colomer 
(1991: ; 1995: ; 2000) with different terms but reflecting the same strategies. The first strategy 
is the strategy of democracy which reflects an actor’s wish to establish a democratic regime. 
The second strategy available is the strategy of status quo which reflects the actor’s wish to 
return to a non-democratic regime as previous to the phase of liberalisation. The final strategy 
available to the actors is the strategy of a hybrid regime which reflects the wish for broader 
and reformed dictatorship imitating democratic features to gain legitimacy while manipulation 
the political game in order for the incumbents to remain in power.8 By using this division of 
strategies and the distinction between hardliner, softliners and actors in civil society it is 
possible to create a typology of six distinct actor fractions interacting in a transition. 
 
Actors in transition 
As earlier mentioned the start of the process of democratisation is a result of a fragmentation 
of actors within the ruling regime. The set of actors which becomes visible as a result of the 
opening of the regime is most often referred to as hardliners  and softliners (O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986: 15-7). The group of softliners can be divided from the hardliners by their 
recognition of the coming crises the regime is facing. They recognise that to stay in power the 
regime has to expand legitimacy and introduce reforms. The goal for this acknowledgement is 
to be able to stay in power and avoid crises and a possible breakdown of the authoritarian 
regime, not to introduce democracy. The hardliners do not recognise that the need for change 
is necessary to be able to uphold the authoritarian system. They believe that the status quo is 
both possible and preferable to reforms. 
 The opening of the regime and the following liberalisation open the possibility for 
actors outside the regime to organise and create alternatives independently of the regime. 
These actors who are not members of the regime are often referred to as the opposition. The 
opposition actors are believed to prefer the introduction of a democratic system. Under a 
democratic system they will have the possibility to compete for the support of the people and 
if being able to win power. This will not be possible for the actors in the opposition under 
                                                 
8 The strategy of a hybrid regime is a reflection of the same goals as the strategy of a broadened dictatorship in 
Przeworski (1991: ; 1992),the strategy of intermediate regime in Colomer (2000) and the strategy of reform in 
Colomer (1991: ; 1995) 
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non-democratic rule. Hence, the opening and later liberalisation of the non-democratic regime 
may allow a gradual formation of a variety of actors with different strategic options and 
different preferences to the question which are central to the liberalisation, to which degree 
the rules of political game shall be changed (Colomer 2000: 31). 
 Colomer (2000) further divides these three main groups of actors into two subgroups 
radical and moderate actors within hardliner, softliner and opposition segments. A division 
between radicals and moderates does not necessarily reflect a division of interests or goals but 
do to a larger extend reflect the actors risk aversion (Przeworski 1991). In general moderate 
actors tends to avoid risks to a larger extend than the radicand they are more risk averse. A 
moderate will try to avoid confrontation, and are more willing to compromise. The moderate 
actor fears their opponents to a larger extend than the radical actors. This opens the possibility 
for pressuring moderate actors to cooperate and compromise by threatening with alliances 
with other players if they do not acquiesce. In this way softliners can for instance pressure 
moderate segments in the opposition to enter into agreements with them by threatening to ally 
with hardliners if they to not enter. Since radical actors are willing to confront their opponents 
they will not be scared by such threats. Radical are willing to take the risk of a confrontation, 
and believe that they can win a confrontation with other actors. This makes them less willing 
to compromise. 
 A characteristic that divides the groups of opposition actors from the groups of actors 
originating in the regime is the clearly asymmetrical relation between the number of actors on 
each side, their organisation, their access to recourses, hence their relative strength. The 
regime actors control over the state structure for a longer period have given them an 
advantage with regard to organising and positioning themselves concerning the future changes 
(Colomer 2000: 38). Similarly, actors in the opposition suffer from the lack of possibility to 
organise in a totalitarian society prior to the phase of liberalisation. Opposition organisation 
has often occurred simultaneous to persecution and suppression by regime institutions leading 
to an asymmetric power relation between the regime actors and opposition actors in a 
transition phase as well as internally between opposition actors. The relatively weaker 
position of the opposition groups can, according to Colomer (2000: 38), pave the way for a 
unification of opposition forces in defence of democracy during transition. Since the 
opposition actors possess relatively less power than the regime actors in the transition phase it 
is rational to expect that they are in danger of ending up in the worst position after the 
transition if the regime actors are willing and able to utilize their relative stronger position in 
the democratisation process. Hence, it is rational for a weaker opposition actor to support a 
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political system that secures the position of the ones which end up in the worst position after 
the transition; this is believed to be a democratic political system. 
 The division of the actors described above creates a set of six groups of actor that can 
be identified in a process of democratisation. In the transition phase of democratisation, 
during the process of constitution, the actors face the question on what kind of regime that is 
to be the outcome of the transition. As earlier argued it is possible to identify three logical 
outcomes of the transition. For each actor the outcomes can be ranked from the most preferred 
outcome to the least preferred. This ranking of the outcomes constitutes the different actor 
groups strategies on the question of regime outcome. The set of strategies that is connected to 
each group of actors does not bind the actors to a specific ideological position, but determines 
only the actors attitude towards the present and their preferences for the future regime 
(Colomer 2000: 37).  
 The first priority of the actors determines which of the three main group of actors that 
they belong to (Colomer 2000). The two opposition actors both prefer democracy as an 
outcome over all other outcomes. The softliner groups of actors recognise the need for 
change, but are not entirely willing to subject to the uncertainty of democracy. They wish to 
be able to extract legitimacy from democratic institutions and procedures but are not willing 
to introduce uncertainty that can send them out of office. They are therefore willing to 
manipulate the system and prefer a hybrid regime to all other outcomes. Hardliners on the 
other hand do not recognise the need for change. They believe that it is both possible and 
desirable to return to a status quo dictatorship as before the process of democratisation started.  
 Within the opposition group the distinction between moderates and radicals is 
reflected in the outcomes that are regarded as the second and third best outcomes. The 
moderate actor is less willing to take risks than the radical actor, and fears to a larger degree 
his opponents. The moderate players tend therefore to avoid confrontation and are more 
willing to enter into compromises and agreements with other actors in the transition. The 
moderate actor is willing to accept a compromise that only partly fulfils the actors goal. By 
prioritising a hybrid regime in favour of a return to dictatorship the moderate player believes 
that a hybrid regime might open a opportunity for them to promote further change at a later 
stage (Colomer 2000: 39). Schedler (2002b) further develops this logic in a nested game of 
post transitional democratisation, showing how actors accept suboptimal strategies when 
seeing the outcome of the interaction as a final outcome. The radical actor will rather see a 
return to a dictatorship than accepting the half way solution that a hybrid regime represents. 
Hence, they prioritise status quo dictatorship over hybrid regime. This also reflects their 
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greater willingness to accept risks. They are not afraid of confronting their opponents, even if 
it means loosing the confrontation. 
 Softliners are the group within the regime that recognises the need for change, most 
often by foreseeing and accepting forthcoming crises of legitimacy which need to be met by 
expanding the legitimacy of the regime. They are the architects of the reforms during the 
liberalisation phase and are a necessity for opening of the regime and the following 
democratisation. The goal of the change is not democracy, but to overcome the crisis so they 
can stay in power. The moderate softliners fear democracy to a larger degree than the radicals. 
Faced with the threat of democracy the moderate softliners will attempt to ally with hardliners 
to rescue their position and hinder democracy (Colomer 2000: 39). Moderates do not believe 
that they will succeed under democracy. Radicals on the other hand consider their own 
chances under democracy to be greater. They regard the risk of loosing elections to be less 
costly than to abandoning the reform. They strongly believe that the regime will go under 
without reform. They are also willing to threaten hardliners with joining the democrats if they 
do not enter into compromise with the softliner fractions (Colomer 2000: 39). While the 
radicals are willing to accept the risks that are associated with the democratic system the 
moderates tend to try to avoid them. Radicals regard reforms as more important than the 
danger of being voted out of office in democratic elections. 
 The hardliner fractions wish to preserve their position in the regime and therefore 
attempt to return to the dictatorship and the status quo. They do not recognise the need for 
change or that a crisis of legitimacy is forthcoming. But the moderate hardliner, like other 
moderate actors, are less risk adverse than radical players. They act to reduce the risk of 
interaction. Hence, they are more willing to compromise than to confront opponents. By 
entering into compromises with softliner fractions they may be able to avoid the risk of 
confronting the opposition or an alliance between softliners and opposition segments 
promoting democracy. Moderate hardliners can enter into compromises of a hybrid regime 
when facing external pressure (Colomer 2000: 40). If they do so it will be to secure their 
privileges, interests and to avoid the fear of democratic change. The moderate hardliners have 
a hybrid regime as their second strategy and democracy as their worst. The radical hardliners 
do not fear their opponents to the same extend as the moderate hardliners. They think that 
they can win a confrontation with other actors. Hence, they believe to have more to gain from 
a confrontation than from igniting in compromises and cooperation with other actors. To save 
their positions they are willing to seek conflicts believing that conflict can save the 
dictatorship (Colomer 2000: 40). Hence, they have democracy as their second strategy and 
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hybrid regime as their worst. It is very likely that attempts to stop or reverse the process of 
democratisation or liberalisation by coups or plots will come from the radical segment within 
the hardliners (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 16). The strategies of the actors in the process 
of constitution under transition are outlined in the table above. 
Actors and strategies during transitions
Hybrid 
regime
DemocracyStatus QuoDemocracyStatus QuoHybrid 
regime
3.
DemocracyHybrid 
regime
DemocracyStatus QuoHybrid 
regime
Status Quo2.
Status QuoStatus QuoHybrid 
regime
Hybrid 
regime
DemocracyDemocracy1.
RadicalsModeratesRadicals Moderates ModeratesRadicals
HardlinereSoftlinereOppositionStrategy
Table 2.1
 
All of these actors may not be present in the process of transition. There are many 
factors that can limit the number of actors in the transition. The process of liberalisation may 
be interrupted by a sudden claps of the authoritarian triggered by a critical event before all 
actors has emerged. Linz and Stephan (1996: 55-66) argue that the former type of non-
democratic regime can influence the actor constellations during transitions. They argue that 
the limited autonomy of civil society within totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes can have 
a negative effect on development of strong opposition groups. This can result in games with 
fewer actors or different actors than transitions from non-totalitarian dictatorships.  
 
Explaining maximalist strategies 
To make a further distinction between actors we can investigate how they grade the outcomes 
of the transition in their different strategies. The three outcomes argued for earlier can be 
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ranked with regard to the degree of change from the former regime. When doing so 
democracy will represent the largest degree of change from the dictatorship, while the re-
establishment of a dictatorship will represent the least degree of change from the former non-
democratic regime. The outcome of a hybrid regime is placed between these two extremes 
with regard to change from the former regime. Actors that grade their preferred outcomes 
according to the degree of change in their strategies can be characterised as gradualists 
(Colomer 2000: 40). This means that if they cannot obtain their first preference in a situation 
of strategic interaction with other actors they will prefer the outcome that is closest to their 
initial priority compared to the one that are farthest off. The rationality of such a choice is 
rather straightforward, a gradualist actor that cannot get all will rather settle for half than 
nothing. The moderate hardliners, moderate softliners, moderate opposition as well as the 
radical softliners all have gradualist strategies. This makes four of the six actors gradualists. 
 This leaves two players with a maximalist choice of strategies. The radical hardliner 
and the radical opposition both prefer the two extreme outcomes over the middle course. The 
maximalist actor will prefer the outcome that represents either the largest degree of change or 
lowest degree of change. This somewhat odd choice of strategy may seem irrational at first 
sight. To uncover the rationality in the strategy of a maximalist actor a closer elaboration is 
needed. Not until we understand all aspects of how the actor forms his strategy the rationality 
of the actor can be illuminated. 
According to Colomer (2000: 42) maximalist behaviour can be explained in two ways 
in a rational analysis, either as a question of risk aversion or as an expression of a more or less 
veiled multi-dimensional conflict structure. If explained by the willingness of taking risks, as 
earlier attempted, the actor’s tendency to risk depends on the actor’s subjective estimate of the 
success attached to the relevant strategies in combination with their expected utility gains 
attached to the strategies. The more relative power the actor possesses the larger is the actor’s 
estimates of winning a confrontation over less powerful actors. Hence, the estimate of success 
attached to a particular strategy is larger. Actors both in the regime and in civil society 
possess power, even though the concrete nature might differ. The larger the degree of utility 
that an actor attaches to a strategy compared to the other strategies the higher the cost of 
abandoning the strategy. If the relative cost of abandoning the most preferred strategy in 
favour of the second best strategy is high, the actor is more willing to enter into conflict than 
if the costs are low. This is the situation when actors attain much higher utility from their 
most preferred strategy than from other strategies. Hence, the more to loose the more there is 
to fight for. These two factors combined decide the actors risk adversetion. 
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The second explanation suggests understanding maximalist strategies as caused by 
situations in which more than one conflict issue is present simultaneous. Actors give different 
attention to the different conflict issues or dimensions. However, the existence of more than 
one conflict dimension can, under certain circumstances force actors to take choices on 
several dimensions simultaneously. This creates what Tsebelis (1990) describes as a nested 
game situation. Strategic interaction about more than one issue simultaneously can force 
actors to make apparently sub-optimal choices or follow suboptimal strategies. Hence, actors 
apparently have a maximalistic behaviour when only one conflict issue or dimension is 
considered alone. The most salient conflict dimension for the maximalist actors influence the 
creation of strategies on the underlying dimension which is regarded as the most important by 
the other actors (Colomer 2000: 44). In such a situation apparently sub-optimal strategy 
choices become rational and optimal when attention is turned towards all relevant issues and 
strategies that are a part of the nested game situation. It is only when the dimensions are kept 
separate that the strategies will cause confusion and appear irrational. 
As argued earlier actors in control of the state apparatus, the incumbent regime actors, 
have a larger possibility to affect the agenda during democratisation. They might, at least for a 
period, be able to control and impose a selection of issues to be dealt with during transition 
(Colomer 2000: 45). Actors with low influence on the agenda setting are then forced to play 
on the agenda set by the actors close to the incumbent rulers even if they regard other issues 
more important. They easily end up as losers in the transition and may turn to actions such as 
boycotting the existing agenda or if they possess the necessary power to overthrow the agenda 
setters by a coup d'état or by mass mobilisation. If they are left out of the compromises and 
interaction during transition maximalist may create instability not only during transition but 
also long after the transition phase.  
 
Multi-dimensional conflicts in post-Soviet transitions 
An actor oriented approach to understand democratisation implies, unlike more structural 
approaches, very few request or preconditions for development of democracy. Rustow (1970: 
350-2) argues for only one single background condition for transition model. He claims that 
the only precondition for a country to become democratic is that the vast majority of the 
citizens in the country has no doubts or reservations about to which political community they 
belong (Rustow 1970: 350). This means that the majority of the people living within the 
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borders of a given country, that are going through democratisation, must regard this country 
as the only legitimate unity for a sovereign state structure on the territory. Without this 
precondition intact the political processes and institutions undergoing change have no 
legitimacy and therefore neither any relevance over time. The process of establishing national 
unity has taken place very differently in time in different countries. To avoid any negative 
effects on the chances of democratisation the process of creating national unity must be 
finished by the time democratisation starts. A simultaneous process of democratisation and 
establishment of national unity can cause problems for the transition and later consolidation of 
a democracy. 
 A similar argument is made by Linz and Stepan (1996: 16-37) under the term of  
“stateness”. They point to the distinction between the concepts of nations and states and the 
problem that may arise when the two are not coincident. The core of their argument is that 
when nations and states become conflicting logics this can create problems for transitions to 
democracy as well as for consolidation of democracy. The conflicting logic between nations 
and states can arise from a situation where two or more nations live in the same state or where 
nations live in separate states. The problem arises when a larger group within one of the 
involved nations no longer recognises the state they live in as the only legitimate unity for a 
state formation. They may wish to join another state, as the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina or the Albanians in Serbia or wish to form their own state as the Basks in Spain. 
If these requests and alternative state ideas win the support from larger segments of the 
members that regard themselves as members of a specific nation and thereby wish to exit 
from the state to join another state or form a new state this can serious undermine the 
legitimacy of the state in transition. Lost of legitimacy can undermine the existence of the 
state and without a unit to build a regime in this is truly difficult. 
 Furthermore, Linz and Stepan (1996b: 23-25) go thoroughly into the possible 
obstacles proposed by stateness. Difficulties may arise when nation building and 
democratisation becomes conflicting logics during the phase of transition. The creation of 
national identity often happens in conflict with democratic principles. The issues of nation-
building, state-building and democratisation can only be addressed with success if almost all 
of the residents of the state identify with the same idea of the nation and the state and this idea 
virtually coincides with the state (Linz and Stepan 1996b: 24). Neither can there be any 
significant irredentism from other states. The greater national diversity and the more 
competing identities existing in a state the more challenges are present for the elites during the 
transition and later consolidation, especially if these issues arise simultaneously. Hence, in 
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nations with severe stateness issues the processes of nation- and state-building can appear as 
obstacles to democratisation when these conflicts create identities which become conflicting 
ideologies or conflicting identities to democracy and democratisation. 
 Linz and Stepan  (1996: 367)  state that severe problems of stateness are found in the 
democratisation of the Soviet Union. Also in Rustow’s terms the transitions are believed to be 
influenced negatively by the lack of consensus about which political community the republics 
should belong to. In both Russia and Belarus this question about the future structure of the 
state and which political and territorial community it ought to belong to was brought to the 
top of the agenda during the phase of liberalisation and it followed the political agenda into 
the phase of transition. The debate was slightly different between the two countries but was in 
essence about the same question; how to define the future nature of the state. The essential 
question in Russia was whether to build a Russian nation state or aim for a Russian dominated 
imperial state including Russia and several other Soviet republics. The question in Belarus 
became relevant after the collapse of the union and focused on whether to build a strictly 
Belarusian nation state or to seek to re-establish the Soviet Union in some form or another. 
This thesis will return to these specific conflict dimensions in later chapters. These conflicts 
rose to become the central conflict dimension at the latest stage of liberalisation in the Soviet 
Union, overshadowing all other conflicts (Szporluk 1991: ; Marples 2004) 
 This thesis will apply the concept of a nested game to the analyses of Belarus in the 
following chapter. To understand democratisation in Belarus as a situation of a nested game it 
will be useful to uncover what may appear as sub-optimal choices, strategies and outcomes 
and not as irrational behaviour but as an effect of a multi-dimensional conflict structure 
during the process of democratisation. In the case of Belarus the conflict created by nation-
building and multiple identities is examined closer by the application of these techniques. 
According to Tsebelis (1990: 7) what is often observed as sub-optimal behaviour is often a 
result of a disagreement between observer and actor about which arena or dimension the 
actors strategies and preferences are formed. One reason for this is that the observer often 
fails to recognise that the dimension of primary focus, for instance the process of extrication 
or constitution during transition, may not be the only one the actor is forming his preferences 
and strategies on. Other dimensions may have considerable influence on the actor’s 
behaviour. Sometimes actors even regard this conflict as more urgent than the conflict of 
primary attention. The choices will only remain sub-optimal when one dimension or arena is 
considered separately (Tsebelis 1990: 7). When taking into account all arenas and conflicts 
that are relevant for the actor’s formation of preferences choices will no longer appear 
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suboptimal. It is therefore important to bring these conflict dimensions into an analysis if 
aiming to uncover the strategies of the actors. 
 A second reason for observation of suboptimal behaviour can be that the actors are 
involved in a game about the rules of the game (Tsebelis 1990: 8). The number of available 
options is limited when considering the primary arena alone. The actor is taking suboptimal 
choices as steps to expand the number of available choices. By taking steps to change the 
rules of the game the number of possible choices increases and optimal choices become 
possible. The actor is involved in both the game in the primary arena as well as a game about 
the rules of the game in which the rules may be variable but in which the set of possible 
choices are considerable larger. Within this larger framework of games the actor is offered 
better choices than within the primary game. I will return to the specific techniques suggested 
by Tsebelis (1990) when building the specific game models in the analytical chapters of the 
two countries.  
 In the case of Russia this thesis applies a different technique to examine the apparent 
suboptimal choices of the actors. To survey the possibility for achieving Pareto-optimality in 
that case the threatening power of the actors participating in the final interaction is discussed 
in further depth. Threats and threatening power can in this particular situation be used to 
further investigate the outcomes of the social interaction. A threat can be defined as: 
  
“a contingent assertion signalling an intention to hurt somebody –physically, economically or otherwise 
– unless that somebody acts in the way prescribed by the threatener. The threatened damage may be 
inflicted on the target directly or indirectly.” (Hovi 1998: 11).  
 
This definition of a threat includes both threats in which the threatener attends or do not 
attends to carry out the threat. The real intention of the threatener does not need to be known 
for a statement to be regarded as a threat. The purpose of a conditional threat is to change the 
behaviour of the threatened in the way the threatener intended when setting forward the threat. 
The threat is conditional when it will only be put into effect if the threatened fails to comply 
with the demands of the threat. On the other hand an unconditional threat will signals an 
intention which is to be carried out regardless of the action of the threatened (Hovi 1998: 13). 
The threats considered in this thesis are regarded as being conditional since they are set 
forward in order to change the behaviour of one of the actors in order to reach a Pareto-
optimal outcome. 
 If the threat leading to a change of behaviour in accordance with the threatener’s 
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desire the threat can be regarded as being effective (Hovi 1998: 13). According to Hovi 
(1998) five criteria must be fulfilled for the threat to be effective. The threat must be relevant, 
severe, credible, complete and clear to be efficient. The relevance of the threat refers to that 
the threat can have an impact upon the outcome of the interaction. For this to be possible the 
target must have the freedom to change its behaviour in accordance with the wish of the 
threatened desire and the target must also have the initiative to act contrary to the threatener’s 
desire (Hovi 1998: 13-14). There is no need to threaten someone who already behaves in the 
way one wishes and a threat is not effective if proposed to someone who is not able to change 
their action anyways. The second condition refers to the threat to be severe enough to make a 
difference for the target (Hovi 1998: 14). If the threat is not severe enough it will not make the 
target change its behaviour. Hence, the threat must be of such a character that the target will 
be inflicted costs to such a degree by not acquiescing to the wish of the threatener that they 
will prefer the change their behaviour. 
 Further the threat needs to be credible to be effective. The credibility of a threat refers 
to which extend the target believes the threat is to be carried out if they do not yield to the 
demands put forward. No matter how severe the threat is it is not effective if the target knows 
with certainty that the threat is not going to be carried out by the threatener (Hovi 1998: 15). 
The target must believe that the threatener is capable and willing to enforce the threat for it to 
be effective. Fourthly the threat must be complete. A threat is complete when the target 
believes that if he changes his behaviour the threat will not be carried out (Hovi 1998: 15). If 
the threat for sure is to be carried out anyways it will make no sense for the target to change 
his behaviour and only to be punished by the further costs of the threat. The final condition 
for a threat to be efficient is that it is adequately clear (Hovi 1998: 16). This condition refers 
to that the targets must understand the intention of the threatener and the consequences of not 
yielding to the demands put forward by the threatener. If the target does not understand the 
threat or how he can change his behaviour to comply with it the threat cannot be effective.  
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3. Methodology and Game Theory 
Section one of his chapter discusses the usage and strengths of the application formal of 
models for analysis while section two outlines some basic feature of game theory used in the 
analytical chapters that follows. The function of this chapter together with the previous 
chapter is to construct a comprehensive model that can be applied to the study of transitions 
where ever they should appear in the world. The methodology is to function as a tool for the 
analysis and as a bridge between the theoretical framework and the empirical observation, and 
thereby to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge both theoretically and empirically.  
 
The strength of a formal model 
In the theory chapter this thesis strongly argues for an actor oriented approach towards the 
study of democratisation in the phases of liberalisation and transition. Regime change is 
argued to be processes in which actor’s strategies, actions and their options under the 
uncertainty of transitions determine the outcome of democratisation. O'Donnell and Schmitter 
(1986) refer to “poker games” and “several sets of chess games” as key events during 
democratisation. These “games” refer to the interactions between the actors with conflicting 
interests in the phases of democratisation. Such strategic situations are believed to be key 
moments in transition in which actor’s collective interaction forms the outcomes. 
 Social situations, such as transitions, involve interaction of individuals or groups of 
individuals and the transition paradigm suggests these interactions to be determinants of the 
outcome of transitions. To analyse these strategic interactions by individuals or groups we 
need a theory that explains how actor’s decisions are interrelated and how these decisions and 
the interaction produce collective outcomes given the social context and uncertainty in which 
they are taken. Such a theory or method can be found in game theory (Morrow 1994: 1). 
Game theory represents a methodological tool which is well suited to analyse interdependent 
collective interaction amongst actors with conflicting interests about specific issues in which 
the interaction leads to concrete outcomes of social situations. Game theory can be applied to 
social interaction in which actors are conscious that their actions affect one another 
(Rasmusen 2007: 11). The decisions made by the actors are not taken in a vacuum but 
affected by context and social settings. Both structures as well as institutions can influence the 
possible strategies of actors as well as preferences of actors. Through game models it is 
possible to formalise the effect of such contextual and structural factors and incorporate their 
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effect upon the outcome into the analysis. By specifying which choices the actors face, how 
these choices lead to specific outcomes and how actors assess the outcomes one can also 
incorporate the influence of macro structures into the analysis (Morrow 1994: 1). The choices 
taken by actors depend upon other actor’s choices as well as the changing influence of macro 
structures as they are described by the theories and models of social sciences. At the same 
time as a game theoretical model takes social structures into consideration the model does 
also specify that it is not the macro structures themselves that create the outcomes of social 
strategic interaction but individuals and actors that do so. 
 A distinction can be made between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. A 
cooperative game is a game in which the players can make binding commitments, as opposed 
to non-cooperative games, in which they cannot (Rasmusen 2007). In cooperative games 
threats and promises are always believed to be binding, while non-cooperative games only 
take into account credible threats and promises (Hovi 1998: 4). All games modelled in this 
thesis are non-cooperative. 
Game theory is a branch of mathematical analysis that is developed to study decision 
making under conflict situations. Conflict situation implies that actors have conflicting or 
opposing strategies and alternatives solutions to conflict issues. Game theory gives the 
possibility to build formal quantitative models for analysis of social phenomena in contrast to 
qualitative analysis. There are several advantages with such an approach. A formal model 
forces precision of arguments in the analysis because assumptions, derivations and 
conclusions must be explicit in the model (Morrow 1994: 302). By doing so, all conditions, 
effects, assumption as well as outcomes become open to inspection and critique by the reader 
and it is not possible to hide weak logic. The model also shows with clarity why the 
conclusions follow from the proposed arguments whether these conclusions are of a general 
or a more specific character. The model gives an explicit logic for how the conclusions and 
outcomes are derived from the premises and assumptions in the model. Consequently, it is 
possible to see the impact of each premise or assumption in the model as well as it opens the 
possibility to see how the conclusion change by removing, changing or adding premises and 
assumptions (Morrow 1994: 303). By establishing the links between assumptions and 
premises explicit in a formal model it is possible to eliminate conclusions that contradict with 
the formal model as well as uncovering inconsistencies. The focus on explicit assumptions 
adds additional clarity to the relationship between the broad theory that creates the foundation 
of the analysis and the model developed to study a specific social phenomenon (Gates and 
Humes 1997: 6). A game theoretical model also provides us with the possibility to examine 
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alternative outcomes. Through the logical structure of the model it becomes possible to derive 
alternative outcomes which can be deduced from the same set of arguments. This opens for 
empirical tests not only of the specific model but also of the theoretical framework which it 
builds upon. At the same time as a formal model has these advantages it also helps us to 
discipline our intuition. According to Morrow (1994: 303) intuition is central to our 
understanding also in modelling, but he underlines its unreliability as the only foundation for 
assumptions. Brought together with theory and a formal model it can be a strength for an 
analysis. The formal model gives a clear guidance to what one should look for in an analysis 
through the key components of a formal rationality model which are actors, actions, the 
consequences of each actions, actor’s preferences as well as access to information (Hovi and 
Rasch 1993: 18). Collectively, these elements are known as the rules of the game and it is the 
modellers objective to describe social interaction in term of these rules to explain the 
interaction leading to specific outcomes (Rasmusen 2007: 12). In addition to these factors the 
context and social settings should be uncovered and central conflict issues identified when 
building the model.  
 The strength of formal models can be summed up by their clarity and parsimony, 
which give strength to an analysis by outlining the relationship between variables in a clear, 
explicit and logical way that opens the model for critical examination by the reader. Formal 
models are especially useful to make questions and hypnotises more precise (Colomer 2000: 
6). Hence, game theory makes it possible to isolate the most relevant variables and factors and 
to analyse their presumed effects upon the dependent variable and distinguish the more 
relevant factors from the less relevant. The basic orientation of game theoretical explanations 
is towards the development of general explanations including the development of theory 
(Gates and Humes 1997: 7). The goal of using game theory combined with transition theory is 
in this thesis not just to take the cases of Belarus and Russia and develop games in which the 
payoffs lead to outcomes which correspond to the empirical reality, but also to develop a 
comprehensive model and a set of methodological tools that together can explain transitions 
regardless where in the world they appear or whatever outcome they produce. Such a model 
which can explain regime changes in one part of the world must have a general character that 
allows it to be applied to other cases of regime change no matter where they appear. However, 
it must be noted that is not the method that is to explain the variety of empirical outcomes, it 
is the function of the theoretical framework. The function of the game theory is to bridge 
between transition theory and the empirical cases by showing how the post-Soviet transitions 
can be understood by a general theory in contrast to an “area specific approach”. 
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Core concepts of Game Theory 
Game theory is founded on a rational choice assumption in which actors are goal directed. 
This implies that individuals or groups of individuals have goals which they will attempt to 
achieve by choosing different strategies that are available to them. Hence, actors must have 
choices, even thought they might be constrained by various factors, they always have some 
choices which they can use to best pursue their goals. When actors have goals and the 
freedom to pursue these goals through their available strategies it is furthermore believed that 
actors actually do so. Rational choice is a method to understand actors preference for one 
outcome over another and game theoretical models explain how individual choices are 
interrelated and thereby how different social outcomes come about (Gates and Humes 1997: 
10). The models developed from these assumptions are simplifications of reality. 
Simplifications of the real world is a necessity to direct the focus towards certain elements of 
social interactions and to lay bare how motivations and actions are interrelated and 
determinants of outcomes (Morrow 1994: 8).  
 The core concepts of game theory were in the previous section described as the rules 
of the game and include actors, actions, strategies, preferences and information. The actors in 
a game model are individual or groups of individuals who take part in interaction about a 
given issue in the game model by possessing the possibility to act in the game. Actors, or 
players, are goal oriented and seek through their actions to maximise their individual utility. 
When actors are modelled as groups of individuals in this thesis it is presumed that they act as 
a uniform fraction entirely sharing a common mind set, the same utility function and a shared 
belief system (Underdal 1984: 67; Hovi and Rasch 1993: 29-30). Following these 
presumption groups of individuals can be modelled as unitary actors jointly pursuing a 
common goal. 
A strategy describes a plan which gives a direction for all situations that can occur in 
the game and can not be a response to other actor’s actions (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 37). 
Actions on the other hand can also be responses to other actor’s actions that have already 
taken place. In other words, actions and strategy generally correspond in static games while 
this is not necessarily the case in dynamic models. In a dynamic model actions are contingent 
strategies, depending upon previous actions and the timing of the action. If a given strategy 
always represents an actor’s strictly best response regardless which strategy his opponents 
might choose the strategy is said to be strictly dominant, on the other hand if the strategy 
always makes the actor at least as well off as any other strategy against all possible strategies 
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chosen by other actors the strategy is weakly dominant (Gates and Humes 1997: 35). 
Dominant strategies are also known as pure strategies, while a deviation of strategies is 
known as a mixed strategy (Varian 1996: 483-84). Action does in some instance coincide with 
strategies when actions are not results of actions already taken by other actors.  
The combination that possible strategies represent, when one combines one strategy of 
each player, is the possible outcomes of the game (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 38). Hence, the 
number of outcomes in a game depends upon the number of players and the number of 
strategies available to the players. The outcomes are final results or the consequence of the 
social interaction amongst the actors. Outcomes are exhaustive and mutually exclusive; hence, 
only one of the outcomes can occur (Morrow 1994: 17). The outcome is only combinations of 
strategies, and it is up to the modeller to fill these outcomes with substance so that they 
correspond with situations that can be observed empirically. 
Actors who are goal driven can distinguish between the outcomes and between which 
outcomes of the social interaction that are most preferable to them. Hence, actors can regard 
one outcome to be preferable to another outcome, thus constructing a strong preference 
relationship (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 99; Morrow 1994: 18). However, the actors can regard 
the outcomes to be equally rewarding which would result in a situation of indifference. The 
ordering of outcomes is constructed in accordance with the payoffs or expected payoffs that 
the actors connect to the different outcomes. The more rewarding an outcome is regarded to 
be the higher the payoff is assigned to it.  
The payoffs are the utility that an actor either receives as a result of the social 
interaction or the utility expected to be received as a function of the strategies chosen by 
relevant actors (Rasmusen 2007: 13-14). Utility is used in the model to express the 
preferences of each set of actors in the model. Nash (1950: 156-58) argues for the use of 
numerical utilities based upon utility functions in the construction of game models with two 
or more actors. These utility functions are constructed in accordance with the assumption that 
the utility of the outcome assigned to an actor is the product of collective interactions and not 
only based upon a single actor’s strategy as in decision theory. Flood (1958: 6) points to the 
problem of finding suitable operational measures of utility when game models are applied to 
empirical cases. In this thesis ordinal values are given to reflect the utility of the outcomes. 
Applying ordinal values as a utility measurement implies that actors can rank the outcomes 
from the best to the worst, including being indifferent to outcomes. Hence, they can decide if 
they prefer outcome A to B and outcome B to C. And when actors are expected to be rational 
it is then presumed that an actor also will prefer outcome A to C. The assumption of 
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transitivity goes as follows: 
If, A > B and B > C then A > C 
It is important to notice the difference between preferences towards outcomes and the 
preferences towards strategies or actions. Outcomes are the final result of collective social 
interactions while strategies are reflections of actor’s goals. Ordinal preferences are in this 
thesis represented by numbers. The larger the number the more preferred is the outcome. 
Equal numbers reflect indifference to the outcomes. The numbers assigned to the outcomes 
are the actor’s utility or expected utility, which is the result of the utility functions of the 
actors. Ordinal values do not predict the distance between the outcomes only the ranking of 
the outcomes. Hence, if an outcome A is given the utility 1 and outcome B is given 2 this does 
not mean that outcome A doubles the utility of the actor, only that A is more preferable. It is 
not meaningful to determine the interval between utilities assigned ordinal values. To do so 
utilities must be reflected in numbers on an interval or numerical measurement level. Ordinal 
values reduce the difficulty assigning real numbers to the utility. 
 The access to information is decisive for how the game is modelled. An important 
distinction is drawn between perfect (or imperfect) and complete (or incomplete) information 
in a game model. Complete information refers to situations in which all players’ payoff 
structure is known to the other players (Morrow 1994: 63). Hence, incomplete information 
occurs if one or more player’s payoffs cannot be determined with certainty or is completely 
unknown to other actors. Perfect information occurs in a game when all information sets are 
singletons (Morrow 1994: 63). Perfect information reflects that all players in the game know 
all previous actions taken in the game. Hence, games with imperfect information are games in 
which some or all previous actions are not known with certainty. The concepts of perfect or 
imperfect information refer to information concerning actions of the other players, while the 
concepts of complete or incomplete information refer to the knowledge actors have of his 
opponents preferences (Fink, Gates and Humes 1998: 11, 18).  
Games modelled as static form games are games with complete information because 
all players know the other players preferences but with imperfect information due to the fact 
that strategies are chosen simultaneously. Games are referred to as extensive form games if 
one or more of the players are able to observe the other actor’s action and react to this as a 
consequence of this observation (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 39). Extensive form games are 
modelled as game trees in which nodes represent points in the game in which actors choose 
from available actions and end nodes correspond to the outcomes to which actors can attach 
different utility. The different nodes in the game are assigned to the different players and 
 38
provide us with information about the possible actions of this actor, the sequence of the game, 
the possible path of the social interaction as well as the access to information at different 
levels of the game. Extensive form games are also known as dynamic games and can be 
modelled with both perfect or imperfect information as well as complete or incomplete 
information. Modelling extensive form games with imperfect information is done by drawing 
a dotted line between the information sets marking that actors beneath this line cannot 
determine the previous moves with certainty. To model extensive form games with 
incomplete information one can introduce the concept of nature. Nature is a pseudo-player 
which is introduced into the game to function as a player that takes a random choice at a given 
point in the game (Rasmusen 2007: 13). The choice of nature is specified by a given 
probability which can be know or unknown and determines the further action in the game. 
The concept of nature can fill several purposes. It can be used to model incomplete 
information in extensive form game by being modelled as a player taking the first action in 
the game which is unobserved by at least one player in the game and thereby being 
determining a player’s type, strategy set, information partitions and utility distributions (Gates 
and Humes 1997: 45-6). As shown by Tsebelis  (1990: 52-61) nature and games with variable 
payoffs can also be used to model situation of multi-dimensional conflicts or nested games. 
The outcomes reached by actors when pursuing their goals through actions or 
strategies are referred to as outcome equilibriums. There exist several different concepts of 
outcome equilibriums. An equilibrium concept is a rule that defines an equilibrium based 
upon strategy profiles and the utility functions (Rasmusen 2007: 18). Mainly three 
equilibrium outcomes are of interest in this thesis, the Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium was described by 
Nash (1951) and reflects an outcome in which none of the actors have the initiative to 
unilaterally deviate from the given equilibrium strategy and is in that sense stable. However, 
the Nash equilibrium neither has to be the best outcome to the actors nor to be a fair outcome. 
An equilibrium outcome is Pareto-optimal when no players can be made better off by 
changing strategy without other players are made worse off (Morrow 1994: 118). Hence, 
Pareto-optimality reflects a situation which is the best that could be reached without 
disadvantaging any other players and is stable in the sense that no one can change strategy 
without making other actors worse off. Finding the equilibrium in dynamic games is done by 
applying backward induction to the game tree. One starts at the last nodes in the game by 
deciding which action that maximises the utility of player assigned to that node and then 
moving upward in the game tree. Using this technique we can determine all players’ optimal 
 39
choice and the outcome found by backward induction is always a Nash equilibrium (Morrow 
1994: 124-27). Unlike the Nash equilibrium, backward induction judges the rationality of the 
moves off the equilibrium path and therefore Nash equilibriums are reached by irrational 
moves not regarded as outcomes when found by backward induction. The game tree can be 
broken down into subgames. A subgame is a game consisting of a node which is singleton in 
every player’s information partition, that node’s successors, and the payoffs at the associated 
end nodes (Rasmusen 2007: 109). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium consists of 
strategies that constitute the best answer of the players in all possible subgames (Hovi and 
Rasch 1993: 71). Or, a strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if it is a Nash 
equilibrium for the entire game and its relevant action rules are a Nash equilibrium for every 
subgame. 
I this thesis I discuss the movements within the framework of static games. This logic 
follows assumptions of Brams’ (1994) theory of moves. The theory of moves implies that a 
game has an initial state. The actors can further react and counter react to each others moves 
before the game ends (Tvedt 2004: 86). This contradicts the conditions of a static game model 
by introducing the logic of repeated or dynamic games to the model. This logic is not without 
controversy and Brams has been criticised by amongst others Stone (2001) and Hoffmann 
(2001). I bear this in mind as I have applied this logic to the games. The assumption of moves 
within a static game is applied because I have found it useful in order to emphasise the 
discussion of pacts, sub-optimality, threatening power and multi-dimensional conflicts. This 
does not necessarily imply that the static games should have been dynamic or actually 
describe dynamic interaction. It is applied in order to explain sub-optimal choices, lack of 
compromise, absence of pacts and the failure of transition to democracy. 
 Section one of this chapter has summed up the main arguments in favour of using 
formal models, including the transparency of a formal model opening it for critique and the 
strict logical nature of the augments ruling out weak and hidden logic. Some basic features of 
game theory have been outlined in section two. These and additional features specific to the 
games presented in later chapters will be discussed in greater detail when used in the analysis. 
Game theory consists of a much larger set of tools than the one outlined here, but it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to discuss features of game theory that is not used in the following 
chapters. 
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4. Belarusian History and Identity 
In this chapter I discuss the historical and contextual background which is believed to have 
influenced the preferences of the actors during the phase of transition. Of special importance 
is the timing of the processes of industrialisation, the state- and nation-building, the lack of 
national consciousness and the limited impact of liberalisation. I start with a historical 
background, discuss the development of national identity and treat finally the phase of 
liberalisation by elaborating the conflict issues and actors in Belarus. 
 
Early History 
Belarus is geographically located close to the centre of Europe, however politically and 
economically the country occupies a much more peripheral role. Little attention has been 
devoted to the country’s political development both from a political as well as from a 
scholarly point of view. Brandt-Hansen et al. (1997: 249) refer to Belarus as the unknown and 
invisible country. The country is land locked and situated between Russia in the east, Latvia 
and Lithuania in the north, Poland in the west and Ukraine in the south. After Lukashenka 
became president in the country’s first election in 1994 it has moved in a still more 
authoritarian direction. Today the country is often referred to as the last dictatorship in Europe 
and Lukashenka as the last dictator in Europe. 
 Even though that Russians, Lithuanians and Poles all, in different epochs, have made 
claims of the territory that today constitutes the Republic of Belarus historical Belarusian 
references go as far back as the 10th century. Being trapped between states with imperial 
ambitions Belarus has been subject of these states rivalry for influence in the area. This 
location of the country has left little or no room for both national independence and 
development of a national consciousness. The historical circumstances have had great effect 
on the attempt of forming a national identity and a reconstruction of Belarusian history, as 
well as a national opposition in Belarus. There is a large contrast between the historical 
understanding of the Belarusian nationalists and the historical perspectives of Poles, Russians 
and Lithuanians and the struggle about Belarus past has never been sharper than today 
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 99). The disputed historical legacy has an effect both on the 
formation of a distinct Belarusian identity as well as on the political developments in the early 
1990s. The struggle about the past has also become a struggle about the future of Belarus. 
This discussion will only point to some central moments in Belarusian history that have had 
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influence on the development of national identities in Belarus today. A broader examination 
of Belarusian history is beyond the scope of this thesis9. 
The Belarusian nation has inhabited the territory of Belarus for centuries, but it is only 
in the last fifteen years that a sovereign strictly Belarusian state has existed, except for some 
brief months in 1918. However, Belarusian culture and language is supposed to have played a 
significant role in the state formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus and Samogitia. 
The Grand Duchy occupied most of the territory of today’s Belarus as well as Lithuania, parts 
of Ukraine and Russia. This state formation lasted from 1386 and Belarusian language played 
an imported role as the language of the chancellery, courts, diplomacy and literature in the 
Grand Duchy (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 100). Several laws written in Belarusian exist from 
these times and were in function until the incorporation of Belarus into the Tarist Empire after 
the 1830 rebellion. The Grand Duchy entered into a political union with Poland in 1569 and 
formed a commonwealth. This leads to gradual expansion of Polish influence in Belarus and 
the decline of the relative autonomy that Belarus had enjoyed as a part of the Grand Duchy. 
The creation of the Uniate Church in 1596 brought the religious influence of the Vatican to 
Belarus at the expense of the Russian Orthodox Church (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 100). 
 During the 15th century the Moscow based Russian state began expanding westwards. 
This brought Russian into confrontation with Poland on, amongst other, the territorial control 
over Belarus. Both Poland and Russia regarded Belarus as a legitimate unit of their states and 
promoted religious, cultural and political influence over the areas they controlled at different 
times (Ibid). In late 18th century the Belarusian lands were incorporated into the Russian 
empire as a result of the dismembering of the Polish Commonwealth by Russian, Prussia and 
Austria (Mihalisko 1997: 228). At this time the nobility of Belorussia was strongly connected 
to Poland and had accepted Polish language and culture in addition to the Roman Catholic 
Church in form of the Uniate Church. However, parts of the upper strata of the Belarusian 
population still had a close connection to Lithuania (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 100). This 
meant that Belarus was without any aristocracy to promote a Belarusian identity at this time. 
The annexation of Belarus by the Russia where followed by period of strong and large scale 
Russification, especially under Tsarina Catherine II and Belarusian language, culture and the 
Uniate Church were severely suppressed during the tsarist rule. However, already under Tsar 
Alexander I (1801-1825) the suppression was relaxed, and Poland once again influenced 
Belarus, especially in the sector of education. The University of Vilnius became a centre for 
                                                 
9 See for instance Vakar (1956) for a detailed examination of Belarusian history.  
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Polish cultural influence in the old Grand Duchy. It was also at this university that the 
foundation for Belarusian national thought was laid in the beginning of the 19th century. A 
group of professors had assembled a collection of documents written in Belarusian which 
sparked the idea of autonomy for the unity that had constituted the Grand Duchy (Zaprudnik 
and Urban 1993: 101). The incipient national awareness was brought to an end after a 
rebellion against Russia broke out in 1830 in the western regions where Belarus to a large 
extend supported the Polish aspirations. Following this uprising the tsar introduced a harder 
line against foreign influence in the western regions. This had severe consequences not only 
for Polish influence on Lithuania and Belarus but also for Belarusian identity and culture. The 
university in Vilnius was closed, Russian became to replace Polish as educational language 
and in government, the Uniate Church were forbidden and even the term “Belorussian” was 
abolished (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 101). Belorussia was now to be known as Western 
Russia and the features that had distinguished the “White Rus” from the “Great Rus” was now 
to be seen as only features of artificial Polish influence in the region. The land of “With Rus” 
was to be reunified with the rest of the Russia. In despite of these devastating results of the 
rebellion for the creation of Belarusian identity the national trends in the early 19th century 
had given birth to a distinct Belarusian national idea. National consciousness was renewed 
after the Polish uprising in 1863. However, Belarus had no aristocracy or elites to promote the 
culture outside the cities and the city population mostly consisted of non-Belarusian 
nationalities like Russians, Poles and Jews showing little or no interest in promoting 
Belarusian national interests (Mihalisko 1997). During the 19th century the national oriented 
movement remained weak and an agitator for reunification with Poland and Lithuania. In a 
century in which many other, both western and eastern, nations developed distinct national 
identities and saw the merging of cultural and political nationalism across Europe creating 
demand for establishment of new national states, Belarus only managed to produce a small 
and weak elite advocating national ideas and identities of Poles and Lithuanians. 
 However, this is not an expression for the non existence of the Belarusian nation or a 
proof of the Belarusian nation in fact is Russian. It is rather an expression of a very low 
degree of development in Belarus at the end the 19th century and the composition of different 
nationalities and the position they occupied in society. As can be seen from the table below 
ethnic Belarusians constituted 63.5 percent of the total population in 1897. However, no more 
than 2.6 percent of the ethnic Belarusian population lived in the cities. Of the one million 
urban population more than half was of Jewish origin followed by Russians with 19 percent. 
Belarusians were the third largest group with almost 14 percent closely followed by Poles 
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with 12 percent of the urban population. According to Hammond (1966: 10-11) differences in 
nationality often coincide with difference in class in Eastern Europe. This means that the rural 
peasant population of Belarus consisted of mainly ethnic Belarusians while the urban 
merchants were Jewish or German and the landlords and autocracy were mainly Polish or 
Lithuanians. When a nation develops a distinct national identity with the creation of a national 
literary language, associated literature and creation of national myths often begin within a 
small intellectual elite (Hammond 1966: 13). The creation of the Belarusian national identity 
amongst intellectuals at the University of Vilnius is an example of this. To expand the 
national identity beyond the national elites there must exist a basis for the nation that can be 
reached by the elite. Spread of the national identity needs a literate nation. This means that the 
spread of the national identity from the national elite to the national population often 
coincides with the spread of education, urbanisation and industrialisation in which peasants 
leave countryside and take over the cities that formerly were dominated by other nationalities 
and thereby create the basis for the awakening of the national identity (Hammond 1966: 
13).
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 103)
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Later on the merging of cultural and political nationalism creates the basis for 
demands of formation of a national state. After the development of the Belarusian identity by 
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the national elites it was not possible to spread it to the national population. Belarus did not 
see a spread in education and neither urbanisation or industrialisation before long into the 20th 
century. At the same time as these preconditions were not present the country faced severe 
suppression as a result of the 1830 and 1863 uprisings. Hence, the congruence between social 
class and nationality and the low degree of development in Belarus hindered both the fission 
of nationalities and the development of a distinct Belarusian identity in the 19th century. The 
few national oriented intellectuals and groups faced large difficulties when trying to awaken 
the vast majority of illiterate Belarusian peasantry and national initiatives were to a large 
extend left to the nobilities and the autocracy who were oriented towards either Poland or 
Lithuania, while the Belarusian peasants kept referring to themselves as only the locals 
(Vakar 1956: ; Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 103).   
Even though they continued to face these difficulties a small group of Belarusian 
intellectuals formed the first party in 1902, the social democratic Socialist Hramada in St. 
Petersburg. The increased political tension in the beginning of the 20th century Russia had 
sparked political activism also amongst the few Belarusian intellectuals. And as the result of 
the liberalisation following the 1905 revolution they started to publish their own organ Nasha 
Niva (Mihalisko 1997: 231). Despite, the 20th century national awakening had a strictly 
limited impact on forming a national awareness it laid the foundation for the establishment of 
the All-Belarusian Congress in the aftermath of the collapse of the Romanov Empire in 1917.   
This lead to the establishment of the first strictly Belarusian state, the short lived 
Belarusian National Republic. The Belarusian National Republic was established on March 
25th 1918 after the collapse of the Russian Tsar Empire. However, The Red Army occupied 
the country in December the same year and put an effective end to the new independent 
national aspirations in Belarus and incorporated the National Republic into the Soviet Union 
together with Lithuanian in 1919 and the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) was 
established on January 1st 1919 (Mihalisko 1997). However, western parts of the country 
came under Polish control after the Treaty of Riga put an end to the Polish Russian war. But 
the country kept growing during the 1920s as eastern parts of today’s Belarus was included 
into the BSSR and the population increased from 1.5 millions in 1921 to 5 millions in 1926 
with more than 80 percent of the population being ethnic Belarusians. However, the 8.2 
percent Jews and 7.7 percents Russians played an important role in both the economy and 
urban life controlling most of the economy of the republic in the early years (Mihalisko 1997: 
232). The republic was one of the four founding republics to establish the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on December 30th 1922. In 1939 the western part of today’s Belarus was 
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re-occupied from Poland by the Soviet Union and included into the Belorussian SSR. The 
area that had been under Polish rule in the twenties and thirties had undergone harsh 
suppression and the Hamada, which had promoted Belarusian distance, was destroyed 
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 105-06). The time under Polish rule did not have a positive 
effect upon the formation of a distinct Belarusian identity in the western areas, it rather lead to 
the destruction of the intellectual elites.  
Even thought the establishment of Belorussian SSR was not a nationalistic project it 
had some positive effect upon nation building and the formation of a national identity in the 
1920s. Establishment of a Belarusian state with, even though it was not independent, state 
structures and institutions distinct from those of Russia, Poland and Lithuania created 
legitimacy for the creation of a distinct national identity as well. Unlike the Polish suppression 
in the western parts of Belarus, the new communist regime in the 1920s did promote national 
culture through national campaigns and official support to Belarusian literature and culture 
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 106). The Belarusian culture also stated to reach larger segments 
of the titular population through literacy campaigns. For the first time a national Belarusian 
identity did spread beyond the national intellectual elites. This had, without doubt, a positive 
effect on Belarusian national identity and culture in the 1920s. But it was only to last until 
Stalin’s repression (the natsdemy) began in 1929. Stalin’s crimes of the 1930s put an effective 
end to Belarusian national aspirations and wiped out the new intelligentsia. According to 
Mihalisko (1997: 232) no less than 2 million Belarusians were killed during the purging, 
deportations, forced collectivisation and starvations until the outbreak of the Great Patriotic 
War in 1941. The war became a new disaster for Belarus killing another 25 percent of the 
population and practically wiping out the country’s entire infrastructure and industry, 
including the city of Minsk where only a few buildings were left. Some 100 000 Belarusians 
formed a partisan resistance against the German invaders creating new national heroes. 
These historical happenings left the Belarus with a very weak national identity in the 
post-war era. After the war a strong attempt of creating an all Soviet identity where launched 
by the central authorities. At the same time as the country experienced rebuilding, 
modernisation, urbanisation and industrialisation it also underwent a process of Sovietisation 
(Mihalisko 1997: 233; Marples 1999). Hence, the processes that are discussed by Hammond 
(1966: 13-14) to have a positive effect upon the spread of the national identity from the 
intellectual national elites to the national population did to a large extend first take place in 
the post-war period or the pre-war Stalinist era.  A universal Soviet identity was attempted to 
be introduced to the Soviet peoples during this time where the processes of urbanisation, 
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industrialisation and the spread of literacy became evident in Belarus. Russian language and 
culture were given a central role in the creation of the Soviet identity as being universal 
identities in contrast to the national identities within the republics. In Belarus the Soviet 
identity became closely connected to the positive contribution made by the Soviet state by 
rebuilding and modernising Belarusian society, economy and culture. The heavily Russian 
influenced culture became attended with positive, modern, urban and progressive values, 
while Belarusian culture and identity were attended with more negative identities as 
backwardness, old-fashioned and rural values. Imitations of Russian language became the 
norm in the urban cities while the majority of the Belarusian speaking population remained in 
the countryside. Nowhere else in the Soviet Union the creation of a universal Soviet identity 
was to be met with greater success than in Belarus. 
The post-war years became an era of great change and development to Belarus. The 
country was benefited by a rapid industrialisation and rebuilding. Alongside the 
modernisation and rebuilding came a process of rapid urbanisation and growth of the share of 
the population employed in industry and the service sector (Mihalisko 1997: 234). Within a 
few years the country changed from a backward agriculture society to a modern industrial 
society. Both the general living standards and the level of education were raised significantly. 
As the education level and the urban population rose, Russian language also gained ground at 
the expense of Belarusian. Ultimately Russian became the dominant language in the education 
system especially in higher educations and in city schools.  
At the end of the 1980s the Belarusian SSR was one of the most industrially advanced 
republics in the USSR with an economy closely interconnected with the other republics. The 
income level, GDP and educational level were amongst the highest in the Union. In the 45 
years from the end of the Second World War until 1990 Belarus was completely transformed 
from a rural agricultural society to a modern Soviet state (Marples 1999: 23). This 
transformation created very favourable conditions for the creation of a new identity. This 
identity is often mistaken as being Russian, maybe because of the dominant role of Russian 
language. Belarusians do not consider themselves as Russians but they have severe problems 
to define a distinct Belarusian identity outside of the Soviet context (Mihalisko 1997: 236). 
Even today most Belarusians tend to remember the Soviet past with great nostalgia, as a time 
of security, growth and prosperity (Marples 1999: 23). If Belarusians identify themselves with 
an identity other than a Belarusian it is not a Russians but a true Soviet identity. 
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Belarus under glasnost and perestroika 
The impact of Gorbachev’s reform politics of both glasnost and perestroika was much more 
limited than in the other European and Caucasian republics. This phase of liberalisation had a 
late and restricted impact upon Belarusian politics. This might reflect that the crises that 
became visible to the central leadership of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s both on the 
economic level but also on a more ideological level never became so pressing in Belarus 
during these times. On the economic level the republic performed at the top end of the 
republics of the Soviet Union. The population enjoyed a relative high living standard 
compared to other republics. The industry of Belarus was heavily connected with the 
economy of the other member states and Belarus delivered industrial products to these states. 
As earlier argued the ideological dimension of the country was marked by a great success in 
the creation a distinct Soviet identity. Many Belarusians had benefited from the 
modernisations in the post-war period. The ideological crisis that became eminent on the 
union level seems much less eminent in Belarus than in the other European and Caucasian 
republics as well as on the state level. There can not be traced a clear and noticeable split 
within the ruling fraction of Belarusian regime in this phase of democratisation, as it can on 
the Soviet level or in Russia. During the phase of liberalisation in the Soviet Union the 
Communist Party of Belarus stayed remarkably unified in the support of the hardliner fraction 
lead by Liegachev in the Politburo (Mihalisko 1997: 239). During this phase the softliner 
fraction in Belarus remained weak, insignificant and isolated. No concession or compromise 
were made between the hardliner fraction lead by first secretary Sakalau and the reform 
friendly fraction within the Communist Party.  Belarus was widely seen as an impeder of the 
processes of glasnost and perestroika and a supporter of the status quo especially by reformers 
and supporters of glasnost in the Soviet Union. The Belarusian leadership actively attempted 
to limit and disturb the impact of the Moscow lead liberal reform programme on Belarusian 
institutions, media and political life (Mihalisko 1997: 239). The ruling elites of Belarus were 
very well integrated into the Soviet nomenklatura structures being loyal clients of the central 
level elites without specific national characteristics or interests to pursue(Belova-Gille 2003: 
55). Hence, the impact of liberalisation did not lead to a split of the ruling elite. A real 
independent or national ruling elite did not arise in Belarus until independence had been 
achieved, leaving the communist unprepared for independence and without a national interest. 
This was in contrast to the Ukrainian or Russian elites who developed political strategies and 
interests which were independent and sometimes in conflict with the ones of the central 
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government. This means that the liberalisation in Belarus, after the opening of the Soviet 
Union, was significantly lacking behind both the central union level as well as compared to 
other republics such Russian or even more the Baltic republics. This development continued 
all along the phase of liberalisation, making Belarus especially ill-prepared for the later 
transition phase. However, the hardliners in control of the Belarusian Communist Party were 
not able to totally hinder organising in the civil society. 
 The national mobilisation in the civil society of Belarus in the late 1980s were mainly 
a consequence of three major events or issues, the language question that where brought up as 
early as 1986, the unveiling of the Stalin era massacre in the Kurpaty forest in the outskirts of 
Minsk and the uncovering devastating effects upon Belarus by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
in April 1986 (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: ; Marples 1999: 49). Especially the two first issues 
are, according to Marples (1999: 49-50), to have a crucial effect upon the development of a 
national consciousness and the process of democratisation in the late 1980s Belarus. Together 
with the attempted veiling of the extent of the Chernobyl disaster these events and issues did 
help to undermine the authority, legitimacy and the monopoly of CPB and especially the 
conservative block and their strong bonds with the conservative fraction on the union level. 
The events gave also the legitimacy to the formation of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) as 
a political party and alternative to the Communist Party. 
 The spread of Russian language in Belarus was intensified during the Stalin period and 
Russian became the only urban language to be taught in the city schools. The Belarusians that 
moved from the countryside into the cities were assimilated into the Russian speaking 
population. Even though that Belarusian now, as a result of the urbanisation, constituted the 
vast majority of the urban population this had not resulted in the spread of neither the 
Belarusian language nor a Belarusian identity to the cities. The use and knowledge of the 
language were in sharp decline in the mid 1980s. In fear that this should lead to the death of 
the language and thereby the end of the Belarusian national identity, twenty-eight intellectuals 
mobilised and appealed to General Secretary Gorbachev to protect the language by law in 
December 1986 (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 108). The protection of the language became the 
most important question for mobilisation of the nationally minded fractions in Belarus at the 
beginning of Glasnost and Perestroika. Appeals by Belarusian youth organisations to follow 
the Baltic peoples in their struggle for national awakeners were made during this period. 
 In the middle of the official de-Stalinisation process that was launched as a part of the 
reform politics of glasnost and perestroika by Gorbachev to rehabilitate victims of Stalin’s 
terror the Belarusian archaeologist and intellectual Zianon Pazinak rediscovered no less than 
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510 mass graves in the forest of Kurapaty in the suburb of Minsk (Marples 1999: 54). 
According to Pazinak (1988) the mass graves hold the remains of 300 000 people who 
became the victims of the NKVDs massacres from 1937-41. His article also gave detailed 
descriptions of the cruelty in the forest by residents of nearby villages. The exposure of the 
Kurapaty mass graves lead to a widespread mobilisation and demands that independent 
investigations were to be made to uncover the full scale of the massacre (Zaprudnik and 
Urban 1993: 110). This demand was never fully met by the conservative rulers of the 
Communist Party and an official commission came to the conclusion that the mass graves 
contained the remains of 30 000 victims but they were unable to name neither the victims nor 
the criminals (Marples 1999: 55-56). The official investigation of the massacre was seen as a 
major attempt to cover up of the actual circumstances and activists created the Commite-58 to 
conduct an alternative investigation of the cruelty in the Kurapaty forest (Zaprudnik and 
Urban 1993: 110-11). The handling of the investigation, the clashes between activist and 
police and the attempted to cover up contributed, maybe more than any other event, to 
undermine the legitimacy of conservatives in the Communist Party and their relations to 
Moscow and their resistance towards reforms. The event also became a direct trigger for the 
establishment of the BNF. Commite-58 established the group Martyrology of Belarus in 
October 1988 and at its founding meeting the group established the Belarusian Popular Front 
for Perestroika, inspired by the Baltic popular fronts, with Pazinak as leader (Zaprudnik and 
Urban 1993: 111). As a part of the politics of glasnost and perestroika Gorbachev launched a 
campaign of de-Stalinisation in the USSR to rehabilitate the victims to of Stalin’s crimes and 
the Gulag. In addition to rehabilitate the victims and mark a break with the past, these politics 
would also help to generate legitimacy for the new politics of reform, openness and 
reconstruction hence to legitimise the politics of the moderate softliner fraction in their 
struggle against the hardliners. However, in Belarus the legitimacy was not generated in 
favour of the ruling elites but in favour of the newly formed national opposition. The process 
of de-Stalinisation was identified with the opposition groups of the popular front and 
especially the Martyrology in Belarus (Marples 1999: 57). These circumstances did threaten 
to undermine the legitimacy of the Communist Party hardliner rulers in Belarus. To narrow 
the effect of this they severely tried to hinder or limit the official investigation of the Kurapaty 
massacre and a campaign in several hardliner Minsk newspapers tried to blame it on German 
invaders during the Second World War (Marples 1999: 57).  
 The third major event that contributed to the mobilisation of the opposition movement 
was the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Belarus’ neighbouring republic Ukraine. The explosion 
 50
at the Chernobyl power plant located just south of the border between the Belarus and 
Ukraine had devastating effects on Belarus. As much as 70 percent of the nuclear fallout from 
the explosion landed on Belarusian soil contaminating large parts of the southern provinces 
(Marples 1996). The authorities took little or no action towards the crises that affected as 
much as 2.2 millions Belarusians. Information was suppressed and the population was assured 
that it had noting to fear, and left people living in contaminated zones (Zaprudnik and Urban 
1993: 111). 
These three critical events became the main triggers for organisation in the civil 
society of Belarus under glasnost and perestroika as well as the formation of the main political 
opposition group the national oriented Belarusian Popular Front. And the Popular Front 
successfully managed to connect the ruling conservative communist party to all of these three 
events in a negative way and undermined, at least to some degree, the legitimacy of the 
regime while legitimising the creation of a national oppositional fraction independent of the 
regime. The three critical events also became the trigger for the development or reawaken of a 
national identity amongst the national minded intellectual elite trying to save the Belarusian 
nation for what they saw as downfall. The possibility to create a strictly Belarusian identity 
and spread it to the titular population once again seemed possible in Belarus but this time with 
an urbanised, industrialised and literate population as receivers. However, a Belarusian 
identity had to compete with a strongly consolidated and distinct Soviet identity developed 
earlier in the 20th century. 
The formation of the Popular Front as well as the open unveiling of and mobilisation 
over the three critical events of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the Kurpaty massacres and the 
struggle for belarusification of the language and culture had never been possible in Belarus  
with out the liberalisation launched by the central government under Gorbachev. The first 
signs of mobilisation in civil society in Belarus came with a letter sent to Gorbachev on 
December 15th 1986 by the 28 Belarusian intellectuals and a new letter to Gorbachev in June 
1987 this time sign by 134 leading Belarusians and in December that same year a rally in 
Minsk gathers young Belarusians and sparked the beginning of a national movement in 
Belarus  (Zaprudnik 1989: 37-9). A vast diversity of small and autonomous civil society 
groups sprang up all over Belarus during the years of glasnost. According to the City Party 
Committee in November 1988 there existed 566 amateur and self managed groups in Minsk 
alone (Zaprudnik 1989: 40). Most of these youth groups or clubs remained apolitical but were 
engaged in national questions. However, mobilisation in civil society in Belarus culminated in 
the establishment of the Belarusian Popular Front as the political party of the national 
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opposition and the Martyorlogy of Belorussia to reawaken the national consciousness. 
However, the politics of glasnost and perestroika was not given as warm a welcome 
amongst the conservative ruling elite of the Belarusian Communist Party as amongst the 
national minded opposition forces. The leadership of the republic did their best to counteract 
the growing organisation outside the official party organisations. The Party did sharply differ 
in opinion with the Popular Front not only in the nationality question but also about future 
reforms in the republic. As earlier mentioned the Communist Party did affect strong support 
for the hardliner fractions in Moscow, while the Popular Front appealed for support amongst 
the softliners associated with Gorbachev. Mihalisko (1997: 238) claims that a sharper 
dichotomy of ideologies than that between the Popular Front and the Communist Party is 
difficult to imagine. The ruling elites initiated a counterattack on the Popular Front in an 
attempt to undermine their legitimacy, after the unveiling and effective association of the 
Communist Party to the events of the Kurapaty forest, the Chernobyl disaster and the 
language question.  
The Communist Party effectively mobilised its nearly monopoly on mass media to 
launch a campaign against the newly formed Popular Front. The initiatives by opposition 
groups were mainly ignored by the leading Belarussian media, and often the opposition of 
Belarus received greater attention from Russian, Soviet or Baltic reform friendly media than 
from Belarusian media. At several occasions the official media did try, directly or indirectly, 
to connect the opposition groups and their symbols to the collaborators during the German 
occupation between 1941 and 1944 blaming them to spread fascist ideology among the 
youngsters (Zaprudnik 1989: 45-6). The campaign did not only attempt to connect Belarusian 
opposition but also the Baltic Popular Fronts with criminal elements. The campaign against 
The Popular front, Martyology and other independent groups tried to radicalise and de-
legitimise the national opposition.  
The campaign made it much more difficult for the national opposition to voice their 
opinion through the media in Belarus than similar groups in other republics such as Russia, 
Georgia or the Baltics. But the Communist Party apparatus did not limit themselves to 
censorship and utilisation of their monopoly on information they also at several occasions 
tried to quell the opposition with force leading to clashes between the supporters of civil 
society groups and the police. At several occasions supporters of the Popular Front, 
Martyology and other independent groups were met by riot police and water cannons when 
trying to organise meetings or commemorate non-communist events (Zaprudnik 1989: 46). 
Also several opposition gatherings were hindered and had to be held abroad often in Vilnius 
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in Lithuania, a city with historical ties to Belarus but lost by the Belarusians to the 
Lithuanians.  
All these factors might have hindered the Popular Front and other national or 
opposition groups in reaching the population with their message of national reawaken and 
support for the Moscow initiated democratisation. This was especially the instance in the rural 
areas where the party kept its tight grip of the public opinion and the civil society. As argued 
by Marples (1996: 47) the Popular Front had its largest support in Minsk and other larger 
cities and as the other civil society groups they found it particularly difficult to penetrate the 
countryside and spread it message to the non-urban population. The spread of a distinct 
Belarusian national identity from the national elites to the population outside the major cities 
and regional centres was seriously disturbed and hindered by the ruling party and had limited 
impact on the rural population during the process of liberalisation. The opposition had only 
limited support outside the major cities and seldom managed to raise candidates for election 
in these areas. 
The twin politics of glasnost and perestroika had a much later impact upon Belarus 
than upon Russia and the leading hardliner fraction did not favour the reform politics. 
However, civil society did finally organise in support of the Gorbachev initiated 
democratisation and in an attempt to renew the national identity and save the nation. The 
impact of the central government reforms and the episodes in the Baltic states, which Belarus 
are closely linked to both historically and geographically, could not be retained from Belarus 
and in 1988 the first opposition party, the Belarusian Popular Front was established. Civil 
society had finally responded to the 1986 opening of the regime by the central government in 
Moscow as Gorbachev launched the first initiatives of the glasnost politics. 
 The regime's response to the mobilisation of the national minded segments of civil 
society and their attempt to foster a strictly Belarusian national identity to a large extend 
corresponds to what is described by Przeworski (1991: 61-64) as suppression after the regime 
has opened for organisation in the civil society and the civil society has failed to be 
incorporated into the regime but continues to organise autonomously from the regime pushing 
for further reforms. In the case of Belarus this mainly corresponds to the Popular Fronts and 
Martyologys attempts to reawaken the Belarusian non-Soviet national identity. They launched 
a counterattack on the opposition trying to undermined their legitimacy and defended the 
Soviet identity as well as their monopoly on power and information (Zaprudnik 1989: 45-47). 
This act may indicate that the hardliner rulers of the Communist Party preferred to establish a 
narrowed dictatorship in favour of transition and perhaps even in favour of a broadened 
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dictatorship. Presumably they wished, by their attack upon the opposition, to re-establish the 
status quo. However, due to the fact that the reform process was initiated by the central 
government in Moscow it would not be possible for the Belarusian authorities to fully repress 
the national opposition even if the had wished to do so. Therefore the liberalisation in Belarus 
brought about an opposition but it had a much more limited effect than the liberalisation of 
the neighbouring Baltic or Russian republics. The liberalisation also failed to produce a single 
national identity in Belarus but left the country with competing ideas of nationhood. 
 
Pre-Transitional elections in Belarus 
 As a part of the process of liberalisation the central government encouraged multi-
candidate elections to both the local Soviets, city Soviets and to USSR Congress of People's 
Deputies. Two elections took place in Belarus in addition to the referendum on the renewed 
union treaty. Elections were held to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 and to 
the Supreme Soviet of Belarus in 1990. In the 1989 election the Popular Front managed, 
despite the huge advantage enjoyed by the Communist Party to win eight mandates to the 
USSR Congress of People's Deputies defeating seven top officials from the Communist Party 
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 112). The republican level election to the Supreme Soviet in 
Belarus was to be the first multi-candidate election the country. However, the election was far 
from being a free and fair election compared to both democratic standards and to elections in 
other Soviet republics. As argued earlier the hardliner regime in Belarus tried to limit the 
impact of the Moscow initiated liberalisation upon the country. Several measures were taken 
to restrict candidates of the Popular Front from reaching the ballot. 50 of the total 360 seats 
were reserved for hardliner supporters amongst war veterans and handicapped associations, 
thereby violating the principle of one person one vote (Mihalisko 1997: 239). The party 
controlled the nomination process entirely and exploited this possibility fully to hinder 
hundreds of opposition candidates from running in the election, while Party loyal candidates 
were easily registered (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 112). The near monopoly on media was 
also used to favour regime friendly candidates. The incumbent regime was at this time both 
able and willing to manipulate the electoral competition in their own favour, to an extent that 
was not seen in the republics of Ukraine or Russia and certainly not in the Baltic republics. 
They must have feared the electoral strength of the Popular Front that by now counted as 
many as 100,000 members. As a result of the difficulties which were inflicted to the 
opposition candidates, the Popular Front won only 7.5 percents of the seats, while the 
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Communist Party won 86 percent. The Popular Front won most of its representatives in the 
urban electoral districts and many candidates of the Communist Party were running 
unopposed in rural districts (Mihalisko 1997: 239). The manipulated character of the pre-
transitional election makes it severely difficult both for observers as well as for actors to 
determine the support and strength of the different actors in Belarus in the late phase of 
liberalisation and the early phase of transition. This may indicate that the Belarusian actors, at 
least to a certain degree, were interacting during the transition without knowing their future 
position or strength. Hence, that they were acting under a Rawlsian veil. 
 Even though the elections did not contribute to reveal the strength of the actors and 
secure representation of the opposition in the representative institutions of the republic they 
did contribute to unveil a fragmentation of the regime that had not been visible before the 
election. While 86 percent of the representatives were members of the Communist Party only 
about one-quarter of the deputies were officials from the party or government apparatus and 
supporting the ruling hardliner fraction. The largest block of communist representatives 
consisted of intellectuals or technical specialists. The result of this was that the old leadership 
was unable to fully control the legislative alone. An informal and rather weak communist 
softliner fraction was created. Even though the ruling elites had managed to hold power their 
grip seemed far more tenuous than before the election, despite the wide spread manipulation 
of the electoral process. Together with the Popular Front, that held only 25 seats in the 
assembly, softliners and supporters joined an informal group called the Democratic Club after 
it became clear that it was of no prospects to create a pro-perestroika fraction within the 
Communist Party (Mihalisko 1997: 240; Silitski 2003: 39). Inspired by Boris Yeltsin’s exit 
from the party in Moscow tens of thousands of party members left the party in disappointment 
about the lack of a reform friendly party wing. The election of the pro-perestroika Stanislau 
Shushkevich as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was a victory for the Democratic 
Club, whilst the hardliner Viacheslua Kebich became Prime Minister (Silitski 2003: 39). The 
new parliament also declared Belarus as a sovereign state as a result of a compromise between 
the hardliners, softliners and the Popular Front. This decision paved the way for the later 
independence, a surly unintended result for the hardliners. 
Independence and transition 
 The independence of Belarus was clearly not the intention of the dominant hardliner 
rulers, that clearly favoured a close connection with the rest of the Soviet Union, but rather 
the consequence of a series of events in Russia and on the Union level. While the struggle for 
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the power to decide the fate of the nation had just begun in Belarus, this process had 
proceeded much further in the other European and Caucasian republics of the Soviet Union in 
the beginning of the 1990s. The Belarusian declaration of sovereignty on July 27th 1990 gave 
Belarus sovereignty to its national resources, its monetary politics and guarantied supremacy 
of Belarusian laws in the territory of Belarus (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 113; Marples 1999: 
59). However, the decision by the communist hardliners to support the declaration of 
sovereignty became a sudden change of politics. Actually, it was a result of a consultation 
with the central government that had approved it as long as their intention was to join the 
proposed new union treaty (Marples 1999: 59). The communist hardliners hoped that a 
signing of a new union treaty in practice would nullify the declaration of independence.  
 However, the regime was facing reduced legitimacy as a consequence of the opening 
of the society during the process of liberalisation and as a result of the accusation made by the 
nationalist opposition against the regime. After a period of civil unrest in April 1991, mainly 
due to rising prices, the party tried for a brief period to improve its legitimacy by adopting a 
national communist agenda to meet the demands of the civil society (Mihalisko 1997: 241). 
This agenda was rather quickly abandoned when hardliners in Moscow in August 1991 
initiated a coup d'état against Gorbachev who was on holiday at his Black Sea dacha, a 
dangerous place for unpopular Soviet leaders to spend their spare time. On august 21st a 
resolution was adopted supporting the State of Emergency Committee by the Central 
Committee awaiting the Soviet hardliner plotters to be victorious (Mihalisko 1997: 241). It is 
suggested that several Minsk hardliners knew of the plans to overthrow Gorbachev long 
before they were realised. The coup unveiled that the loyalty of the Belarusian regime was 
with the Moscow hardliners and that the coup had the Belarusian regimes full support. They 
saw it as a possibility to realise their goal of reversing the liberalisation and return to the 
status quo. The coup d'état became a short-lived triumph for both the hardliners in Moscow 
and their followers in Minsk. Faced with the popular mobilisation by Yeltsin in Russia the 
coup soon became a farce and the democratic forces of Russia were victorious. In the 
aftermath of the coup the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were facing a suspension and 
the Belarusian Communist Party tried to distance itself from its former comrades in the 
central party structures to avoid a ban. However, the Communist Party was temporarily 
suspended from the Supreme Soviet of Belarus following the ban of the CPSU in Moscow 
(Marples 1999: 59). This ban had only limited effect upon the influence of the old party 
apparatus and the nomenklatura. The party kept direct control over the cabinet and already 7th 
of December the same year, the party re-emerged in a new and reformed version, the Party of 
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Communist of Belarus. Even thought the party managed to control most of the institutions 
and society the unionist block in Belarus was severely discredited by their support of the 
hardliner coup and altered the political balance in favour of the nationalist opposition 
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 116). The hardliner Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, N. I. 
Dzemiantsei, was forced to resign making the deputy, Shushkevich, chairman of the 
parliament. The appointment of Shushkevich to this position gave the softliner fraction the 
possibility of a more influencing role in Belarusian politics than they had before the coup 
d'état. Despite these changes it was mostly the same people who had supported the coup d'état 
that lead the country during the transition. 
 After the Baltic republics and Ukraine had declared independence in august 1991 
Belarus followed their example. They declared independence August 25th after an initiative of 
the Popular Front but also supported by the communists who tried to regain at least some 
credibility after their unlimited support to the coup d'état. At that moment the declaration of 
independence was somewhat superficial. According to Mihalisko (1997: 241-42) the 
compromise between the Popular Front and the communists allowed the Popular Front to 
pursue economic and political independence, as opposed to national independence, in 
exchange for indefinite ban on the Communist Party which allowed them to reorganise. 
Merely after the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet in December 1991 signed the founding 
agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States with Yeltsin from Russia and 
Kravchuk from Ukraine that effectively ended the Soviet Union Belarus faced independence 
as a real alternative. Had Shushkevich not become Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 
September 1991 this agreement would properly never have been signed, at least not with the 
support of Belarus. The participation of Belarus was essential for the nullification of the 
Union Treaty of 1924, where the three Slavic republics were the original founding republics. 
Shushkevich gave Belarus the independence that not even the national opposition had dared to 
hope for, and by ending the existence of the USSR and thereby removing the central 
government the regime of the Soviet Union broke down. Hence, by ending the Union and 
establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States Shushkevich lead Belarus into the 
phase of transition. The agreement that Shushkevich signed with the Russian and Ukrainian 
leaders was later confirmed by the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, only opposed by a single 
member, later claimed to be the peoples representative Alexander Lukashenka (Mihalisko: 
242). 
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5. The Belarusian Transition 
In this chapter I discuss and analyse the Belarusian transition with regard to regime type. I 
construct three games in this chapter. The two first deal with the social interaction about the 
constitution of new intuitions while the last game includes the influence of the conflict 
dimension about national independence. The games show that sub-optimal outcomes are the 
equilibrium in all games and the nested structure and the hidden agendas of the transition are 
argued to hinder compromises in Belarus on the regime type dimension. However, first I turn 
the attention towards conflict dimensions and actors in the Belarusian transition. 
 
Conflict dimensions and arenas of transition in Belarus 1990-1994 
The transition of Belarus can be defined in time from starting with the break-up of the Soviet 
Union in late 1990 and ending by the presidential election in 1994 as the founding election. 
New institutional arrangements were then established as a consequence of interaction between 
the major political elites. The transition of Belarus differs from many transitions in Southern-
Europe and South-America in a least two aspects, the relative long transitional period as well 
as it seems clear that the transition was a direct result of the break-down of the Soviet Union. 
Hence, the Belarusian transition did not start from internal tension between competing elites 
in the regime and the civil society. However, liberalisation had brought about both opposition 
as well as fragmentation of the ruling elites as shown above. 
 The elites that have been outlined earlier are thought to be the central actors in the 
transition of Belarus. All of them were represented in the Supreme Soviet during the transition 
phase, and it was the same legislative that was elected in the manipulated or biased election of 
1990 that remained intact until 1995. The legislative functioned in close cooperation with the 
Cabinet of Ministers, being the executive branch of power until the founding presidential 
election in 1994 (Marples 1999: 60). It seems reasonable to assume that the Supreme Soviet 
and the Cabinet of Ministers were the main arena for political interaction during the phase of 
transition in Belarus, holding representatives from all major actors and being legitimate 
political institutions recognised by all major actors in this phase of democratisation. 
Both the legislative and the executive were dominated by the communists and there 
was never held an early election for the parliament in Belarus after its independence, even 
though this was demanded by the national opposition. The Popular Front gathered in 
December 1991 about 440.000 signatures in a campaign to call for a referendum on 
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dissolution of the legislative and for new elections (Silitski 2003: 40). The majority in the 
parliament refused to recognise the demand because of supposed violations of the procedures 
for collecting signatures. The failure to create a new parliament did not only leave Belarus 
with a Soviet area legislative dominated by communists, but also left the relative strength of 
the actors and their support in the population to be somewhat unknown to the actors as well as 
observers of the transition. The Popular Front was clearly a minority in parliament but was 
very visible in the political arena. However, the failure of the 1991 campaign to call for a new 
election might, according to Silitski  (2003: 40) show that they had overestimated their own 
strength. A clarification of the actor’s relative strength and support did not occur until after 
the transition defined by the presidential election. It can therefore be suspected that the actors 
did interact without being able to fully foresee their future political position. 
While the political interaction during transition took place within the institutional 
framework established during the phase of liberalisation several conflict issues were central to 
the transition phase. Przeworski (1991: 66-88) argues for two central conflict issues during 
transition, extrication from the powerbase old regime and constitution of a new institutional 
framework for the political game. Furthermore, in his 1992 reversed article he includes 
interaction over the economic reform or economic conflict as an issue of conflict during 
transition (Przeworski 1992: 126-31). In addition to these three conflict issues the 
reintroduction made by Linz and Stepan (1996: 17-37) of Rustow’s (1970) argument under 
the name of stateness can be highly relevant for Post-Soviet transitions as a conflict issue 
regarding the future nature of the state. These four potential conflict dimensions have 
different degree of relevance for the Belarusian transition. This thesis will argue for dominant 
presence of two of the conflict issues in Belarus during transition, namely the conflict of 
constitution and the conflict concerning the future nature of the state. The other two conflict 
issues were only to a limited degree present in Belarus, and were never brought about as 
central issues by any of the main actors.   
 The conflict about the future nature of the state is of central importance in Belarus at 
the beginning of the transition. When Belarus entered a transition there was no consensus on 
whether Belarus should be a nation state, take part of a commonwealth together with other 
former communist states or strive for a reintegration with other former Soviet republics in an 
attempt to re-establish the Soviet Empire in some form or another. Unravelling these choices 
was of great importance to the Belarusian elites. Even for the Popular Front the idea of a 
nation state was so remotely from what they had expected possible that they strongly 
supported that Belarus should join a commonwealth with its neighbouring republics and its 
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historical brothers (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 116).  
   The conflict dimension which is central to the question on which regime type that is 
the outcome of the transition is the constitution of a new institutional framework, and the 
possible choices for the actors on this dimension are clearly the three broad categories 
outlined in the theory chapter. It is this conflict that determines the outcome of the transition 
with regard to regime type, an issue that becomes central towards the end of the Belarusian 
transition. This issue can be regarded as somewhat problematic to the Belarusian actors since 
they spent over three years to establish a new regime as well as refusing early elections. An 
explanation of why this was problematic to the actors of the Belarusian transition and why the 
Belarusian transition did expand in time can be that the creation of institutions might have 
unintended effects in arenas other than just the constitution. The creation of national 
institutions in Belarus might have a positive effect on the solution of creating a new set of 
rules of the political game in the Post-Soviet context, while producing a negative effect for 
non nationalistic actors in the national arena or stateness issue. Creating national institutions 
will in both long and short term perspectives help to consolidate the national idea, and have a 
positive effect on nation building. Hence, the establishment of a Belarusian presidency will 
weaken the imperial segments while strengthen the national segments in short term as well as 
in long term. The cost of the new institutions that can strengthen the national segments and 
support nation building will be larger for imperialists than for nationalists. As long as re-
establishment of the Soviet empire seems a possible outcome, the cost of establishing new 
national institutions will be more costly for the imperialist than upholding the status quo. As 
long as the possibility of re-integration with the other republics exists, the short term costs of 
the inappropriate institutional design and an expanded transition period will be lower than the 
cost of creating national institutions. This can be one explanation of why it took over three 
years to establish a new institutional framework in Belarus and why the resistance amongst 
parliamentary hardliners to an early election was so pronounced. They strived against 
initiatives that could give legitimacy to a national state. Hence, from this argument it can be 
seen that these two dimensions had influence upon one another. To understand actor’s 
preferences upon a single dimension it will be useful to take the other into consideration. 
 With regard to the issue of extraction from the power structures of the former regime 
Przeworski (1991: 74-5) argues that the presence of this conflict dimension in post-
communist transitions is of minor importance due to the fact that the military as a tool for 
repression to a large extent was under civilian control and placed itself on the sideline of the 
transitional conflicts serving the nation rather than the regime. However, in the Soviet Union 
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a complete apparatus for suppression existed outside the military through the police and the 
KGB. While the military was defined to defend the regime and country against outside 
enemies a parallel apparatus existed to defend against internal enemies. This apparatus was to 
a large extend pacified during transition due to their unlimited support of the august 1991 
coup d'état. Hence, the extraction was largely ended before the phase of transition started in 
both Russia and Belarus.  
 The forthcoming crisis that seemed imminent in the Soviet Union was according to 
Koktysh  (1999) not recognised in Belarus until after independence due to the relative high 
living standards enjoyed by Belarusians compared to other republics and to the economic 
structure of  Belarus. This factor combined with the fact that no political actors dared to bear 
the cost of an economic transition effectively hindered this issue from becoming central 
during the phase of transition. The Popular Front did not affect a transition to market 
economy or market reforms neither did any segment of the incumbent regime. On the other 
hand Belarus was and still is heavily depended on other former Soviet republics to allocate its 
goods and to maintain inexpensive energy supplies. However, the economic conflict was of 
minor importance during transition and has only become an issue of conflict at later stages. 
 
Actors and preferences 
As discussed in the previous chapter, three sets of actors can be defined as relevant in the 
Belarusian transition. The Belarusian Popular Front appeared during liberalisation mobilising 
on national and environmental issues. During the phase of liberalisation the regime was 
dominated by hardliners. However, a fragmentation of the regime became visible after the 
March 1990 election to the Supreme Soviet of Belarus where a reform friendly fraction was 
established as a part of the Democratic Club. The softliner fraction was led by Deputy 
Chairman Shushkevich. This fraction remained weak but took the opportunity offered in the 
aftermath of the August coup d'état and became influential in the beginning of the transition. 
The hardliner fraction remain the most powerful actor in the Belarusian transition despite their 
strong support for the plotters during the 1991 coup d'état. They controlled the executive and 
were supported by a majority in the Supreme Soviet. The most prominent figure in this 
fraction after the dismissal of Dzemiantsei as Chairman of the legislative was Prime Minister 
Kebich. 
 To analyse the outcome of the interaction between these three actor groups about the 
two relevant conflict issues one must outline their preferred strategies towards the outcome of 
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the interaction. As outlined in the theory chapter the strategies considered in this thesis are 
collapsed into the three main categories of democracy, hybrid regime or a status quo 
resembling authoritarian regime. As this thesis defines the actor group’s strategies towards the 
constitution of new institutions, it also defines the actor’s position towards the question of 
national independence. 
 
Strategies of the Belarusian Popular Front  
The establishment of the Popular Front in 1988 was a direct result of the phase of 
liberalisation and the glasnost and perestroika politics, to support these developments in 
Belarus as well as the national reawakening. The Popular Front functioned both as a cultural 
movement and later as a political party and states itself as having a clearly democratic and 
national orientation to the political agenda of the transition. As the Popular Front is not a 
fraction of the incumbent regime, but a result of mobilisation from civil society after the 
opening of the regime it is reasonable to anticipate that the party can be classified as an 
opposition group and in support of democracy, hence having democracy as its most preferred 
strategy.  
This is confirmed by the party’s own internet homepage. According to the party 
charter the party had a: dual objective of the attainment of democracy and independence 
through national rebirth of civil society, which was destroyed by communists and foreign 
occupation. ((BNF) 2000). The pages also outline the Party of the Popular Fronts goals and 
policies as being the struggle for a independent, democratic and neutral state having good 
relation with all nation without having …special ties with gigantic Russia and the 
strengthening of the semi-colonial status advocated by the communist rulers of Belarus. (BNF 
2000). The party also advocates closer bonds and cooperation with the historical partners in 
the Baltics, Central Europe and the Black Sea regions claiming them to have a similar 
mentality, historical experience and economic and political challenges giving hope for a 
speedy integration into Europe (BNF 2000). Hence, an orientation towards the European 
Union while keeping good relations with Russia and other former Soviet Republics like the 
ones adopted by the three Baltic Republics after their independence and transition. The party 
does not openly speak out for membership of the European Union but mentions … a speedy 
integration with pan-European and organizations (BNF 2000). If the goal of the party is 
integration into the European Economic Community democracy is an absolute necessity for 
such a process to take place. 
As the above quotation shows the Popular Front has a dual agenda of both democracy 
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and national independence. As argued earlier, the Popular Front mobilised on the three issues 
of language, Stalinist crimes and the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. All issues were 
related to national reawakening and national mobilisation of the Belarusian nation and the 
creation of a new national identity. Independence as well as democracy are to be achieved 
through national rebirth, hence the creation of a real and distinct Belarusian identity. The dual 
goals are also confirmed by Marples (1999: 48) as being the establishment of popular 
authority and the rebirth of the Belarusian nation. The Popular Front are, according to its 
leader Paznyak, not extremists but committed to the concepts of Christian democracy and 
conservatism (Marples 1999: 48). In the phase of transition nothing implies that the Popular 
Front is to take a maximalist or radical position. They are believed to be gradualist on the 
dimension of constitution of new institutions, hence representing the moderate opposition 
segment as described by Colomer (2000: 37,49). The prioritising of the strategies of the 
Popular Front is therefore as follows: 
 
Democracy > Hybrid regime > Status Quo 
 
However, it is worth mentioning the potential for a maximalist strategy structure for the 
Popular Front as a consequence of its dual goals. As long as the Popular Front has the 
possibility to pursue its goal of independence and national rebirth independently of its 
decision upon the dimension of constitution, hence that the dimensions are not interconnected 
and choices upon them are made separately, the Popular Front will remain gradualists. On the 
other hand, if it is no longer possible for them to make decisions independently upon the two 
dimensions and they are forced to prioritise between their twin goals they might be willing to 
sacrifice democracy over national independence. This holds as long as national independence 
is considered to be of greater importance than democracy. Hence, the actor’s utility is 
maximised. 
 
Strategies of the centrist reform communists 
Stanislau Shushkevich played a strategic role in the first phase of the Belarusian transition as 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and functioning head of state. He represents a centrist 
fraction in Belarusian politics in the early 1990s and was a leading figure in Belarusian 
politics in the beginning of the transition. According to Mihalisko  (1997: 242) Shushkevich 
is one of very few politicians to occupy a centric position between the national opposition and 
the hardliner communists. However, the role played by Shushkevich in the transition is 
controversial and disputed and he is blamed by some democrats for the failures of the early 
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transition phase and by taking an active part in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. He also became the scapegoat for 
the hardliner fraction blaming him for all future failures as well (Marples 1999: 61).  
Unlike the hardliners he recognises, at least in the long term, the need for economic 
reforms and restructuring of society. In an interview with the journal Demokratizatsiya in 
2004, Shushkevich points to opposition or opponents to his own position from two sides, from 
the left by communists and from the right by the Popular Front placing himself in a centrist 
position between the national opposition and the hardliner communists. (Shushkevich 2004: 
68). He distances himself from the majority of  communists in The Supreme Soviet; “…where 
the majority was not of my thinking. (Shushkevich 2004: 68). He very much put himself in the 
same situation as Gorbachev did on the central level some years earlier when trying to 
navigate between the communist majority and the national opposition. Trying to control the 
transition he shifted alliance between the hardliners and the Popular Front trying to build 
compromises and promote his own centrist goals.  
 The softliner actor that occupies the central position in the scheme adopted by 
Colomer (2000: 37) has a hybrid regime as his most preferred strategy. As Shushkevich is 
identified as a being in a middle position between the two other actors it is in this thesis 
presumed that he promotes the intermediate position of a hybrid regime as his most preferred 
strategy. However, it is hard to determine whether he is adopting the position of the radical or 
moderate softliner. In the aftermath he claims himself to be a democrat indicating a radical 
softliner position (Shushkevich 2004). Attempts to cooperate with the Popular Front would 
also point to such a position. On the other hand many things do indicate a position of the 
moderate softliner player. He does at several occasions point to the importance of 
compromising with the communist majority of the Supreme Soviet stressing the danger of 
confrontation in a society with a week national identity which had still not consolidated the 
idea of national independence. He promotes moderation towards the former rulers:  
 
Besides, we did not attack them, we had just separate incidents. People that all the time had suffered 
because of the repression of Belarusness, they demanded more, they demanded punishment against 
those that carried out the reprisals against Belarusness. But we did not go the way of lustration. We 
were brave enough to understand that you cannot do this in Belarus. (Shushkevich 2004: 67) 
 
No, this was not the Czech Republic, where there was a clear national treachery by the top leadership. 
It was also not the Baltic republics. In Belarus there was a different system. And we developed certain 
restraints. More than anything, we achieved independence without shedding a single drop of blood after 
200 years of Russian domination. That is why I don’t think we could have gone any further. But 
probably we did not pay enough attention to explanation- it was difficult to explain.(Shushkevich 2004: 
67) 
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According to Mihalisko (1997: 247) Shushkevich was a meandering moderate at times 
where bold steps were to be taken to point out the future for Belarus. On the question of an 
early election in Belarus that was brought forward by the Popular Front, that preceded as 
much as 440.000 signatures in favour of a parliamentary election in 1992, Shushkevich sided 
with the communist majority in rejection the proposal and at this time he sided with the 
majority on many issues (Silitski 2003: 40). Despite his prominent position as speaker of 
parliament and function head of state Shushkevich failed to put forward any blueprint for 
democratic reforms in Belarus during the Belarusian transition (Mihalisko 1997: 247). Neither 
did he show particular interest in the Popular Fronts initiative for an early parliamentary 
election. Internal rivalry between the Popular Fronts leader Pazniak and Shushkevich 
weakened the opposition and the Popular Front newer forgave him for his “betrayal” (Silitski 
2003: 40). These confrontations with the opposition, his reservations against confrontation 
with the old regime and his orientation towards cooperation with the communist majority of 
the Supreme Soviet do indicate a moderate softliner position. Hence, Shushkevich will 
prioritise the status quo over democracy. The prioritising of the strategies of Shushkevich on 
the dimension of constitution is therefore as follows: 
 
Hybrid Regime > Status Quo > Democracy 
 
It is very likely that the utility expected by the actor in return from following his second and 
third strategy is approximately equal. The reason for his ordering of preferences can be the 
actor’s expectation of extraction benefits from cooperation with the majority actor, hence 
gaining slightly more utility from his second best strategy when played in cooperation with 
the majority actor. If the strength of the actors change or new and more important issues are 
brought to the arena he might extract greater utility from changing allies by playing the third 
best strategy. Hence, he will then gain a greater utility for the third strategy of democracy and 
the structure of the strategy order will change to the one of the radical softliner.  
Such an issue may lead to an alteration of the actor’s strategies and be the one 
described as the issue of national independence. Shushkevich did host the meeting between 
himself, Yeltsin and Kravchuk at Belavezha in Western Belarus where the three leaders of the 
founding republics of the Soviet Union put an end to the existence of the Soviet Union and 
created the Commonwealth of Independent states. The commonwealth was adopted as a 
civilised form of transition towards independence, much reflecting the earlier views of the 
Popular Front, that had advocated a commonwealth including Belarus historical companions 
(Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 116-17). Shushkevich was closer to the Popular Front on the 
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issue of national independence than to the communist hardliners and was committed to 
independence and sovereignty (Mihalisko 1997: 247). However, he stresses the importance of 
compromising with the hardliners, creating a broad compromise for independence by 
including continued work on a Union Treaty while safeguarding Belarusian independence and 
recognition by Russia (Shushkevich 2004: 68-9). Hence, on this issue he stays with the 
national opposition but unlike the Popular Front he sees the necessity of making a concession 
to the hardliners to secure independence.   
 
Strategies of the communist hardliners 
The radical hardliner coup d'état attempt in Moscow in August did not only clear the way for 
softliners like Shushkevich but it also brought Viacheslua Kebich and his fraction into a 
dominant position as head of the Council of Ministers of Belarus. Kebich had long roots in the 
communist party and had been a party member for more than 30 years when he became Prime 
Minister in 1991 (Marples 1999: 60). In the phase of transition he took a leading role in the 
hardliner fraction due to his position as Premier and head of the executive branch of power in 
Belarus. Through the Kebich fraction, the old elites and the nomenklarura had a strong grasp 
on power in Belarus both in the executive and legislative during the phase of transition. They 
totally dominated the soviet era parliament as well as the government. Real power did not lay 
with Shushkevich but with the Council of Ministers, hence with the Kebich fraction (Marples 
1999: 61). However, the legitimacy of the majority fraction represented by Kebich was 
seriously damaged by the unlimited support of the Belarusian regime for the August plotters 
in Moscow and was therefore dependent on cooperation and compromise with other actors for 
legitimacy. This was at least the case in the beginning of transition when the real strength of 
the actors in society remained unclear. 
 According to Marples (1999: 61) Kebich was resistant to a fundamental change in 
Belarus and a long term member of the ruling soviet elite. During the phase of liberalisation in 
Belarus the Communist Party was as earlier shown hostile to the reforms that were 
implemented by the regime in Moscow, trying hard to restrict or hinder implementation of 
these in Belarus. The regime in Belarus also sided with the plotters during the August coup 
d'état. Even though the Communist Party of Belarus was forbidden after the coup, a new party 
emerged in December that same year, the Party of Communist of Belarus. The ban led to 
some change in the ruling elites, though the major changes in the top leadership were 
peripheral (Marples 1999: 59-60). The communists were still in control of most spheres of 
society even after the independence, and as stated by Shushkevich  (2004: 66-7) a clear break 
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or lustration of the communists were neither possible or desirable in Belarus. The communists 
stayed in power throughout the phase of transition and did to a large extend stay loyal to 
Kebich and acted as a united group both in parliament and in the Council of Ministers. The 
main political goals of the communists were according to Marples (1999: 60) to support 
closer ties with Russia, being hostile and resistant towards economic reforms and privatisation 
and in favour of a restoration of the Soviet Union, hence a return to the pre-Gorbachev era. 
This argument supports a structure of strategies of the hardliner fractions as described by 
Colomer (2000: 37) hence having a status quo as their most preferred strategy. 
 Even though the leadership of the hardliner communist fraction largely remained the 
same after the coup d'état and some radical elements as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
was removed, the most radical elements of the ruling elites was neutralised due to their 
support to the August coup. This was not sufficient to introduce radical changes in the 
political elites or leading the majority to adopt new ideas (Belova-Gille 2003: 56-7). 
However, the most radical elements were pacified, and the prioritising of the strategies for the 
hardliner actor in the Belarusian transition phase is believed to be the gradualist one, hence 
the one of the moderate hardliner actor. The prioritising of the strategies of the Kebich 
fraction on the dimension of constitution is therefore as follows: 
  
Status Quo > Hybrid regime > Democracy 
 
On the aspect of national independence the Kebich fraction differs substantially from both the 
national opposition and the centric Shushkevich by being strong opponents of national 
independence as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some fractions even advocate the 
re-establishment of the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union (Marples 1999: 60). The compromise of 
independence made between the hardliner communist fraction, the national opposition and 
with Shushkevich as architect opened for the possibility of re-integration with other former 
soviet republics, work on a new union treaty or development of closer integration within the 
framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Such goals were also pursued by the 
Kebich fraction towards the end of the transition phase. 
 
Preferences of actors towards possible outcomes of interaction in the 
Belarusian transition 
Having outlined the ordering and prioritising of strategies of the actors of the Belarusian 
transition towards the dimension of constitution of institutions lead us to the next step; 
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outlining the ordering of preferences towards the possible outcomes of the collective 
interaction that takes place during the phase of transition on the dimension of constitution. 
The interaction between two actors within the framework of the three strategies democracy, 
hybrid regime and status quo produces a total of nine different outcomes (23=8). Adding a 
third actor to the strategic interaction expands the possible number of outcomes to 27 if all 
three strategies are taken into consideration (33=27). However, as stated by Colomer (2000: 
47-8) the last strategy of the actor should be considered as a complete defeat or surrender to 
the predominant actor rather than a strategy of interaction. Since we can expect the actor to 
extract little or no utility from playing such a strategy the third strategy is not considered a 
rational option for the actor to play. Hence, the actor will be at least as good or better off by 
withdrawing from the interaction as by playing the third strategy if the costs of interaction 
exceed the possible utility of the third strategy. It will then no longer be rational for the actor 
to participate in the interaction. Hence, actors are not playing their third strategy during the 
interaction with other actors in the phase of transition. Therefore, including the third strategy 
in the game model and the preference ordering will not add any explanatorily strength to the 
model. So, to maintain realism and avoid unnecessary complication of the model the third 
strategy of the actors is excluded from the model. 
 To order the actors preferences towards the possible outcomes where the actors 
involved in the game can choose from their two most preferred outcomes Colomer (2000: 48) 
suggests a hypothesis in which the actors above all prefer the outcome with a degree of 
pressure for change that corresponds to the actor’s most preferred strategy. Hence, the actors 
preferring the largest degree of change from the former authoritarian regime, the opposition 
actors who prefer the strategy of democracy over all other strategies will prioritise outcomes 
with the largest degree of pressure for change over outcomes with a lower degree of pressure 
for change. The most preferred outcome for the opposition actor is when all actors play the 
strategy of democracy and so on. The least preferred outcome for an opposition actor will be 
one of almost no change where all actors play the strategy of status quo. If outcomes of 
interaction reflect roughly the same degree of change the outcome that is produced by 
coincident strategies of actors are preferred to an outcome with consecutive strategies 
reflecting a conflict outcome (Colomer 2000: 48). This reflects the costs related to a situation 
of conflict for the actors. If possible, the actors will try to reduce the costs connected with the 
interaction when the outcomes produce an approximately equal degree of change. Hence, 
when the actor can extract an approximately equal degree of utility from the outcomes with 
regard to the degree of change the actor’s choice will be determined by the degree of costs 
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connected with outcomes and the one with the lowest degree of cost is chosen.  
Actors choice = Utility of degree of change minus Cost of conflict. 
 It is possible to have a total of 27 outcomes from interaction with three actors with 
three different strategies. However, in a static game between the three actors who play their 
two best strategies that have been examined above there are eight possible outcomes. To make 
a perspicuous examination of the actor’s preferences towards the outcomes relevant for the 
model only the eight possible outcomes are considered. Only one of the outcomes of the 
interaction, the outcome where all actors choose a hybrid regime, is a non-conflict outcome. 
This represents an outcome where the moderate or centric player, here the Shushkevich 
fraction, intervenes between two distant actors with opposing interests creating the possibility 
for a compromise that includes all actors in the transition. This outcome where all actors play 
the intermediate strategy of a hybrid regime represents both a low cost of conflict by 
compromising and a medium high degree of pressure for change.  
All other outcomes represent some degree of conflict either between two actors with 
coinciding strategies and one actor opposing this, or where all three actors have opposing 
strategies. No less than six outcomes represent situations where two actors compromise while 
the third actor is left out. Only two of these six outcomes represent a compromise between the 
national opposition and the Shushkevich fraction while four outcomes reflect compromises 
between the Shushkevich fraction and the Kebich fraction. This skewed distribution between 
actor compromises firstly reflects a situation where the softliner fraction is moderate and, for 
some reason or another, seeks cooperation with the hardliners. Hence, Shushkevich 
recognised the dominant position of Kebich as well as the necessity of compromising with 
this fraction in the phase of transition (Shushkevich 2004). At the same time this argument 
reflects the relative weakness of the national opposition compared with the hardliners in 
power. However, it also reflects the distance between the actors on the dimension of the 
constitution of the new regime. When viewing this dimension isolated the Kebich fraction and 
the Shushkevich fraction are relatively closer while the national opposition takes a more 
distant position at least towards the hardliners. It might also reflect the Popular Fronts 
scepticism towards compromising with the other actors because they fears loosing national 
independence, hence viewing the interaction over this dimension as a part of a nested game 
that also includes the national dimension. 
Twice does the compromises reflects an outcome where the Kebich fraction and the 
Shushkevich fraction agree upon the strategy of status quo while the national opposition is left 
out of the compromise by choosing either democracy or a hybrid regime. Such an outcome 
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would uphold the authoritarian regime and probably exclude the national opposition from 
further political participation. These outcomes reflect a low or a medium low degree of 
pressure for change compared with the former regime. The last compromise outcome 
excluding the national opposition occurs when both the Kebich and the Shushkevich fractions 
choose to play their strategy of hybrid regime while the Popular Front plays the strategy of 
democracy. This situation reflects an outcome similar to the compromise outcome discussed 
earlier, but where the one actor, the national opposition does not enter into the compromise 
but stays with its most preferred strategy of democracy. Like the outcomes ending in status 
quo the national opposition does not take part in the compromise. The crafting of the new 
institutional framework is left to the two remaining actors. However, unlike the outcomes 
resulting in a status quo situation a hybrid regime opens for the possibility of limited 
participation also for the Popular Front. This situation reflects the largest degree of pressure 
for change of all the outcomes resulting from this interaction. 
Two outcomes are reflections of a situation in which the Popular Front enters into a 
compromise about a hybrid regime with either the Kebich or the Shushkevich fraction while 
the actor who does not enter into the compromise chooses the strategy of status quo. A 
compromise between the national opposition and the incumbent ruling fraction would lead to 
a regime with limited contestation and participation most likely leaving the Popular Front 
without major influence in politics at first, but still securing them the possibility to continue to 
press for reforms. A compromise between the Popular Front and the Shushkevich fraction 
reflects a situation where the two weakest actors in a astounding way manage to 
outmanoeuvre the ruling Kebich fraction and somehow pacify this dominant actor. Both these 
changes reflect outcomes with a medium low degree of pressure for change. Schedler (2002b) 
presents an argument for why actors would settle for this sort of a half way solution which the 
hybrid regime represents. Shortly his argument is that the actors do not see the founding 
election as the end of transition as closing the possibility for political changes in the future. 
Instead the actors see the limited possibilities for contestation and participation as tools to 
pressure for further political change especially at times of election in a situation of a nested 
game democratisation by elections. This hypothesis can also help explain the recent 
revolutions in post-communist regimes. 
 Two outcomes represent situations where all actors play strategies which are opposing 
each other without any element of compromise between the participation actors. Respectively, 
when the national opposition plays democracy, the Kebich fraction plays status quo when the 
Shushkevich fraction plays a hybrid regime or when the Kebich fraction chooses to play a 
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hybrid regime and the Shushkevich fraction plays status quo. These two outcomes represent 
situations of conflict between the actors in which actors face the cost of conflict without being 
able to extract utility from cooperation. The result of such a confrontation during the phase of 
transition will therefore depend upon the position and strength of the actors. Both conflict 
outcomes represent a medium high degree of pressure for change from the authoritarian point 
of departure. 
Outcome descriptionStrategy sets
Compromise outcome in which the Shushkevich fraction and Kebich fraction agree 
upon a status quo regime while the Popular Front presses for a hybrid regimeH,S,S
Compromise outcome in which the Kebich fraction and the Popular Front agree 
upon a hybrid regime while the Shushkevich fraction presses for a status quo regimeH,S,H
Compromise outcome in which the Shushkevich fraction and the Popular Front 
agree upon a hybrid regime while Kebich fraction presses for a status quo regimeH,H,S
Compromise outcome in which the Shushkevich fraction and Kebich fraction agree 
upon a status quo regime while the Popular Front presses for further democratic 
reforms
D,S,S
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue conflicting strategies, no compromise 
reached as result of interactionD,H,S
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue their most preferred strategy, no 
compromise reached as result of interactionD,S,H
Compromise outcome in which all actors agree upon the establishment of a hybrid 
regimeH,H,H
Compromise outcome in which the Shushkevich fraction and Kebich fraction agree 
upon a hybrid regime while the Popular Front presses for further democratic reformsD,H,H
Strategies: D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the 
Popular Front, second to Shushkevich fraction and third to Kebich fraction
Outcomes of strategic interaction about constitution
Table 5.1
 
The eight outcomes can be ordered with regard to the degree of pressure for change 
from to the former regime. The strategy representing the largest degree of pressure for change 
is the opposition’s first strategy of democracy followed by the softliners first strategy of a 
hybrid regime representing a medium pressure for change. A low degree of or no pressure for 
change is represented by the hardliners most preferred strategy of a status quo dictatorship.  
The ordering of the outcomes is discussed above and is illustrated in table 5.2. The outcome 
representing the highest degree of pressure for change is a hybrid regime established by the 
softliner and hardliner actors while the opposition actor keeps pressing for democracy. A 
medium high degree of pressure for change is present in the outcomes when all actors are 
compromising on a hybrid regime as well as the two conflict outcomes in which the 
opposition always pressures for democracy and one of the two other actors will pressure for a 
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hybrid regime. 
 The remaining two outcomes that leads to a hybrid regime is ordered together with 
the outcome in which the opposition goes for democracy while the two remaining actors 
compromise upon preserving the regime in its pre-transitional form as outcomes with medium 
low pressure for change. Both these compromise outcomes represent a situation in which the 
actor excluded from the compromise will press for a status quo dictatorship. While the status 
quo compromise outcome in which the opposition actor plays the strategy representing the 
largest degree of change, the strategy of democracy, the two remaining actors press for low or 
no change in their choices of strategy. One outcome represents a situation with a lower 
pressure for change than these three outcomes, hence the outcome in which the opposition 
chooses the medium change strategy of a hybrid regime while the hardliners and the softliners 
choose to pressure for the status quo pre-transitional dictatorship leading to a low or almost 
non existing pressure for change compared to the former regime. 
High D,H,H
Medium high D,S,H D,H,S H.H.H
Medium low H,H,S H,S,H D,S,S
Low/non H,S,S
Outcomes ordered towards the degree of pressure for change
Strategies: D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the 
Popular Front, second to Shushkevich fraction and third to Kebich fraction
Table 5.2
 
Having discussed the degree of pressure for change connected with the different 
outcomes it is possible to rank the actor’s preference order towards the eight alternative 
outcomes. This is done in consistency with Colomers (2000: 47-9) hypothesises on how the 
actors range the outcomes in accordance with their strategies and how to minimise the cost of 
conflict. However, by ordering the preferences in a three player game after these two 
 72
assumptions there will be outcomes in which the actors are indifferent towards the outcomes, 
hence they are expected to extract the same degree of utility from the different outcomes. The 
preference structure for the three actors is outlined in table 5.3. The outcomes are given 
ordinal values of which eight represents the greatest utility while one represents the lowest.  
The Popular Front first strategy is as earlier outlined democracy followed by a hybrid 
regime and status quo as the least preferred. This ordering of strategies defines the preferred 
outcomes as the ones that represent the largest degree of pressure for change over the ones 
that represent a lower degree of pressure for change. Hence, as seen in table 5.2 the outcome 
that represents the largest degree of change is the outcome in which the opposition presses for 
democracy and the two other actors press for a hybrid regime. Therefore this is the most 
preferred outcome of the Popular Front. Three outcomes are described as representing a 
medium high degree of pressure for change. Of these the Popular Front will prefer the 
compromise outcome in which all actors compromise on a hybrid regime. After that the two 
conflict outcomes will follow. Here the Popular Front will always press for the most preferred 
strategy and it is assumed that the Popular Front will be indifferent to which strategy the two 
other players choose as long as the result is a conflict. Consequently, it is believed that the 
Popular Front is indifferent to the conflict outcomes that represent the same utility to the 
actors and it is therefore given the same ordinal value. Of the three outcomes that represent 
medium low degree of pressure for change the outcome in which the Popular Front press for 
democracy while the others press for status quo will be the most preferred by the opposition 
because it is the closest choice of its initial strategy. The two remaining outcomes would 
according to the two original hypnotises represent a situation of indifference for the Popular 
Front. The worst outcome for the national opposition would be the situation in which they 
press for a hybrid regime while the other actors agree upon upholding a status quo 
dictatorship leaving no room for nationalism or opposition activity. This outcome also 
represents the lowest degree of pressure for change of all outcomes in the game. 
As can be seen from the above table, Shushkevich would prefer the outcomes 
representing medium high degree of pressure for change over the other outcomes. Hence, the 
outcome that is most preferred is the one in which all actors compromise on a common 
solution of a hybrid regime. Of the two conflict outcomes Shushkevich fraction will prefer the 
one in which he chooses a hybrid regime and the other two actors choose conflicting 
outcomes over the conflict outcome in which the Shushkevich fraction chooses status quo. 
These outcomes are followed by those that represent a medium low degree of change. The 
most preferred outcome among these is that of which both the Shushkevich fraction and the 
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national opposition choose a hybrid regime. In accordance to the two hypothesises the actor is 
indifferent towards the two remaining outcomes representing a medium low degree of 
pressure for change. It is furthermore assumed that the actor would prefer the outcome 
representing high degree of pressure for change over the one representing low pressure for 
change. The Shushkevich fraction which belongs to the softliner group of actors is in favour 
of changes and does recognise the need for change to avoid a systemic crisis in the future. 
Preferences of the actors in the Belarusian transition
1D,H,HH,S,SH,S,S
2D,S,HD,H,H
3D,H,SD,S,S-H,S,HH,H,S-H,S,H
4H,H,HH,H,SD,S,S
5H,S,HD,S,HD,H,S-D,S,H
6D,S,S-H,H,SD,H,SH,H,H
7H,S,SH,H,HD,H,H
Ordinal 
Payoff
Kebich
Fraction
Shushkevich
Fraction
Popular Front
D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the Popular 
front, second to Shushkevich fraction and third to Kebich fraction
Table 5.3
 
The most preferred strategy of the Kebich fraction is status quo. Then follow the 
strategy of a hybrid regime and finally democracy. This ordering of the strategies suggests an 
orientation against change and in favour of preservation of the existing social order and 
regime. Hence, this fraction will prioritise outcomes representing a low degree of pressure for 
change over the ones representing higher pressure for change. Their most preferred outcome 
is the one representing low or no degree of pressure for change, the one in which both the 
Kebich and the Shushkevich fractions press for status quo while the Popular Front presses for 
a hybrid regime. This outcome is followed by the ones representing a medium low degree of 
pressure for change in which the Kebich fraction will be indifferent to the two outcomes of in 
which they are pressuring for status quo while the third outcome in which they are pressing 
for a hybrid regime would be the least preferred of the three. Of the three outcomes 
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representing medium high degree of pressure for change, the outcome representing consensus 
is the most preferred followed by the conflict outcome in which the Kebich fraction chooses 
status quo and the least preferred is the conflict outcome in which the Kebich fraction chooses 
a hybrid regime. The worst outcome for the Kebich fraction is the one which represents the 
largest degree of pressure for change in which the Popular Front presses for democracy and 
the two other actors press for a hybrid regime.  
 
The Game of Transition in Belarus 1991-93 
The game presented in the figure below is a refection of the political situation in Belarus 
during the first phase of transition with three actors participating as player in the game of 
strategic interaction about constitution. As can be seen from the preference structure in table 
5.3 the two distant actors possess dominant strategies in the game. The Popular Front has a 
dominant strategy of democracy while the Kebich fraction possesses a dominant strategy of 
status quo. This means that these two actors would be better off choosing their most preferred 
strategy no matter what the two remaining actors choose. The dominant strategy of an actor is 
unconditionally the best choice the actor can make under any circumstance. Choosing this 
strategy gives higher utility to both actors. The Shushkevich fraction on the other hand does 
not possess a dominant strategy, and will therefore be able to change strategy according to the 
other players choice to maximise his utility. This game is sketched in figure 5.1. 
 This applied model is a static game theoretic model in which the actors possess full 
information about their own and their opponent’s strategies and payoffs. The actors are 
expected to act simultaneously not knowing the move of the other actors (Hovi and Rasch 
1993: 45). By solving the game it appears that the equilibrium of the game is positioned in the 
upper left cell of the matrix.10 This outcome has earlier been described as a conflict situation 
in which all actors choose their most preferred strategy. This actual outcome is a Nash 
equilibrium meaning that none of the actors have the initiative to change their strategy 
unilaterally from the strategies that forms the equilibrium. However, the Nash equilibrium in 
this game is a Pareto-suboptimal equilibrium because all actors can improve their payoffs by 
moving from the conflict outcome representing the Nash-equilibrium to the compromise 
                                                 
10 The game is solved by dominant strategies for the Popular Front and the Kebich fraction. They will always 
play their most preferred strategy. The Shushkevich fraction has a mixed strategy which forms the equilibrium in 
the outcome: DHS. 
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outcome in which all actors choose hybrid regime as their strategy.11 Nevertheless, the actors 
does not manage to end in this outcome, not because they are irrational but because they form 
their decision based upon individual rationality and not upon collective rationality and as long 
as an actor possesses a strategy that is strictly dominant it would be irrational to change this 
strategy to a another one that makes the actor worse of (Midtbø 2003: 127).  
 
To reach the Pareto-optimal solution of the game it is necessary for both the Kebich fraction 
and the Popular Front to shift from their strictly dominant strategies simultaneously as a 
collective action and not as a unilateral move. If one of the actor fractions makes a unilateral 
change of strategy in expectation of achieving some collective good by inspiring other actors 
to do the same change of strategy it would most likely face a punishment from the other actor. 
The opposing actor will extract greater utility by staying in his original position playing his 
strictly dominant strategy leaving his opponent with a worse payoff than in the Nash 
equilibrium while he himself extracts a greater utility. This makes the game presented in 
                                                 
11 This discussion of change in strategies depends upon the assumptions of Brams’ (1994) “theory of moves” in 
which the game has an initial state and the actors can react and counter react on each others moves before the 
game ends (Tvedt 2004: 86). Hence, they are entering into a dynamic interaction. 
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figure 5.1, a three player variant of the prisoners’ dilemma.12 
 Having a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto suboptimal makes the outcome stable 
towards the actors unilaterally changing their strategy due to the danger of being punished by 
other actors while being unstable with regard to the actors collectively changing their 
strategies in order to achieve a better payoff. On the other hand the Pareto optimal solution is 
which might be achieved by collective action, is unstable precisely because it is not a Nash 
equilibrium and is therefore vulnerable to actors unilaterally changing their strategy to receive 
better payoffs. If the Nash equilibrium had corresponded to the Pareto optimal it would not 
have been possible to change the outcome neither unilaterally nor collectively (Tsebelis 1990: 
67). The Prisoners’ dilemma does on the other hand open for instability not only in the Pareto 
optimal solution but also in the Nash equilibrium.13 
 The game in figure 5.1 is modelled as a static game with full information regarding 
other actor’s preferences upon the dimension, but the information is incomplete due to the fact 
that the game does not specify the sequence of actors’ moves. Actors are believed to act 
simultaneously and not as reactions to choices of other actors. To model the game with full 
and complete information can be done by changing the game into a dynamic game. According 
to Gates and Humes (1997: 4) this can at some instants rule out Nash equilibriums that seems 
unreasonable. In this game actors can respond to previous choices taken by other actors by 
rewarding or punishing their action (Hovi and Rasch 1993: 68). To investigate whether the 
sequence of choice can rule out the Pareto-sub-optimality equilibrium in the Belarusian game 
the game has been turned into a dynamic game as shown in figure 5.2. 
 In the figure the game is opened by the Kebich fraction that can choose between their 
two most preferred strategies status quo or a hybrid regime exactly as in the static game. The 
                                                 
12 In this game, two distant actors intervene as in the classical two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma game. The 
hardliner and opposition players possess dominant strategies in this game. However, in this game they are joined 
by an intermediate softliner player who presumably may temper the sharpness of the confrontation or act as an 
intermediator (Colomer 2000: 147). Despite this, the Nash-equilibrium largely corresponds to that of the two 
player game.  
13 This game has been simulated in a computer model to examine whether repeated games will influence the 
equilibrium. For the expected utility of choosing comprise to be approximately equal to that of not 
compromising the interaction has to be repeated several hundred times. Even when “tit for tat” strategies were 
applied to the game the number of interaction which was needed to achieve a compromise was way beyond the 
time frame of the Belarusian transition. Even when taking into account that this is only a simulation, a 
compromise as result of repeated games seems to be unrealistic in this case. I have neither found empirical 
evidence for such an assumption. 
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Shushkevich fraction can chose between his two most preferred strategies which also is status 
quo and a hybrid regime as a response to the choice of the Kebich fraction. The Popular Front 
on the other hand chooses between democracy and a hybrid regime which is its two most 
preferred strategies. The pay-offs and the outcomes of the game fully correspond to the 
outcomes and utility payoffs determent in the static game. 
Kebich Fraction
S. Fraction S. Fraction
Popular Front
Hybrid
Status Quo
Hybrid Hybrid
Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
Hybrid
Status Quo Status Quo
Dem.Dem.Dem.Dem.
4,7,6 1,2,7 5,3,3 2,5,5 6,4,3 3,6,5 7,1,1 6,3,4
Game of strategic interaction about constitution
Figure 5.2
 
 The game is solved trough backward induction by finding the subgame prefect 
equilibriums. To decide the equilibrium we start by deciding the choices of the last player. 
This is here the Popular Front which in all cases will choose the action that rewards them with 
the highest utility. As for the static game this will always be choosing democracy. Hence, no 
matter the choices of the other actors democracy will always be the most rewarding for the 
Popular Front. Their dominant strategy of democracy is intact even in the extensive form 
game. By deciding the choices of the Popular Front we decide the sub game perfect 
equilibriums in the game. By knowing the Popular Fronts strategies we can rule out four of 
the outcomes that will not be chosen. Knowing these we can decide the Shushkevich 
Fractions action in the game. They can choose between equilibriums that are still available. 
The choice will depend upon the expected utility Shushkevich connects to the outcomes. As 
in the static game Shushkevich has no dominant strategy but makes his choice based upon the 
 78
choice of the other actors. The outcomes not chosen by Shushkevich can be excluded as 
equilibriums. This leaves us with two possible choices for the Kebich fraction when he opens 
the game. One in which implies the choice of a hybrid regime and one in which implies the 
choice of status quo. The strategy of status quo will always reward the Kebich fraction more 
than their second best strategy due to their position of a dominant strategy which also is 
existing in the extensive form game. Hence, the strategy of status quo is chosen. The sub 
game prefect equilibrium that is chosen in this extensive form game corresponds to the 
outcome DHS. This is the same result as found in the static game. The static game Nash 
equilibrium fully corresponds to the sub game perfect equilibrium. This outcome is enhanced 
by the circle. In this game as well there exists a Pareto optimal equilibrium which is enhanced 
by the rectangle. This also corresponds to the Pareto-optimal outcome in the static game the 
compromise upon a hybrid regime. The same instability which characterises the static game is 
also present in the extensive form version. 
 The game presented above the game was opened by the party in power, the Kebich 
fraction. The games could be initiated by other actors such as the opposition or the head of 
state, Shushkevich. However, changing the sequence of the actors choices does not affect 
neither the outcome nor the instability of the game. Thus, the sequence of choices and actors 
position can not help us to reach an equilibrium that is different from the instable and sub-
optimal Nash equilibrium of the static game. 14 
 The prisoners’ dilemma game does not hinder actors from reaching the Pareto-optimal 
solution by moving from the Nash equilibrium to the Pareto optimal outcome, but this have to 
happen under certain circumstances to avoid punishment of the actor that initiates the change 
of strategies. To change strategies the actors must be non myopic and able to communicate, to 
develop what Tsebelis (1990: 68) refers to as contingent or correlated strategies in which 
actors coordinate their strategies in order to avoid sub-optimality. Contingent strategies can be 
developed in general situation when actors start to communicate, and they enter into binding 
agreements known as pacts in the transition literature or when they are able to enter into 
repeated interaction. Actors contracts, their communication or their behaviour in previous 
interaction corresponding to the present game, can give actors the possibility to coordinate or 
correlate their strategies (Tsebelis 1990: 69). By following one or more of these strategies the 
actors can escape the prisoners’ dilemma and avoid Pareto sub-optimality. 
 Colomer (2000: 146-8) suggests that in a three player prisoners’ dilemma game as the 
                                                 
14 For games initiated by the Popular Front and the Shushkevich fraction, please refer to the appendix. 
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one presented above, the softliner actor may temper the sharpness of the confrontation or act 
as an intermediator. The situation of three players intervening over the issue of constitution 
reflects a high degree of pluralism over the relevant conflict dimension in the society. The 
more players the less chance of interaction leading to victory for only one actor according to 
Colomer. If the Shushkevich fraction in Belarus is to act as a intermediator it would be by 
virtue of his position as a centric player positioned between the two more distant actors on the 
conflict dimension of constitution. In such a position it would be possible for Shushkevich to 
use the threatening power he possesses due to his strategic position as an intermediate player 
to try to persuade the two other actors to simultaneously change their strategies and achieve 
the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. As Tsebelis (1990) argues binding agreements can force 
actors to choose such contingent strategies to reach Pareto-optimality. This kind of binding 
agreements is known as a pact in transition theory. They are believed to play an important role 
in transitions as a part of gradually changing the political systems into a more democratic 
direction. Pacts are explicit agreements, not necessarily public known, which are made 
between selected actors. A pact is meant to secure actors vital interests by mutual guarantees 
during transition as well as in the new regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 37). Pacts can 
not only help actors to reach the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in a prisoners’ dilemma game, 
they may also secure that the compromise represented by an equilibrium becomes a stable one 
by rewarding the actor who keeps the agreement and stays in the equilibrium. It is possible to 
reach and keep the compromise equilibrium when the pact rewards the actors to such an 
extend that the cost of breaking the pact by returning to the dominant strategy is larger than 
the utility increase gained by such an action. Under such negotiated situations it is possible to 
move to the Pareto-optimal outcome and secure, as long as the pact is functioning, stability 
against actors leaving the equilibrium unilaterally. It is Colomers (2000) belief that the 
softliner actors in such games can contribute positively in the effort to achieve such outcomes.  
 
Power struggle and conflict during the Belarusian transition 
The game equilibrium is reflecting a conflict outcome where all actors pursue conflicting and 
opposing strategies. The prisoners’ dilemma game suggests that only when specific conditions 
are achieved it is possible to move from this Nash equilibrium to the Pareto Optimal 
equilibrium or any other outcomes which reflects a compromise. The conflict between the 
democratic opposition and the ruling communist fraction has earlier been discoursed under 
the phase of liberalisation as well as under the early phase of transition. The Popular Front 
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and the Kebich fraction are distant actors both on the dimension of constitution as well as on 
the issue of national independence. But conflicts also arose between respectively the Popular 
Front and Shushkevich fraction and the Kebich fraction and Shushkevich during transition. 
These conflicts and Shushkevich’s failed attempts to act as an intermediate actor between the 
more distant actors lead to finally lead to the end of his political career early in 1994. 
 Shushkevich came into conflict with the Popular Front already in aftermath of the 
August coup d'état when the Popular Front was resistant against compromises with the 
softliners fraction within the nomenklatura apparatus. The Popular Front pursued a goal of 
gaining power without building real and lasting political alliances with centric actors (Silitski 
2003: 39). The Popular Front believed Shushkevich to be submissive towards the Kebich 
fraction and was unwilling to enter an agreement on a radical reform program to democratise 
as well as reorient Belarus towards the West. As a consequence no formal cooperation was 
established to secure independence or democracy for Belarus among the reform friendly 
actors. Shushkevich admits such attitudes, claiming it not to be possible due to the strong 
position in the power apparatus of the Kebich fraction (Shushkevich 2004). He claims that it 
was not possible or desirable to press for any further reforms as the situation developed in the 
early 1990. It was not possible for him to break with either the past or the Kebich fraction. 
Shushkevich’s negative attitude towards the Popular Fronts initiative for an early election that 
could have secured stronger support in the parliament for the reform friendly fraction created 
a final climate of distrust and hardened the collaboration between the Popular Front and the 
Shushkevich fraction. Shushkevich did never manage to include the Popular Front in a 
compromise to solve the issue of constitution of a new political framework. 
 As the conflict arose between Shushkevich and the Popular Front Shushkevich turned 
towards Kebich. As said earlier Shushkevich was strongly committed to independence and 
sovereignty but at the same time he was dismissive of further reforms believing that 
independence, neutrality and sovereignty were as far as it was possible to push the change in 
the phase of transition. In the 2004 interview he states:   
 
More than anything, we achieved independence without shedding a single drop of blood after 200 years 
of Russian domination. That is why I don’t think we could have gone any further. But probably we did 
not pay enough attention to explanation- it was difficult to explain.(Shushkevich 2004: 67) 
 
Judging from his statements he was clearly reluctant towards further change allying him with 
the hardliner fraction and distances himself from the democratic movement. This choice can 
indicate a vision of national communism known from the perestroika and glasnost period as 
well as the early day of the revolution. Such a vision, however, never became an alternative to 
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democratisation in Belarus (Mihalisko 1997). Shushkevich were quite far from the Kebich 
fraction on the question of national independence and much closer towards the Popular Fronts 
position. He was strongly committed to national independence, sovereignty and neutrality. 
Being the architect behind the compromise of national independence thoughts the declaration 
of independence in 1991 as well as Belavezha accord he believed that national independence 
could be secured if more radical reforms including institutional, democratic and economic 
reforms were postponed. This strategy corresponds to the hypothesis set forward by Schedler 
(2002b) in which the founding election is not considered an ending point of democratisation 
by all actors but continuing also after the founding election. The actor’s goals must therefore 
not be fulfilled by the time of the founding election, but can be realised later on at another 
critical moment, such as elections. Hence, democratic and economic reforms can therefore 
delayed off in time as long as main goals of actors is secured, especially the goarl of national 
independence achieved trough the compromise of independence in 1991. 
 Such a situation will correspond to the outcome DSS where the Kebich fraction and 
the Shushkevich fraction compromise on a status quo upon the conflict of constitution of a 
new institutional and political framework while the Popular Front continues to press for 
democracy but under the conditions of further democratisation as a “nested game of 
democratisation by elections” following the logic of Schedler  (2002b). The outcome HHS 
would also correspond to such a situation but is excluded because of the Popular Fronts 
dominant strategy of democracy as a result of their twin politics of democracy and national 
independence. A compromise in which the Popular Front suddenly changes its strategy to the 
most preferred strategy of the Shushkevich fraction might have produced new dynamics. For 
these reasons and for keeping the analys easier to follow the possibility of dual payoffs for 
this outcome is excluded. To create stability in such an outcome the Popular Front must share 
the belief of Shushkevich, in which the dimension of national independence is regarded to be 
the far most important, so important that the actors are willing to put other agendas on hold 
for a considerable period of time. A change in equilibrium from the conflict outcome DHS, 
which is the Nash equilibrium in the Prisoners’ dilemma game, to the outcome which is sub-
optimal to both the Shushkevich fraction and the Popular Front on the dimension of 
constitution, would need a unilateral change in strategy by the Shushkevich fraction. A 
unilateral change of strategy would result in an equilibrium in the outcome DSS when both 
other actors stay on their dominant strategies. One explanation for such a unilateral change in 
strategy would be that Shushkevich has changed his political orientation with regard to the 
conflict dimension of constitution in such a way that he corresponds with the ones of the 
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moderate hardliner or the expected utility of all dimensions must be taken into consideration. 
In the long term this would result in an amalgamation between the two fractions. I have found 
no empirical evidence for such a change. In fact a confrontation between the two competing 
fractions developed during the phase of transition. Another explanation for such a strategy 
change can be found if both actual conflict dimensions in Belarus are taken into consideration. 
According to Tsebelis (1990) actors can make suboptimal choices on the principal arena when 
being involved of games in multiple arenas. Only when the principal arena, here the arena of 
constitution, is considered separately do the choices appear to be irrational. When both arenas, 
constitution and national independence, are included in the analysis the real priorities of the 
actors become visible to the analysis. Suboptimal choices do no longer appear irrational when 
the context of the principal game is brought into the analysis. The utility of the Shushkevich 
fraction is changed by an outside factor. Hence, to fully understand the actors choices the 
national dimension must be included. The Shushkevich fraction could unilaterally change 
their strategy form hybrid regime to a status quo if the compromise outcome DSS also 
includes a national compromise that secure national independence and sovereignty. As a 
consequence, the expected utility of such a compromise would be the product of a function 
including both the expected utility of DSS and the expected utility of national independence:  
ƒ(ц)= ц(DSS)+ ц(independence) 
This is true if the expected utility of such a compromise surpasses the utility of the Nash 
equilibrium and is expressed mathematically by the following equation: 
ц(DSS)+ ц(independence)> ц(DHS) 
In such a situation it would be rational for the Shushkevich fraction to unilaterally change the 
strategy to status quo in order to gain the better expected payoff. However, for this to happen 
one assumption must hold, that the Shushkevich fraction believe that the Kebich fraction is 
going to stay with 1991 compromise on national independence. A movement away from this 
national independence by the Kebich fraction would leave the Shushkevich fraction worse off 
and only receiving the payoff from the DSS outcome which is worse than the payoff in the 
Nash equilibrium. 
Tsebelis  (1990: 53-61) suggests games with variable payoffs as a solution on how to 
model nested games. In this case the variation of payoffs is limited to the Shushkevich 
fraction to reflect the argument outlined above. To reflect this, the payoffs of the Shushkevich 
fraction are changed so that they will unilaterally change their strategy if they believe that the 
Kebich fraction stays with them and the Popular Front on the matter of national independence. 
To decide whether or not the Kebich fraction chooses that option Nature is build into the 
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game tree. The new preferences of Shushkevich are as follows:  
HHH>DSS>DHS>DSH>HHS>HSH>SHH>HSS 
The outcomes are given ordinal values from one to eight for Shushkevich while the other 
players keep their original values. A model of the nested game with variable payoffs is 
outlined below. 
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The Nested Game of Constitution and National Independence
Figure 5.3
 
The game is modelled as a dynamic game where Nature makes the first move deciding 
whether the game is played under a situation where the national compromise is intact or in a 
situation where the national independence still is contestable. The game tree to the left of 
Nature corresponds to the prisoners’ dilemma game discussed earlier and is an illustration of 
the transition when the issue of national independence is not clear, because no binding 
agreement about the future nature of the Belarusian state is included. The right hand side of 
tree corresponds to the situation in which a compromise of national independence has been 
negotiated as a binding agreement between the actors and the Shushkevich fraction chooses 
unilaterally to change their preferences to achieve a higher payoff. Which side of the three 
that is played is decided by the size of the quantity a, which represents the probability of the 
choice of nature. If larger than 0.5 the game on the left is played and if less than 0.5 the game 
on the right is played. Unlike the extensive form game presented earlier this game is one with 
 84
incomplete information. The incomplete information is a result of the uncertainty of the 
variable pay-off structure that is build into the game in order to illustrate the multi-
dimensional conflict structure of the Belarusian transition. The incomplete information causes 
that players do not with certainty know the pay-off structure of the other players since it 
depends upon agreements made on the national dimension. The variation of the pay-off 
structure is reflecting the multi-dimensional character of the game. To include this uncertainty 
and the multi-dimensional structure of the transition into the game model the concept of 
Nature is introduced. Nature is modelled as moving first in the game deciding which side of 
the game tree is played. Here Nature decides if the national agreement of 1991 is binding or 
not. This affects the pay-off structure of the Shushkevich fraction. The move of Nature is 
unobserved by the players and therefore they can only estimate which game they play but not 
know this for sure. 
 To solve the game and uncover the equilibriums we solve the game tree on each side 
of Nature separately by backward induction by finding sub game perfect equilibriums as done 
in the dynamic game presented earlier. If the game to the left is played the outcome will 
correspond to the suboptimal Nash equilibrium DHS. This solution fully corresponds to the 
prisoners’ dilemma game discussed earlier. However, if the game on the other hand is played 
on the right hand side of Nature a different outcome will be the equilibrium. The Popular 
Front still possesses a dominant strategy in the right hand side of the game and hence, their 
choice corresponds to that of the left hand side. However, the change in the payoff structure 
of the Shushkevich fraction has changed strategies to correspond to the choice of the Kebich 
fraction. They will now choose status quo when the Kebich fraction does, and the same way 
around with the strategy of a hybrid regime. This is the opposite choices as in the left hand 
side of the game. The Kebich fraction payoffs are not influenced by the nested game context 
and they still possess a dominant strategy of a status quo. The equilibrium in this game 
corresponds to the outcome DSS.  
The DSS outcome is a compromise outcome in which the two regime actors agree 
upon a status quo dictatorship while the opposition continues to press for their most preferred 
strategy of democracy. This outcome is both a sub game perfect equilibrium as well as it is 
Pareto-optimal. The instability of the prisoners’ dilemma game is not present in this game. 
The dotted line between the information sets after the choice of Nature indicates that the game 
is played with imperfect information. Hence, the actors do not know for certain which tree 
they are playing in, or in other words; they do not know whether the national compromise of 
1991 is a binding agreement or may be cancelled in the future. Therefore, the actors make 
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choices based upon their estimates of the quantity a. The equilibrium in this game depends 
upon the Shushkevich estimation of the quantity a. If he estimates it to be above 0.5 the game 
will be played as the prisoners’ dilemma and the outcome will be the suboptimal Nash-
equilibrium. In the left hand side of the game it will be possible for Shushkevich who 
possesses a centric position to explore the possibilities to act as a mediator between the two 
distant actors and attain the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Such a solution to the conflict in the 
DHS outcome would imply a pact as described by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 37-48) that 
secure a simultaneous change of strategy by the two distant actors to achieve the Pareto-
optimality and a stable institutional solution. However, if Shushkevich estimates the quantity 
a to be smaller than 0.5 it will be rational for him to change his strategy unilaterally and 
secure national independence as a trade off with the Kebich fraction. This will lead to a 
situation with little or no institutional reforms but secure national independence.  
 The empirical situation in 1992-1993 does very much reflect such a “nested game” 
situation. The question is whether the actors take a compromise into exchange on the 
dimension of constitution for a compromise on the national dimension. Several aspects 
suggests that Suskevich estimated the size of the quantity a to be smaller than 0.5, hence 
believing that the compromise made with the communists in 1991 over the declaration was a 
binding agreement that would secure Belarusian independence while putting the issues of 
further political and economic reforms on hold. With the national compromise being intact 
Shushkevich pursued closer cooperation with the Kebich fraction believing to be play on the 
right hand side of the game. Support for such an assumptions can be found in the 2004 
interview with Shushkevich: 
 
And we found a compromise, where we included sufficient precise articles where independence of Belarus was 
safeguarded. And under those compromise conditions, the communists voted in favour .(Shushkevich 2004: 69) 
 
In Belarus there was a different system. And we developed certain restraints. More than anything, we achieved 
independence without shedding a single drop of blood after 200 years of Russian domination. That is why I don’t 
think we could have gone any further.(Shushkevich 2004: 67) 
 
As we see from these statements, Shushkevich believes that the compromise with the 
communists was sufficient to secure Belarus independence and sovereignty. At the same time 
he states that no more reforms were possible, something indicating a belief of entering the 
DSS outcome in the right hand side of the game, where independence is traded off against no 
further reforms. 
However, in this period the actors failed to produce new institutions. And at this 
moment the situation in Russia as well as other republics was still inconclusive. In Russia 
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Yeltsin contested for power with the hardliners and no real outcome of the power struggle or 
the transition had yet been decided. Neither was the future role of the Commonwealth of 
Independent states clear. A victory for the Moscow hardliners would open for a re-integration 
with Russia which was a goal for the Kebich fraction. This possibility might have hindered an 
agreement upon the dimension of contestation in Belarus before the situation in Russian was 
clarified. In summer 1992 Russia moved to secure its interests in Belarus as a response 
towards Polish presidents Lech Walesa’s wish of a NATO security pact for Central- and 
Eastern-Europe. At the Commonwealth summit in May Russia tried to press both Belarus and 
Ukraine to enter a security agreement. Shushkevich, strongly committed to independence and 
believing the national compromise to be binding, refused to do so because it would violate the 
neutrality and sovereignty of Belarus. Only two month later Kebich was ordered to Moscow 
to sign a bilateral agreement that created a common political, social, and economic space 
between Russia and Belarus as well as giving Russia the command over armed forces 
stationed on Belarusian territory. According to Mihalisko (1997: 248) this agreement gave 
Russia an effective power to cancel Belarusian sovereignty. Kebich was most likely not hard 
to persuade to sign the agreement. In 1991 he was in support of the coup d'état against 
Gorbachev to save the Soviet Union. He stated his future intention about the status of Belarus 
at a gathering in the eastern town of Homel in September 1993 that he was directing his effort 
at: 
 
“not toward the resurrection of the Soviet Union – which is practically impossible- but 
toward its creation in a renewed form” (Mihalisko 1997: 249) 
 
Such goals, if pursued, would represent a break with the 1990 compromise upon 
independence and sovereignty. This action and the statement quoted above indicate that 
Kebich had a different perspective of which side of the game tree the game was played. Being 
willing to break national compromise indicates that the Kebich fraction estimated the quantity 
a to be larger than 0.5. Hence, the game was with no binding agreement upon national 
independence. Indication the outcome to be the conflict outcome in which all actors pursue 
their most preferred strategy corresponding to the DHS Pareto-suboptimal equilibrium.  
The signing of the agreement by Kebich as well as the refusal to do the same by 
Shushkevich were the beginning of the end of the alliance between the two fractions. 
Reopening the conflict dimension over national independence destroyed the possibility for a 
compromise solution to the game as described in the DSS outcome of the game. As argued 
earlier national independence was the motivation for Shushkevich to abandon his preferred 
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strategy of hybrid regime and to turn to the strategy of status quo. The controversy between 
the two fractions continued when Kebich in early 1993 proposed the signing of a defence and 
economic union with Russia before the Supreme Council. It was easily passed despite protest 
from Shushkevich (Mihalisko 1997: 248-9). This politics was initiated by Kebich as a start of 
a re-integration and a political union between the two countries. However, with the political 
situation still unclear in Moscow this was not possible. The future for this project was at best 
obscure. Close bonds remained between the Minsk hardliner rulers and the Moscow hardliner 
opposition. A victory for the hardliners in Moscow in the confrontation with Yeltsin would be 
the best assurance for further integration between the two states. The possibility of an alliance 
with the Moscow hardliners did not disappear for the Kebich fraction until Yeltsins victory at 
the White House in the October 1993. 
The Yeltsin victory, however, opened an unexpected opportunity for the Kebich 
fraction with regard to their goal of re-integration. Yeltsin’s reformist victory in Russia did 
not lead to a spread of democratic ideas to its former Soviet counterparts as one might have 
expected. To balance the influence of the hardliners Yeltsin’s politics shifted to the right on 
the aspect of the near abroad, and foreign intelligence chief Primakov was assigned the task to 
create a plan for re-integration of the Commonwealth countries (Mihalisko 1997: 249). This 
was the opportunity the Kebich fraction needed to cancel the 1991 compromise. Even though 
Shushkevich de facto had little power as speaker of parliament he was a popular figure 
amongst the Belarusian people during the transition phase well ahead of the opponents Kebich 
and the Popular Front leader Paznyak on surveys conducted in 1992 and 1993. Only 6,2 
percent supported Kebich as head of state as an alternative to Shushkevich while Paznyak 
received 3.7 percent support in the same May 1993 survey (Marples 1999: 67). 
Shushkevich had developed to become an opponent or a threat to Kebich’s influence 
and planes of re-integration instead of being an allied. Together with another new name in 
Belarusian politics Lukashenka, an allied and open supporter for the Moscow hardliners, 
Kebich formed a classic Soviet style plot to topple Shushkevich as speaker of parliament. 
Lukashenka was to lead a corruption committee which ended up with allegations against 
Shushkevich lead to his dismissal as speaker of parliament in early 1994 (Marples 1999: 61; 
Silitski 2003: 40). Shushkevich was replaced by Hryb who never became anything else but a 
tool for communist influence in parliament. 
At this stage of transition the Popular Front continued to pursue their twin politics of 
democratisation and national independence as outlined earlier Their call for an early election 
as well as collection of signatures in support of such an act imply that their estimation of the 
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magnitude of the quantity a is larger than 0.5 or that they are not included in a national pact. 
They make serious and real attempts to press for further democratic reforms without 
considering such actions to have any negative influence upon issue of national independence. 
Such an action is conflicting with the attitude that Shushkevich expressed in the quotation 
earlier given. The Popular Front also expressed distrust in the declaration of independence by 
at first dismissing the agreement due to an article declaring further work upon a union treaty 
with the commonwealth countries (Shushkevich 2004: 68-9). The Popular Front chose at first 
to walk out of parliament as a protest against this article. An action criticised by Shushkevich 
as a show-off and this clearly indicated difference in opinion between the two fractions about 
the character of the compromise: 
 
And we found a compromise, where we included sufficient precise articles where independence of 
Belarus was safeguarded. And under those compromise conditions, the communists voted in favour. But 
the Popular Front walked out. And today, the farce of Zianon Pazniak and of his colleagues is that they 
walked out, and for what? The communists were the ones that voted for it. It was a farce, and there is 
no other way to describe it. They walked out to demonstrate that they were more radical towards 
independence of Belarus. Such giant steps are not wanted. We will not achieve nothing if we go on the 
offensive that quickly. (Shushkevich 2004: 69) 
 
 
The action of the Popular Fronts suggests a considerable scepticism towards the real contents 
of the compromise and the guarantees it gave to provide for Belarusian independence. The 
Popular Front also earlier expressed negative views on the Commonwealth of Independent 
States when including Russia. In the late phase of liberalisation the Popular Front had 
advocated an idea of a commonwealth between Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic republics for 
geopolitical and historical reasons (Zaprudnik and Urban 1993: 115-16). However, the 
Popular Front strongly opposed the new Union Treaty in 1990 and saw the Commonwealth of 
Independent States as a potential threat to Belarusian independence. This is confirmed by 
Shushkevich (2004: 69): 
 
“And Zianon Pazniak and his colleagues also absolutely condemned the Belovezsky agreement –
forgetting that for the first time in two hundred years, Russia recognized the independence of Belarus – 
saying that the agreement smelled of some kind of a Union Treaty…But they screamed “this is a new 
union Treaty,” true, a weaker one. They wanted to show that they are holier than the Pope.” 
 
 
The Popular Front also saw an article in the compromise of national independence that opens 
for further work upon a union treaty as a possibility for the Kebich fraction to cancel 
independence in the future. Hence, the compromise could not provide the Popular Front with 
the necessary guarantees that the compromise could be a safeguard for Belarusian 
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independence. Shushkevich (2004: 68) describes the conflict with the Popular Front like this:  
 
“It went to an unbelievable scale, that in a month we adopted the declaration of independence. The 
Belarusian Popular Front, which all its life had embodied the best traditions of the fighters for 
independence of Belarus, staged a sign of protest by walking out. Why? Because there is an article in 
that declaration that we will continue working in a Union Treaty. That article was the result of a 
compromise. The declaration of independence was put forward by a communist.” 
 
These quotations show that there excised not only a severe disagreement between the Popular 
Front over the approach towards the ruling Kebich fraction and further democratic reforms 
but also upon the substance of the compromise of national independence and the possibility 
for this compromise to secure Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future. These 
observations indicate that the Popular Front did not have the same calculation as the 
Shushkevich fractions. Hence, their estimation of the quantity a lead to a larger value than 
0.5. 
 One should also take notice of Shushkevich’s negative attitude towards the Popular 
Front in these quotations. His strong attacks on the Popular Front and their politics further 
indicates that Shushkevich believed he was playing on the right hand side of the game tree 
compromising with the Kebich fraction while distancing from the Popular Front. However, 
there are few indications that either the Popular Front or the Kebich fraction are of the same 
belief as Shushkevich. 
 
Few new institutions; the outcome transition 
With Shushkevich effectively removed from the political arena and the power struggle finally 
set in Moscow it was time for an adoption of a new Belarusian constitution. Shushkevich had 
been a popular figure and at the time the only real challenger to Kebich in a contested 
election. Two major institutional changes were the result of the Belarusian transition. This the 
formation of a national army and the establishment of a national presidency in which the first 
was by large the most significant change (Mihalisko 1997: 250). The presidency was created 
to expand the influence of the Kebich fraction. This fraction was by far the most powerful 
political actor in Belarus during the transition. They controlled the entire Soviet era state 
apparatus and were willing to use this in the political struggle against their enemies. The 
Soviet constitution had not separated the institutional powers and this situation strengthened 
the position of the Kebich fraction. By creating a presidency after the removal of Shushkevich 
speaker of parliament Kebich expected to be able to finally unite the position as head of state 
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with the executive branch of power. This position was clearly intended for Kebich himself. 
By accusing Shushkevich of corruption the incumbent rulers effectively undermined his 
legitimacy and his popularity in the population was declining. The candidate of the Popular 
Front Paznyak did increasingly grow unpopular due to his still more radical nationalism and 
Russophobic politics which were unpopular among the nostalgic population.    
Almost all other institutions in Belarus were left intact whenever possible. This was 
even the case of most civil society organisations that remained closely connected to the 
regime. To some degree the national institutions were expanded to compensate for the 
removal of the all union structures (Mihalisko 1997: 250).  The government retained a tight 
grip on the media upholding its monopoly on the broadcasting and printing facilities and 
outlets (Mihalisko 1997: 255). This gave the government the possibility to control the media. 
However, the constitution granted some rights to the population that had been unknown in 
Soviet times such as equality before the law, respect for human rights, freedom of speech, 
access to information, the right of assembly and association (Mihalisko 1997). However, most 
of these rights are still not enforce in Belarus in practice. 
With a constitution in place the founding presidential election was scheduled for June 
1994. Four candidates received most of the votes casted in the election with Kebich receiving 
17 percent, Pazniak 13 percent and Shushkevich only 10 percent (Mihalisko 1997: 254). The 
corruption campaign that Kebich had initiated against Shushkevich had proven its 
effectiveness. However, the plan had somewhat backfired because the candidate that received 
by far the majority of votes in this election was the leader of the parliamentary commission 
which was to investigate the corruption, Alexander Lukashenka. In this first round he received 
45 percent of the votes and in the second round he defeated Kebich with 80 percent of the 
votes (Mihalisko 1997: 254). Lukashenka was a populist politician who knew how to take 
advantage of the political atmosphere in the population. He soon started to expand his 
political power beyond the limits set by the constitution. 
The presidential voting process in 1994 was conducted rather democratically and this 
is taken by several observers to be evidence of a democratic outcome of the Belarusian 
transition. Amongst these are Marples (1999) and Silitski (2003) who both claim that Belarus 
experienced a short period of democracy after transition until the mid 1990s when 
Lukashenka started to alter the power structures. As Snyder (2006) argues elections are a 
rather poor indicator of regime type. Such a classification does under no circumstances meet 
the definition of democracy I give in this thesis. At best, a democratic vote constitutes parts of 
the dimension of participation and is therefore a necessary but by no means a sufficient 
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criterion for classifying Belarus as a democracy after transition. Marples (1999: 69) points to 
the fact that several electoral rules gave an unfair advantage to prime minister Kebich. This 
can put forward serious doubts about the democratic nature of the so-called first and only 
democratic election in Belarus. Kebich was expected to win by everyone and it was a great 
surprise not only to Kebich and the communists but also to all observers that he did not win. 
It is my opinion that Belarus never became democratic. At best the country 
experienced a brief period of a more liberal politics by the ruling regime. The political 
continuity both in leadership, politics and institutions from the Soviet Union era to the post-
transitional independent republic is staggering. Belarus saw few institutional changes which 
were not due to the pressing need to adapt to independence. Furthermore, economic and 
political reforms stagnated after independence. I therefore conclude that the Belarusian 
regime to a very large extent remained in status quo after transition only seeing some minor 
changes which was the result of adoption to independence. At best, Belarus did only for a 
brief moment in the early 1990s see a more liberal regime, which was close to a hybrid 
regime and the country has not yet experienced democracy.  
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 6. The Russian Transition 
In this chapter I will first discuss the main lines of Russian and Soviet history that have had 
historical and contextual effect upon the Russian transition from 1991 to 1993. Then the 
major conflict issues and actors are discussed. Following this the chapter presents three games 
of social interaction during transition. Two games about constitution of new institutions 
occurring at different moments of transition. And the final game is about the threatening 
power of the Yeltsin fraction at the 1993 confrontation.  
 
Early history and revolution 
Historical parallels of the present Russian state are often drawn as far back as the Kiev Rus 
state formation from the ninth century. The city of Kiev was strategically placed on the river 
Dnieper which functioned as a major the trade route between the countries surrounding the 
Baltic Sea, the Byzantine Empire and the Persian Empire (Britannica 2007 c: 15). The 
strategic position of the town made it an important centre for controlling the trade. The Kiev 
Rus state was established by Vikings as a colonial outpost as a part of their control of the 
major river based trade route to the Eastern Roman Empire which was in rapid decline. The 
Kivian Rus adopted orthodox Christianity from Constantinople and became a part of the 
Eastern Church. During the tenth century Kievan Rus expanded territorially to the east, the 
west and the north by adding extensional principalities to the dynasty. In 1240 the state was 
destroyed by the Mongolians as a part of their offensive into the west. This invasion led to the 
separation of the eastern Slaves. A western part, including present day Belarus and Ukraine, 
came under control of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Rus which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The north-eastern part came under control of the Grand Prince of Moscow and the principate 
of Moscovy action as viceroy for the Mongolians was also known as Greate Rus. Declining 
Mongolian influence secured independence for the Principate of Moscovy which in the early 
sixteenth century was given the name of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great. The Russian 
Empire expanded in all directions creating a modern multi-ethnic empire including the parts 
of present day Ukraine and Belarus. Today some 70 smaller nations live in Russia (Britannica 
2007 a). Peter the Great also moved the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg and started a 
program of extensive modernisation and westernisation to make Russia a modern state.  
The monarchic power in Russia developed a strong absolute character. The nobility 
was linked to the Tsar as clients with almost unlimited power over the peasants in the lands 
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they administrated. But their power was strictly economic while political power was 
exclusively the domain of the monarch and his will and power was unlimited (Treadgold and 
Ellison 2000: 9). The system of serfdom seems to have been purified by the Russians leading 
to an extreme exploration not only by the aristocracy of the peasants but also by the tsar of the 
aristocracy. No room for political activity or power sharing existed in Russia until the late 
nineteenth century. The Russian defeat in the Crimean war exposed Russian backwardness 
compared to its western counterparts and Tsar Alexander II realised the urgent need for 
reforms and modernisation. Alexander II attempted to reform the old patterns of autocracy 
and serfdom, opened for local political power sharing and put an end to serfdom at least in 
theory. This opening of society led to a growth in political opposition to the monarchy and 
Alexander II was assassinated by revolutionaries. The Great Reforms of Alexander were 
gradually abridged in the following decades (Treadgold and Ellison 2000: 9). Further reforms 
came about by the last Russian Tsar Nicolai as a result of the defeat to the Japanese and the 
political discontent that this brought about in the political arena. The discontent sparked the 
October 1905 revolution which culminated in 1907 but further political reforms including the 
establishment of the parliament, the Duma, and a semi-constitutional political system. A 
programme of modernisation also led to a growing urbanisation and a starting 
industrialisation in the early twentieth century and the peasants enjoyed a growing freedom. 
However, at the end for the First World War Russia lacked decades if not centuries behind the 
western industrial powers. 
 The entering of Russia into the First Wold War became the end of Russian autocracy. 
The Tsar had taken political and military control after increased opposition by the Progressive 
Block in the Duma (Britannica 2007 a). The Russian army was severely inferior to the armies 
of the central powers. The Russian troops were weak and poorly equipped leading to defeats 
on the battlefield for. Russia lacked the industry, the infrastructure, sufficient modern military 
training, military equipment as well as a modernised society to engage and win a modern 
warfare. The war had also severe negative consequences for the Russian economy after the 
entering of the Ottoman Empire into the war, by blocking off supplies from their western 
allies with increased prises and shortages as the result. By entering the war Russia had taken a 
step closer to a crisis economically, politically as well as militarily. As a consequence riots 
broke out in both Moscow and Petrograd in November 1917 in which garrisons join the 
protesters and the tsar was forced to abdicate in March ending the Russian monarchy 
(Britannica 2007 b). This was the closure of the old aristocratic regime and the start of the 
Russian revolution. 
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 The Revolution in 1917 brought down the dictatorial monarchic regime. However, a 
new was soon to be established as the Communist Party consolidated power though a civil 
war during the 1920s and the Soviet Union was established. During the leadership of Lenin 
the New Economic Politics brought some positive changes to the Russian population. After 
defeating the external opposition of the revolution in the civil war Lenin removed the internal 
opposition by banning fractions within the party (Sakwa 2002: 6). The rule of Lenin’s 
successor Stalin introduced to the Soviet Union one of the most brutal terror regimes ever 
seen. Through forced collectivisation, political persecution, ethnic cleansing and massacres 
upon supposed enemies Stalin became responsible for the largest genocides known to history 
in the 1930s and 40s, the Gulag. The personalitic and brutal rule of Stalin is characteristic of a 
classical totalitarian regime. Khrushchev followed Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union leading 
to a period of De-Stalinisation, limited reforms and a return to the original ideas of Lenin 
(Sakwa 2002). These ambiguous reforms had limited success and by 1964 Khrushchev was 
outset by hardliners fearing the change. The rule of the successor Brezhnev saw a tightening 
of the regime. The social contract secured stability and social security for the population while 
they desisted from political change. Corruption and patronage networks spread and the 
nomenklatura system became established (Sakwa 2002: 7). Brezhnev was followed by first 
Andropov and soon after Chernencko who both had limited impact upon the Soviet system 
due to their rather short remaining expectation of life. High age and bad health were a bad 
combination for long and lasting rule. However, Andropov attempted to reform the system 
during his rule while Chernencko restored the glory of the age of stagnation of the Brezhnev 
area and ended his days in March 1985 (Sakwa 2002: 8). 
 
The Soviet Union in crisis  
The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party on 
March 11th 1985 marks the beginning of a shift in politics from Moscow. Gorbachev 
portrayed himself as an opponent to Stalin and his brutal totalitarian terror regime but as an 
admirer of the Lenin politics of the early twenties. During the first one and a half year in 
office Gorbachev consolidated his power by placing supporters in key positions in the party, 
as ministers and amongst regional leaders (Marples 2004: 11-12). In the mid eighties it 
became clear also for the new Soviet leadership that the country was facing a severe and 
imminent crisis that was impossible to ignore. And for the first time the leadership was 
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outspoken about the problems the Soviet Union were facing. Gorbachev did believe firmly 
that the Brezhnev era politics could not continue and he spoke openly of a need for a clear 
break with the past. 
As described in the transition literature, the new leadership in the Soviet Union 
recognised the crises the country was facing and responded to this by an opening of the 
regime to reforms. Gorbachev was unusually outspoken about the crisis and did not hesitate to 
remind both the party and the people about the wretched state of the nation. In November 
1987 the rector of the Moscow State University warned in the newspaper Pravda that: “We 
were sliding into the abyss and are only starting to stop the slide” (Bialer 1991: 29). The 
frankness of the leadership on the issue of the state of the Union is a clear indication that the 
goal was to increase consciousness amongst the population as well as in the party about the 
situation and inspire to mobilisation in support for the upcoming reforms of Gorbachev. The 
opening and the mobilisation attempts also indicate a split within the regime between reform 
friendly softliners recognising the need for change and hardliners not willing to admit the 
crisis. 
 The crisis recognised by Gorbachev was present in almost all sectors of the society 
and not only being of economic character but of a more systemic character. The crisis was the 
failure of the political, social and economic system of the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin 
period. A fundamental change in all three arenas was a necessity to overcome the crisis. If the 
necessary action was not taken immediately and reforms were implemented and the economy 
accelerated it would mean the end of the Soviet system and the Soviet Union (Bialer 1991: 
30). In the political and social arenas the crisis became visible by a growing distance between 
the leadership and the general population. The population as well as much of the party were 
characterised by political apathy and the party had become a bureaucracy for implementation 
of politics rather than a canal for political participation and mobilisation. The cooperative 
structures and the clientilism of the party combined with the corruption hindered social 
mobility based upon effort and knowledge while it rewarded loyalty and corruption. 
 The economic stagnation was so imminent that the Soviet national income had not 
increased in real terms in the 20 years previous to Gorbachev’s accession to power, with 
exception of the production of alcohol (Bialer 1991: 30). The Stalinist system of planned 
economy had remained more or less intact. While this system had functioned rather well 
during the phase of industrialisation, it had hindered the transformation of the Soviet economy 
into a post-industrial economy and the Soviet Union increasingly lacked behind its western 
counterparts. High labour costs, unrealistic price setting and an insufficient infrastructure 
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together with a drop in prices on raw material in the eighties contributed to the stagnation of 
the Soviet economy.15 Militarily the Soviet Union did no longer have the capacity to follow 
the USA and their allies in the arms rise of the Cold War and a growing portion of the GDP 
went to military purposes. The gap between the ideological utopian goal of real life 
communism and the reality that the Soviet people faced could no longer be hidden. The 
system that was supposed to represent a real functioning alternative to the western capitalist 
democracies was at the edge of collapse and it became visible to the Soviet leadership, the 
people and most of their western followers. 
 
Response to the crises: glasnost and perestroika 
The response to the crisis by the Gorbachev fraction within the regime was the twin politics of 
glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reconstruction). Without these reforms the Soviet Union 
would have faced serious political, economic and social crises (Gorbacev 1988: 15). The 
perestroika reforms started with a discussion phase from 1987 until mid 1988. An open 
discussion through the new and more open politics of glasnost brought about a non regime 
organisation of views on the political, social and ideological situation. The politics of 
democratisation of society and economic transformation by reform communism were quite 
openly debated in the Soviet society.  
This period in the Soviet Union corresponds to the phase of liberalisation as described 
in the theory chapter (Sakwa 2002: 10). This phase was to be followed by a phase of 
implementation of the reforms to form a broadened reformed regime fully exploring the 
potential of the socialist revolution ready to continue competition with the democratic western 
alternative and thereby establish what Przeworski (1991) describes as a broadened 
dictatorship, which is a system with expanded legitimacy and incorporation of new groups 
and ideas into the regime. Gorbachev (1988: 10) states that the Perestroika politics is a 
response to the misfortunes of the Soviet system and its problems, and the perestroika is a 
result of the realisation of the potential of socialism and that this potential had not yet been 
fully explored. However, rather than strengthening the system by being incorporated into the 
regime new groups took advantage of the political opportunities created by the opening of the 
regime and glasnost politics. The limits of the regime’s tolerance were challenged by the 
                                                 
15 For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet economic crises and economic reforms see Lapidus and Dallin 
(1991), Marples (2004), Hewett  (1991), Schroeder (1991) or Bialer (1991: 30-33) 
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media, artists and writers leading to a radicalisation of the demands from civil society 
(Remington 1991). The uncovering of the Stalinist crimes and pressure for more radical 
political and social reforms helped to undermine the legitimacy of the regime. The 
introduction of democratic features in the Soviet states such as semi democratic elections and 
a law governed system inspired to pressure for more radical reforms rather than incorporation 
into the regime by new actors. The result of the reforms was growing pluralism both within 
the old party system as well as in the society in general. New conflict dimensions were 
brought to the political arena, especially a growing nationalism and a centre-periphery conflict 
materialised.16 The very existence of the Soviet state in its present form was challenged by the 
Baltic republics and as well as by Georgia (Sakwa 2002: 11). 
In this phase of liberalisation during perestroika and glasnost the Soviet society 
became more polarised and pluralistic. Fractions of actors became visible both reform 
communists as Gorbachev, more radical reformists as well as hardliner communists resistant 
to reforms of the system. New political conflict dimensions were brought to the attention, 
both in the national republics and on the union level. Reform of the institutional framework, 
economic reforms together with growing demands for decentralisation or even independence 
became central political issues in this phase of democratisation all over the Soviet Union. In 
this new more plural political framework Gorbachev tried to play a role as a centric political 
figure balancing his power by shifting alliances with the opposing fractions. The adoption of a 
centric position as a tool to guide reforms in a positive direction has generally been seen as a 
positive strategy in transition theory (Batty and Danilovic 1997). This was a strategy followed 
with great success by Suàrez in the Spanish transition (Colomer 1991: ; 1995). However, the 
centric strategic position showed to lead to sub-optimal solutions both in the case of 
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and of Suskevich in Belarus due to multiple games played in 
arenas. Increased nationalism and separatism finally changed the conditions for Gorbachev to 
control the reform process and made room for the initiatives leading to the August 1991 coup 
d'état by the hardliner fraction to the save the Soviet Union (Batty and Danilovic 1997: 100-
3). The coup materialised as a farce leading to the victory of radical reformers allied with 
Russian nationalists. The hardliners attempt to save the union became the beginning of the 
end of the Soviet Union. 
The coup represents the beginning of the last stage before transition, the breakdown of 
                                                 
16 For a detailed discussions of the growing nationalism and its consequences see Suny (1993), Dunlop (1993), 
Maples(2004) Lapidus (1991) and Szporluk (1991)  
 98
former regime and the extraction from its power apparatus. The coup led to a rapid de-
legitimisation of the central Soviet institutions and the belief of their capability to lead the 
country through reforms (Sakwa 2002: 32). The standoff between reformers and the plotters 
lead to a great triumph for the reformers. The Yeltsin lead opposition who took up the fight 
against the plotters in August increased their legitimacy and promoted the demand for further 
decentralisation. A wave of declarations of independence followed during and after the coup 
as several republics followed in the footsteps of Lithuania and Georgia and transformed their 
declarations of sovereignty into declarations of independence (Sakwa 2002: 32). Even the 
founding Slavic republics of Belarus and Ukraine declared independence in August. The old 
central power structures had been more or less destroyed as a result of the coup leaving 
behind a power vacuum which in Russia gradually was to be filled by newly establish national 
institutions such as the Russian presidency and parliament. The rise or rebirth of Russia left 
very little authority for Gorbachev and the central government at the very end. The power 
struggle between the Russian institution and the central government led to a fear amongst 
many non-Russian republics that the union centre was to be taken over by Russia on the 
expense of the republics. The old power apparatus institutions for repression which included 
first and foremost the KGB but also to some degree the military had been actively supporting 
the August coup attempt. As these institutions for repression had lost the standoff between 
Yeltsin and the plotters the Soviet Union broke down in a state of paralysis and disarray and 
was not able to interfere in the transition (McFaul 2001: 126). Hence, this indicates that the 
process of extraction was finished before the process of constitution began. 
Despite Gorbachev’s attempts to form a new confederal union treaty the Soviet Union 
came to an end by an agreement between the Russian president Boris Yeltsin and the 
Ukrainian and Belarusian leaders as a result of the Belovezh Accords and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States was established (Sakwa 2002: 37). These events represent the 
breakdown of the former Soviet regime and the beginning of the Russian transition.  
 
Russian Conflict Issues 
The key conflict to be studied in the phase of transition will always be the constitution of new 
institutions because this issue is determining the outcome of transitions with regard to regime 
type. Linz and Stepan (1996: 366) suggest Russia and the other former Soviet republic to 
represent the most severe problems of their vague concept of the stateness problem. There is 
no doubt that Russia, Russian language and Russian culture had a unique and dominant 
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position in the Soviet Union compared to other national and ethnic groups. Russia was often, 
and for good reasons, erroneously taken to be synonymous to the Soviet Union. However, this 
did not mean that Russian national interests coincided with those of the Soviet Union. Russian 
political institutions had been dissolved into the central union structures of the Soviet Union 
(Sakwa 2002: 16). Russia lacked a national party organisation, a ministry of internal affairs, 
an independent national government, national media, Russian trade unions, a Komosomol 
organisation, an academy of sciences and a Russian KGB. There existed no channels in 
Russia for representation of Russian social and economic interests as there existed in the other 
fourteen republics. A growing dissatisfaction with the role of Russia spread in the early in the 
nineties both in Russia and in the other republics. In the republics a growing russophobia 
spread in response to Russia’s leading role as patron nation in the union.  
At the same time, the Russians became increasingly dissatisfied by the neglecting of 
Russian interests in the union. Many Russians felt that all the costs of the union were borne by 
Russia while all the benefits were extracted by the other republics. As shown in Chapter 3 and 
4 Belarus had developed multiple and competing national identities and these conflicting 
national identities effected the development of the Belarusian transition. A similar question 
arose in Russia during the phase of liberalisation. However, the conflict issue in Russia is 
much more tied to the process of state-building than to the question of nation-building such as 
in Belarus. While the central conflict issue in Belarus concerned the identity of the Belarusian 
people was the central conflict issue in Russian politics connected to the role of the Russian 
people and the territorial boundaries of the Russian state. The conflict dimension stands 
between “nation builders” and “empire savers”.  
The nation builders argues for Russia as something very different from the Soviet 
Union as a cultural, historical and geographical entity while the empire savers regard the 
borders of the Soviet Union as the proper boundaries of the Russian state (Szporluk 1991: 
442). The empire savers regard the Soviet state as a synonym with the Russian state and 
believe Russians to have a special and dominant position in this “empire”. The preservation of 
the Soviet state, as a Russian state, becomes an overall goal for this group of actors. The all-
union structures and institutions were seen as sufficient structures for governing the Russian 
empire since they do not recognise a profound difference between the Soviet Union and 
Russia. It is easy to see that they believed in continuity from the former Russian empire to the 
Soviet empire in this position. According to Szporluk (1991: 443) the strongest supporters of 
the empire savers in the late eighties and early nineties can be found amongst military, the 
police, the state and party bureaucracies as well as the members of the all-union structures. 
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These were exactly the same actors supporting the August coup against Gorbachev to save the 
Soviet Union. 
Opposing this view of the Russian state is the nation builders. They wished to 
establish a Russian nation state separately from the Soviet Union after the patterns of the 
modern western European nation states with borders that more or less corresponded to the 
borders of the Russian Soviet Republic. The supporters of this fraction is in the belief that 
Russia is not benefiting from the union and should establish separate national institutions and 
even independence from the Soviet Union and that the crisis of the Soviet Union is caused by 
central Stalinist bureaucracy that controlled the union (Szporluk 1991: 448). The nation 
builders like empire savers differ in their view upon the institutional arrangements which they 
prefer, but they have a common goal of establishing a Russian state different from the Soviet 
Union. 17  Even though some of the nation builder fractions do wish a territorially larger 
Russia than the present Russia they all agree upon the formation of Russia as a nation state 
not an imperial multi-ethical state. 
The conflict that emerged as a consequence of Gorbachev’s liberalisation has the same 
potential for creation a multi-dimensional conflict structure during the transition phase as in 
Belarus. The two conflict issues are not directly similar, but have several similarities and both 
arise as a consequence of state- and nation-building processes. However, the Russian conflict 
dimension between nation builders and empire savers materialises in Russia and the Soviet 
Union during the phase of liberalisation and is more or less coinciding with the conflict of 
extraction from the former regime as the Soviet Union starts to break down and the conflict 
between Yeltsin and Gorbachev and later Yeltsin and the plotters materialises. This argument 
is supported by Sakwa (2002: 39) who claims that the insurgency against the communist 
regime took the form of a struggle for the restoration of Russian statehood 
(gosudarstvennost). It was a dual struggle against the communist party and for institutions and 
attributes of a nation state. The conflict materialised between the empire savers represented by 
the August plotters and the nation builders in the democratic opposition led by Yeltsin during 
the coupe. This conflict was won by the nation builders lead by Yeltsin and within the end of 
that same year Russia together with Belarus and Ukraine had left the union leading to the final 
breakdown of the Soviet Union.  
Hence, the national conflict in Russia did not coincide with the phase of transition in 
Russia but with the phase of liberalisation. As shown by  (Batty and Danilovic 1997) this 
                                                 
17 For a detailed description of the nation builder and empire saver fractions se Szporluk (1991: 442-56) 
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created a “nested game” situation during the liberalisation phase of democratisation in the 
Soviet Union.  This conflict in Russia together with similar conflict issues in other republics 
led to the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Marples (2004: 101-11) gives growing nationalism 
in the republics as the main reason for the collapse of Soviet Union. This does not mean that 
the borders of the Russian nation state were undisputed or final, but it was clear that the new 
Russian state was to be a nation state and not an empirical unity. In Russia the national 
conflict dimension was no longer a dominant conflict issue when transition started leaving the 
main conflict of transition to be about constitution of new institution and over economic 
reforms. 
These conflicts were treated separately and not simultaneously as in Belarus. As 
argued above the national conflict was addressed first together with the process of extraction. 
Later the economic reforms were addressed and finally the constitution of new institutions. 
This argument is supported by McFaul (2001: 129) saying that the Yeltsin government 
believed that all these issues could not be addressed simultaneously but were to be dealt with 
in sequences, first filling the vacuum of power after the breakdown of the union, then begin 
economic reforms and finally reconstruct a democratic polity.18 The agendas of economic 
transformation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a higher priority for Yeltsin in 
1991 and early 1992. According to McFaul (2001: 154) these two issues demanded immediate 
attention and Yeltsin and his supporters therefore put off the issue of a new constitution in 
fear of that this issue would constrain Yeltsin’s ability to pursue other agenda items 
simultaneously. No one had foreseen that the consensus existing in late 1991 between the 
president and the parliamentary fractions would not last and that a potential for development 
of a conflict about the issue of constitution existed. However, the conflict about the nature of 
the economic reforms developed further between Yeltsin and the Communist Fraction in the 
1992 and 1993. This thesis will later argue that this third conflict in Russia did contribute to 
the political stalemate which developed in late 1993. The conflict about the future nature and 
scope of the economic reforms together with other factors hindered a compromise about 
future reforms in Russia.  
 
Actors and preferences towards regime type 
In the late eighties and early nineties Russian society saw a grooving pluralism, political 
                                                 
18 The investigation of the interaction of economic reforms is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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fragmentation and debate about several new conflict issues. This included the conflict of 
constitution of new institutions. This arising conflict issue polarised political actors and elites 
into different political camps. This section is to discuss the relevant actor’s preference to the 
possible outcomes of transition.  
 
Radical Softliner: Yeltsin fraction 
The transition literature suggests that opening of the regime and the later transition is a result 
of a fragmentation of the ruling elites into fractions of hardliners and softliners (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986: 19). This split also occurred as a consequence of Soviet liberalisation. 
The Gorbachev’s fraction grew forward as a moderate reformist fraction with opponents who 
both was resistant to further change and opponents who pushed for more radical reforms 
(Breslauer 2002: 100). On the radical side of the spectrum the coming Russian president, 
Boris Yeltsin, pushed for more radical and speedy reforms and a clear break with the 
hardliner fractions of the communist party. Yeltsin was brought into central level politics by 
Gorbachev who appointed him to the Politburo (Marples 2004: 146). Yeltsin had followed a 
party career becoming a Central Committee member in 1981. Yeltsin was introduced to the 
Politburo to strengthen the position of the reformist fraction. However, Yeltsin came into 
conflict with his former reform ally Gorbachev over the progress of the reforms. He was 
removed from the Politburo again in1988 and as Gorbachev in 1990 turns towards the 
hardliners Yeltsin left the Communist Party (Marples 2004: 72).  
Yeltsin was elected as deputy of the Congress of The People’s Deputies and later as 
chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in May 1990. The conflict between the two softliner 
fractions grew and Yeltsin finally allied with the democratic nation builder fraction and 
pursued power through the new institution of the Russian presidency. As president of Russia 
Yeltsin is the key actor of the Russian transition and after the breakdown of the central power 
structures he gains control over the remaining power structures. Late in the phase of 
liberalisation and in the early transition he is closely related to the democratic opposition 
forces. 
 Yeltsin was a man of the Communist Party and his professional and political 
background is not fundamentally different from Gorbachev’s (Altermark 2000: 344). They 
had to a large degree shared the same goals of political and economic reform. His 
membership of the Communist Party and his close relations with the reform fraction of the 
party indicate a softliner position of Yeltsin. However, Yeltsin grew increasingly impatient 
with the speed of the reforms in the Soviet Union, something which brought him into conflict 
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with both the hardliner fraction and with Gorbachev himself. This conflict does not 
necessarily indicate that Yeltsin wished to press for democracy, but rather that he can be 
classified as a radical softliner who sees the need for the reforms as a more pressing matter 
than other fractions. Following this logic I argue in this thesis for a classification of Yeltsin as 
a radical softliner while Gorbachev is a moderate softliner. This places Yeltsin within the 
regime actor category and not in the democratic opposition camp. Furthermore it should be 
noted that Gorbachev is not regarded as a relevant actor during the Russian transition phase. 
He is relevant only in the phase of liberalisation due to his dismissal after the August coup. 
Yeltsin did both in the phase of liberalisation and in the phase transition favour 
economic reforms over institutional change (McFaul 2001). The main issue for the first phase 
of the Russian transition was the transformation of the halting economy through the 500 day 
plan and shock therapy. Institutional changes came to a larger extend about as a result of a 
power struggle first with the CPSU hardliners and Gorbachev later on as a result of the 
conflict with the Russian parliament. The issue of constitutional change did first become an 
pressing issue in late 1992 when the president came into a deadlock situation with the 
Communist fraction in the parliament about the further progress and extent of the economic 
reform program. This indicates that Yeltsin belonged to what Shevtsova (2000: 242) describes 
as a liberal fraction who favours economic reforms about democracy and who is willing to 
support some form of authoritarianism for the sake of economic reform. This indicates the 
preference structure of the radical softliner actors in which the Yeltsin fraction will prioritise a 
hybrid regime over democracy and the worst outcome will be a status quo situation. This 
leads to the preferences:  
Hybrid Regime > Democracy > Status Quo 
 
Yeltsin was a populist political player who had great success by telling the people what they 
wanted to hear (Altermark 2000: 345). Having left the communist party Yeltsin had a larger 
room for political manoeuvring than politicians committed to a party programme. By the 
establishment of the Russian institution and Russian independence Yeltsin did to a large 
extend give the people what they had wanted, a distinct Russian identity and a Russian nation 
once again. These institutions granted him victory over the hardliner in the first round, but he 
pushed for further reforms when he once again came into conflict with the Communist 
fraction in 1993.  
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Democratic moderate opposition: Democratic Russia Movement 
As said earlier the politics of glasnost brought about a mobilisation of the civil society in 
Russia. The new openness of the regime allows fractions outside the regime to form political 
strategies and goals that differ from the goals of the regime. As long as these goals do not 
coincide with the goals of the regime fractions these fractions will remain independent of 
regime and challenge the regime. Such opposition fractions also grew out of the Soviet 
liberalisation. A real nationwide popular front like in the Baltic States was newer formed in 
Russia. Only local movements in the major cities were formed but never as a national 
organisation. The popular fronts also lacked a strategy to challenge the reforms of the regime 
and rather acted as supporters of the Gorbachev reform fraction.  
A new opposition movement known as Democratic Russia was established in 1990 as 
an electoral pact for democratic minded candidates (McFaul and Markov 1993: 136) This 
electoral block developed into a parliamentary fraction and later became an umbrella 
movement in the period after the March election in 1990. Democratic Russia united a wide 
spectrum of reform forces in Russia and did never develop into a political party. Democratic 
Russia represented the liberals and democrats amongst the intelligentsia and the new 
entrepreneurial class benefiting from reforms and the main base of supporters can be found in 
the larger cities (Shevtsova 1995: 8). The goal of the organisation was according to its charter 
of October 1990  
 
“the coordination of democratic forces, opposition to the state-political Communist Party monopoly, 
holding of a joint election campaign, parliamentary activity and other actions for the common purpose 
of creation a civil society” (McFaul and Markov 1993: 137).  
 
Not being a political party nor a united movement but an umbrella organisation Democratic 
Russia did not have a clear ideological platform and newer adopted a clear political program. 
Since the movement lacked a collective programme it can be hard to track a unified political 
approach towards the tree transitional conflict dimensions identified earlier. This point is 
underlined by one co-founders of the Democratic Movement Victor Dmitriev (1993 a: 159) 
when he states that  
 
“the only thing that is keeping  the Democratic Russia is its anticommunism. This is why, at the time 
when we were organising the Democratic Russia movement and writing its charter, we initially 
attempted to unite all anti-Communists. Then, after the downfall of communism in this country we will 
take different positions in the political arena.” 
 
Since Democratic Russia was a loosely connected coalition movement, united by the struggle 
against communism, their views differed upon the central conflicts issues in Russian Politics. 
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McFaul (2001: 167-8) points to an increasing internal split within Democratic Russia in which 
several fractions favoured dictatorship over democracy in exchange of economic reforms. 
These strategies are in this thesis seen as result of multi-dimensional conflict issues where the 
actors are willing to sacrifice their position on the dimension of constitution for compromises 
on dimensions that are regarded to be more important. When only the dimension of 
constitution is considered Democratic Russia is believed to follow a strategy set 
corresponding to the Moderate opposition. However, it seems clear that some fractions of 
Democratic Russia might have had a maximalist preference structure as they later left 
Democratic Russia or actively promoted dictatorship. Democratic Russia expresses in its 
charter that the movement should be an organisation for promotion of democratic forces and 
ideas. On the dimension of constitution alone it therefore seems quite clear that the movement 
is in favour of democratic reforms. The preference structure for Democratic Russia is as 
follows:  
Democracy > Hybrid Regime > Status Quo 
 
The democratic Russia Movement became the leading reform group in Russia during 
liberalisation. Yeltsin allied with the movement in his struggle first against Gorbachev and 
later on in the standoff at the White House against the communist plotters. Democratic Russia 
played a key role in mobilising the protesters coming to the White House to support the 
reformist and democratic fractions. Democratic Russia was the only political movement with 
significant influence in the early phase of transition as well as being the political force that 
had helped Yeltsin to power (Shevtsova 1995: 9). Victor Dmitriev confirms a close 
relationship with Russian president Yeltsin before the coup d'état and that they had a common 
goal in fighting the communists:  
 
“Today we support Boris Nikolaevich, and he knows it. Most of his following and his aides are from 
Democratic Russia. So far we have been united – and, I think, will continue to be united – with Boris 
Nikolaevich, by common ideas about democratic principles.” (Dmitriev 1993 a: 162)  
 
However, The Democratic Russia did fail to build a lasting alliance with the radical softliner 
fraction and transformed itself into a permanent political force in favour of democratic 
reforms. Not long after the collapse of communism the alliance started to erode. Without a 
common enemy and a political program the democratic alliance slowly lost support and 
influence towards the end of the transition phase. Especially difficult became the issue of 
Russia’s position within the former Soviet Union. Democratic Russia was split between the 
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camps of liberalists and democrats.19 
 
Moderate Hardliners: The Re-organised Communist party of Russia and Right wing 
nationalists 
The victory of Yeltsin over the empire savers and the breakdown of the communist party and 
the Soviet institutions in 1991 had pushed the anti reformist communists into opposition 
together with the nationalist extreme right wing empire savers. During the first phase of 
transition the Communist fraction remained weak due to the effect of the ban of the 
Communist Party and their defeat in August 1991. However, in this period the rhetoric of the 
communist and the Neo-Bolsheviks became increasingly nationalistic and patriotic and less 
Marxist in an effort to attract nationalist and Fascist to their protests against Yeltsin (McFaul 
and Markov 1993: 203) . 
 The reorganised Communist Party, the  Neo-Bolsheviks was in 1992-1993 joined by 
more radical nationalist, empire saver and the extreme left fractions in a common attempt to 
seize power, defeat the centre and remove the president (Sakwa 2002: 52). In this coalition of 
anti democratic forces is in this thesis regarded as a unitary actor in this short period of time 
due to the fact that they had a common agenda of taking power, removing the president and 
the restoration of the Soviet Union in some form or another. Two of the leading figures in this 
Communist fraction were speaker of parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President 
Aleksandr Rutskoy (Remington 1997: 74-5). Both had been close allies of Yeltsin during 
liberalisation and the first phase of transition. Khasbulatov proposed during the crises in 1993 
the formation of a parliamentary republic at the central level and the restoration of the powers 
of the Soviets at the local levels as well as he declared himself in favour of the restoration of a 
new form of post-communist Soviet power (Sakwa 2002: 50). This indicates a strong 
commitment to the status quo strategy by one of the most prominent members of the 
Communist fraction. Even though he might not be in favour of the re-establishment of the 
Soveit Union in its on it former structures he was clearly in favour of re-establishing Soviet 
power in the Russian Federation.  In April 1993 Khasbulatov declared that he had restored 
                                                 
19 Several matters raise serious questions whether Democratic Russia can be regarded as a unitary actor. In this 
thesis Democratic Russia is regarded as a unitary actor during the first phase of transition. However, when 
conflicts and splits arise in the movement about central issues such as the constitution of new institutions the 
movement is no longer regarded as a unitary actor. Therefore the movement is not a relevant actor in the second 
phase of transition. 
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Soviet power in the regions and now he would move to restore Soviet power at the national 
level as well (Sakwa 2002). The preference structure for the communist fraction is as follows: 
 
Status Quo > Hybrid Regime > Democracy 
 
The communist fraction united most of the anti-democratic opposition to Yeltsin during the 
late phase of transition. According to Steele (1994: 377) the opposition fraction inside the 
White House in 1993 consisted of a hard core of communists and nationalist deputies, the so-
called irreconcilable opposition, who believed that the time had come for a showdown with a 
regime which they believed had destroyed the Soviet Union. After the erosion of Democratic 
Russia the Communist fraction led by speaker of parliament Khasbulatov and vice president 
Rutskoy became the dominant opposition player in Russian politics. Rutskoy had clear 
ambitions of becoming the next president of Russia (Shevtsova 1998: 41).  
 
Game of social interaction about constitution 
Unlike McFaul (1999), who seems to have somehow tangled up the concepts of liberalisation, 
transition and consolidation ending up calming that Russia has had no less than three 
transitions from 1987 to 1995, this thesis will argue that the Russian phase of transition 
started by the breakdown of the former regime in 1991 and ended by a founding election in 
1993. 20 This phase of transition is, unlike the previously phase of liberalisation and the 
following consolidation, characterised by the normal rules of the game, was suspended for a 
limited period. The shock of the coup and the breakdown of the Soviet Union had removed 
the former institutions and power structures and left the political actors with ill-defined and 
variable rules for interaction during the transition. This situation is confirmed by McFaul 
(2001: 124) who clams that the Russian mode of transition left many rules of the game of the 
polity ambiguous, unmodified and subject to manipulation. This is exactly how O'Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986: 6) describe transitions as intervals between one regime and another in which 
the rules are in flux and are being contested by the actors involved in the interaction about 
new rules of the game. 
                                                 
20 Mcfaul (1999: 103-4) argues for one transition from 1987 to August 1991 and a second from 1991 to 1993 
which both is supposed to have failed, and finally a third in December 1993 and 1995 claimed to be successful. 
This conceptional confusion may also explain his claim that social sciences lack a comprehensive theory for 
understanding transitions (McFaul 1999: 103; McFaul 2002) 
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 With the regard to the balance of power between the actors which are suggested by 
Przeworski (1991) to be determinant for the outcome of transition this seems to be quite 
balanced between the actors during the phase of transition. Yeltsin had won the presidential 
election with about 57 percents of the votes in June 1991 (Sakwa 2002: 25). Yeltsin further 
seems to have gained popularity when standing up against the plotters of the August coup. 
However, in March the very same year 71 percent had supported a renewed union treaty 
(Marples 2004: 75). While Yeltsin had received support in the August struggle in the major 
cities of Russia leaders and the population in most towns and regions seemed to await the 
situation. The distribution of power seems therefore to be quite balanced and relatively ill-
defined (McFaul 2001: 125). An ill-defined balance of power and support in the population 
suggests that the actors of the Russian transition acts under the uncertainty of the Rawlsaian 
veil. Hence, they knew little about their real political strength after the transition and may 
pursue strategies to create institutions that secure their interests even if they should be the 
least powerful actor. 
 With regard to the criteria set forward by Przeworski (1991: 67-79) of the extrication 
from the power apparatus as a premise for the establishment of a democratic regime as the 
result of transition it seems at best to be unfinished during the phase of transition. The power 
apparatus of communist regimes differ significantly from the military dictatorships which 
seems to have created the foundation of the discussion by Przeworski (1991). While the 
military in most post-communist transitions took a neutral or passive position towards the 
political this was certainly not the case in the Soviet Union. Many of the August plotters had 
close connection to the military. However, these forces were pacified by the loss during the 
August standoff that included most fractions of the KGB which was designed to control the 
population. On the other hand, the bureaucratic system of power was kept more or less intact. 
Supporters of the former regime were allowed to remain in key positions in the political and 
economic system (McFaul 2001: 162). Yeltsin refused to support initiatives taken by 
Democratic Russia to reorganise the KGB, the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(McFaul 2001: 157-58). On the issue of removing central supporters of the former regime 
from their positions Yeltsin expresses doubt about what was to be the right action at the 
moment but he chooses to not follow the demands of the people and “crush them”. On the 
issue of showdown with the former regime Yeltsin expresses opposition against such a break: 
To break with everything, to destroy everything in the Bolshevik manner was not a part of my plans. … I 
still considered it possible to use in government work-experienced executives organizers and leaders… 
(El'cin 1994: 110) 
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Yeltsin’s victory in August 1991 pacified most of the power apparatus of the former regime 
and the supporters of non-democratic continuity and thereby opened a golden opportunity of a 
coalition of reform friendly actors to secure reforms or maybe even democracy in Russia. 
However, by not breaking with the past, including not holding the ones behind the coup d'état 
responsible he gave the authoritarian forces in Russia the possibility to reorganise at a later 
stage during the phase of transition. 
 
Phase one of transition 
As the Soviet Union ceased to exist in on 1st of January 1992 and with the hardliners pacified 
as a result of the failed coup in August the year before, Yeltsin had the opportunity to seek a 
compromise with his allied during the August confrontation Democratic Russia over a new 
institutional design for the new Russian State. With the hardliners pacified and the communist 
party prohibited the interaction in the first part of the phase of transition took part between the 
Yeltsin fraction and the elites in the Democratic Russia Movement who controlled the 
parliament.  
Outcome DescriptionStrategy sets
Compromise outcome in which all actors agree upon the establishment 
of a democratic regimeD,D
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue their most preferred 
strategy, no compromise reached as result of interaction. The Yeltsin 
fraction presses for Hybrid reforms while the Democratic Russia presses 
for Democratic reforms
D,H
Compromise outcome in which all actors agree upon the establishment 
of a hybrid regimeH,H
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue confliction strategies, no 
compromise reached as result of interaction. The Yeltsin fraction presses 
for democratic reforms while the Communist fraction presses for hybrid 
reforms
H,D
Strategies: D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to 
Democratic Russia, second to the Yeltsin fraction
Outcomes of strategic interaction about constitution
Table 6.1
 
In addition to the issue of constitution of a new institutional framework for Russia Yeltsin 
also prioritised the issue of economic reforms through the shock therapy program which was 
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to transform the Russian economy into a market economy. 21 Neither had Yeltsin build a 
consensus on the issue of future structure of Russia but Democratic Russia had supported the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Hence, interaction takes place during this phase about the 
issue of constitution between Democratic Russia and the Yeltsin fraction.  
 As in the earlier presented games it is expected that the actors do not pursue their 
lowest preferred strategy during interaction. This leaves us with two actors both having two 
strategies which as the result of interaction can produce four different outcomes. The strategy 
most preferred to the Democratic Russia Movement is the strategy of democracy then 
followed by the strategy of hybrid reforms while the Yeltsin fraction being a Radical softliner 
fraction will prefer a strategy of hybrid regime to the strategy of democracy. These four 
strategies can be combined to produce the four distinct outcomes as the result of the social 
interaction. The outcomes can be seen in table 6.1. The interaction between the actors can 
produce two compromise outcomes and two conflict outcomes. If both the Yeltsin fraction 
and Democratic Russia choose to play the strategies of democracy this will lead to a 
compromise in which the actors agree upon the establishment of a democratic political system 
as result of the transition. On the other hand if both actors choose the strategy hybrid regime 
during the interaction the result will be the establishment of a reformed hybrid regime. In both 
these outcomes the actors strategies coincide. However, the conflict outcomes are a result of 
the actors choosing conflicting strategies. When the Yeltsin fraction chooses to press for 
hybrid reforms while Democratic Russia presses for democracy or when the Yeltsin fraction 
presses for democratic reform while Democratic Russia presses for hybrid reforms such 
conflict outcomes occur. In a conflict outcome no consensus about the issue of constitution of 
new institutions are reached during interaction as in the Belarusian example.  
 To determine the preference structure of the two actors during their interaction about 
the issue of constitution according to the hypothesis set forward by Colomer (2000: 47-49) it 
is needed to order the outcome towards the pressure for change. The outcome with the highest 
pressure for change is the outcome in which both the Yeltsin Fraction and the Democratic 
Russia Movement press for a democratic change. The result of such an outcome would most 
likely be the establishment of a new and democratic regime in Russia. The two outcomes in 
which the actors choose conflicting strategies represent a high degree of pressure for change. 
While the lowest pressure for change in this interaction is represented by the second 
                                                 
21 For more on Russian economic reforms and Russian economy after independence see Ericson (1995: ; 2001) 
or Sakwa (2002: 227-304) 
 111
compromise outcome in which both actors press for a hybrid regime. It is worth noticing that 
the pressure for change in this game is much higher than in the pressure for change in the 
game presented in the previous chapter on Belarus. Hence, the strategy sets of the Yeltsin 
fraction and Democratic Russia represent more radical reformist actors than the actors present 
in the Belarusian transition. 
Very High D,D
High D,H H,D
Medium H,H
Outcomes ordered towards the degree of pressure for change
D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the Democratic 
Russia, second to the Yeltsin fraction
Table 6.2
 
 The ordering of the pressure for change is used to construct the preferences and utility 
assigned by the actors towards the outcomes. The most preferred outcome for the Democratic 
Russia Movement is the outcome which represents the highest degree of pressure for change 
since it corresponds to the actors’ most preferred strategy. Of the two outcomes which 
represent a high pressure for change Democratic Russia prefers the outcome in which they 
play the strategy of democracy over the outcome in which they choose their second best 
strategy. The worst outcome for Democratic Russia is the outcome in which both actors 
choose to compromise about the strategy of hybrid regime. The Yeltsin fraction will also 
prefer the outcome closest to their most preferred strategy that of a hybrid regime. Of the two 
outcomes with a high pressure for change the Yeltsin fraction prefers the outcome in which 
they press for a hybrid regime while Democratic Russia continues to press for democracy. 
The least preferred outcome for the Yeltsin Fraction is the one in which both actors 
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compromise upon democratic strategies. The outcomes are assigned ordinal values ranging 
from one to four where four is the most preferred outcome. 
Preferences of the actors in the Russian transition
D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the Democratic 
Russia, second to the Yeltsin fraction
Table 6.3
1D,DH,H
2H,DH,D
3D,HD,H
4H,HD,D
Ordinal ValueYeltsin FractionDemocratic 
Russia
 
 The game which takes place between the Democratic Russia Movement and the ruling 
Yeltsin fraction in the early phase of transition about the constitution of new institutions is a 
game between two actors with rather close preference structure. Both are in favour of 
independence and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the issue of constitution of new 
institutions the Yeltsin fraction will always prefer the strategy of a hybrid regime. On the 
other hand Democratic Russia will always prefer the strategy of Democracy. This preference 
structure leaves us with two close actors both possessing dominant but conflicting strategies 
upon the dimension of constitution. These strategies sets are closer than the strategy sets of 
the Belarusian actors which have been described as distant actors. Following intuition one 
would instantly believe that two closer actors would easily be able to compromise upon either 
a democratic outcome or a hybrid regime. However, when construction the game model it 
becomes visible that exactly because these two actors are so close and posses similar 
preferences no one possesses the necessary threat power to alter his opponents preferences in 
order to arrive at a compromise outcome (Colomer 2000: 141-42). The equilibrium of the 
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game lays in the outcome DH in which the actors pursues their most preferred strategy. 22 
2,21,4
4,13,3
Yeltsin Fraction
Democratic 
Russia
Hybrid Regime
Hybrid Regime Democracy
Democracy
Game of strategic interaction about constitutionFigure 6.1
 
The outcome DH is both the Nash-equilibrium as well as the Pareto-optimal solution 
to the game. None of the actors have the initiative to unilaterally change their strategy to 
achieve better payoffs. If an actor changes his strategy unilaterally to the least preferred 
strategy of the two he would end up in his worst outcome while his opponent will receive his 
best payoff. Thereby none of the actors have the power to threaten the opponent to change his 
strategy because he by such an action will end up in his worst possible outcome. Threatening 
to change his own strategy is neither a real threat since this would only benefit his opponent 
by rewarding him with his best payoff.  
In this game there neither exists any initiative for a collective change of strategies. A 
collective agreement or a pact in which the actors both agree to change their strategies does 
not reward any of the actors with a higher payoff than the Nash-equilibrium outcome. Such a 
pact would lead to the sub-optimal conflict outcome HD and there exists therefore no 
initiative amongst the actors to enter into such an agreement. As long as the actors agree upon 
the issue of national independence as well as upon the need for economic reforms it is neither 
possible to include such issues in a pact in order to reach a compromise upon the dimension of 
                                                 
22 This game is solved in dominant strategies in which both actors always will choose their dominant strategy. 
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constitution of new institutions. Hence, it is not possible to extract further utility by any of the 
actors by offering tradeoffs on other dimensions.  
The game is a stable conflict game in which the actors have almost alike strategies 
which makes it impossible to reach a compromise. What might have seemed a golden 
opportunity for two close actors to reach a compromise in the early phase of transition will 
after a closer examination appear to be a frustrating situation in which it became impossible 
for the actors to reach a compromise. Many scholars have claimed that Yeltsin, on purpose, 
omitted to solve the constitutional issue when having the chance to do so with democratic 
Russia (McFaul 2001). He is accused to have prioritised economic reforms over regime 
change. However, this thesis uncovers, by going beyond the intuition, that a compromise 
between Yeltsin and Democratic Russia was impossible. This striking paradox is found by 
applying game theory to the interaction about constitution of new institutions. 
 The Democratic Russia Movement supported Yeltsin in his struggle against the CPSU 
hardliners and later Gorbachev. Together, Democratic Russia and Yeltsin defeated the August 
plotters and dissolved the Soviet Union. Democratic Russia helped Yeltsin into power, 
organised rallies and mobilised civil society. However, Democratic Russia, unlike Central 
European movements such as Solidarity or Civic Forum, never gained access to real power 
under the rule of Yeltsin (Shevtsova 1998: 31). This exclusion from power led to widespread 
frustration amongst the Democratic Russia Movement. While having relied upon Democratic 
Russia to gain power Yeltsin wanted to stay independent once he had achieved power. 
Democratic Russia tried to confront Yeltsin with an ultimatum that unless Yeltsin gave the 
movement real power and allowed them to take part in the decision-making they would 
withdraw their support and go into opposition (Shevtsova 1998: 32). One of the leaders of 
Democratic Russia, Ponomaryov described the conflict with Yeltsin as it became imminent in 
late 1991 as: “We have been trying for months to get a meeting with Boris Nikolayevich. He 
has become inaccessible.” (quoted in Shevtsova 1998: 32). As the game outcome suggests 
Yeltsin and Democratic Russia failed to enter into a compromise either about the constitution 
of new institution or about including the democratic opposition into the power structures. 
Even thought an agreement was signed between the two actor fractions which were to 
coordinate the President’s politics with Democratic Russia a formal collaboration never 
became functional. Yeltsin more or less ignored the agreement as he feared, probably 
correctly, that the ideas of Democratic Russia were not shared by the majority of the 
population (Shevtsova 1998). 
 The conflict between the Yeltsin fraction and Democratic Russia became a source of 
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internal division for the movement. Conflict arose between fractions that had managed to get 
a position within the power structures and the ideological leadership of the movement. Both 
the further connection to the Yeltsin fraction and a conflict between fractions promoting 
democracy and fractions willing to submit to strong personality rule or a bureaucratic and 
clannish style of government in some form of liberal authoritarianism brook out in the open 
(Shevtsova 1998). This conflict finally split The Democratic Russia Movement into a 
minority democratic fraction promoting democracy in opposition and a majority fraction 
supporting the grooving personalistic, bureaucratic and authoritarian rule of the president in 
hope of being able to control Yeltsin. However, this strategy failed and several prominent 
members of the latter fraction later joined the Communist fraction in opposition to Yeltsin. 
Consequently, the split of Democratic Russia led to result that the movement no longer can be 
regarded as a unitary actor promoting common goals. According to Shevtsova (1998: 33-4) 
much of the failure of Democratic Russia can be explained in their lack of a program of action 
and the fact that they failed to become an unified national movement but stayed as an elitist 
centre movement. 
 
The second phase of transition 
While Yeltsin and The Democratic Russia Movement were struggling over power and 
reforms during the first phase of transition nationalists joined with re-organised communists 
in opposition to the ruling president. In January 1992 this Communist fraction for the first 
time took to the streets to protest against Yeltsin’s politics (Shevtsova 1998: 34). Soon the 
newly formed alliance between nationalist empire-savers and communist hardliners from the 
August coup started to form a parliamentary alliance. As Democratic Russia eroded a new 
opposition fraction grew forward which united anti-Yeltsin, anti-reform and anti-democratic 
from all segments of Russian politics. 
The main basis of the conflict between Yeltsin and the Communist fraction which 
became pressing during the death lock situation between the President and the Communist 
fraction in the parliament was about how Russian society and politics should be organised 
(Altermark 2000: 360). The conflict regarded what the Russian identity should be and how it 
was to be ruled in the future. Hence, the main issue which caused the conflict between the 
President on one side and the majority fraction in the Parliament on the other side was about 
the issue of constitution of new institutions. The present institutional framework which had 
been inherited form the phase of liberalisation had its day and did no longer manage to solve 
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the political conflicts and impel further reforms.  
As The Democratic Russia Movement eroded and the Communist fraction grew 
stronger once again relevant actors in the Russian transition shifted. During transition the 
central actors became the still ruling Yeltsin Fraction and the Communist opposition now 
controlling the Russian parliament. The Yeltsin fraction continues to uphold these two most 
preferred strategies of a hybrid regime followed by the strategy of democracy as in the 
previous game while the Communist fractions two most preferred strategies are a return to a 
status quo dictatorship followed by a hybrid regime strategy. This interaction between these 
two more distant actors also produces four possible outcomes. Unlike the previous game and 
similar to the game in Belarus there exists only one compromise outcome in this interaction. 
The three remaining outcomes represent some degree of conflict. The compromise outcome in 
this game occurs when both actors follow the strategy of a hybrid regime. This outcome will 
lead to the establishment of some sort of a reformed regime with elements of democratic 
legitimacy but in which the opportunities for manipulation of the system are still present for 
the ruling fractions. 
Outcome DescriptionStrategy sets
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue confliction strategies, no 
compromise reached as result of interaction. The Yeltsin fraction presses 
for democratic reforms while the Communist fraction presses for Status 
quo
S,D
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue their most preferred 
strategy, no compromise reached as result of interactionS,H
Compromise outcome in which all actors agree upon the establishment 
of a hybrid regimeH,H
Conflict outcome in which all actors pursue confliction strategies, no 
compromise reached as result of interaction. The Yeltsin fraction presses 
for democratic reforms while the Communist fraction presses for hybrid 
reforms
H,D
Strategies: D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the 
Communist fraction, second to the Yeltsin fraction
Outcomes of strategic interaction about constitution
Table 6.4
 
Three outcomes lead to conflict in this game. None of the three outcomes will result in 
a common settlement upon the future nature of the regime. The outcome in which the Yeltsin 
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fraction presses for democracy while the Communist fraction presses for a hybrid regime 
represents a conflict outcome in which both actors follow their least preferred strategies. In 
the second conflict outcome the Yeltsin fraction continues to press for democracy while the  
Communist fraction follows their most preferred strategy of status quo. The third outcome of 
the strategic interaction is the conflict outcome in which the two actors press for their most 
preferred strategies of respectively a hybrid regime for the Yeltsin fraction and a status quo 
dictatorship for the Communist fraction. The outcomes are outlined in the table above.  
 The outcomes in this game are ordered towards the pressure for change in order to 
create a preference structure for the actors during interaction. The outcomes pressure for 
change is shown in the table below. As can be seen from this table the pressure for change is 
considerably lower than it was in the interaction taking place between the democratic 
opposition and the Yeltsin fraction earlier during the phase of transition. The pressure for 
change in this game corresponds to a larger degree to the situation in Belarus. However, it is 
still somewhat higher than in Belarus due to the classification of Yeltsin as a radical softliner 
rather than a moderate softliner.  
High D,H
Medium H,H S,D
Low S,H
Outcomes ordered towards the degree of pressure for change
D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the Communist 
fraction, second to the Yeltsin fraction
Table 6.5
 
The outcome that represents the highest degree of pressure for change is the conflict outcome 
in which the Communist fraction presses for a hybrid regime while the Yeltsin fraction 
presses for democracy. This outcome represents a high degree of pressure for change. Two 
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outcomes represent a medium degree of pressure for change. The first is the conflict outcome 
in which the Communist fraction presses for status quo while the Yeltsin fraction continues to 
press for democracy.  The second is the compromise outcome in which both actors agree upon 
the strategy of a hybrid regime. The final outcome in this game represents a low degree of 
pressure for change and is the one in which the Communist fraction presses for status quo 
while the Yeltsin fraction press for a hybrid regime.  
 As in the games analysed earlier the pressure for change is used to construct the 
preference structure of the actors and assign the ordinal utilities for the actors towards the 
outcomes. The actors prefer outcomes with a degree of pressure for change which 
corresponds to the actors most preferred strategy and if more than one outcome have the same 
degree of pressure for change those in which the actors chooses coinciding strategies are 
chosen (Colomer 2000: 48). The payoff structure of the actors is outlined in table 6.6 below. 
The Yeltsin fraction prefers the compromise outcome in which all actors agree on a hybrid 
regime over all other outcomes. The second best outcome for the Yeltsin fraction is the 
conflict outcome with the same degree of pressure for change in which the Communist 
fraction presses for status quo while the Yeltsin fraction presses for democracy. The outcome 
which is preferred as the third outcome is the outcome which represents the highest pressure 
for change in which the Communist fraction presses for a hybrid regime while the Yeltsin 
fraction presses for democracy. The worst outcome for the Yeltsin fraction is the one in which 
the Communist fraction presses for status quo while he press for hybrid reforms. This least 
preferred outcome is the one with the lowest degree of pressure for change.  
 The Communist fraction on the other hand will prefer the outcome with the lowest 
degree of pressure for change over all the other possible outcomes of the strategic interaction. 
This is followed by the two outcomes with medium pressure for change. Of these two the 
Communist fraction will prefer the compromise outcome in which both actors choose the 
hybrid regime strategy over the conflict outcome. Hence, the third most preferred outcome by 
the Communist fraction is the outcome in which they press for status quo while the Yeltsin 
fraction presses for democracy. The least preferred of the four possible outcomes for the 
Communist fraction is the one with the highest degree of pressure for change, which is the 
conflict outcome in which they press for a hybrid regime while the Yeltsin fraction press for 
democratic reforms. 
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Preferences of the actors in the Russian transition
D=Democracy, H= Hybrid Regime S=Status Quo. First strategy belongs to the Communist 
fraction, second to the Yeltsin fraction
Table 6.6
H,D
S,D
H,H
S,H
Communist 
Fraction
1S,H
2H,D
3S,D
4H,H
Ordinal ValueYeltsin Fraction
 
Compared to the game between the Yeltsin fraction and Democratic Russia the later 
interaction between the Communists and Yeltsin consist of actors with a more distant 
preference structure. The game which reflects the social interaction between Yeltsin and the 
communists in the later phase of transition is in several aspects similar to the prisoners’ 
dilemma game. The game is described by Colomer (2000: 143) as a mugging game. The 
Nash-equilibrium in this game is, as in the prisoners’ dilemma game, suboptimal with regard 
to Pareto-optimality. However, only one of the actors in the mugging game possesses a 
dominant strategy. As can be seen from the table above the Communist fraction possesses a 
dominant strategy of status quo while the Yeltsin fraction does not possess a dominant 
strategy.  
 The static game of strategic interaction about constitution is modelled above. The 
Nash-equilibrium is marked by a circle while the Pareto-optimal solution is marked by the 
quadrangle. For the Communist fraction that possesses a dominant strategy of status quo it 
will always be more rewarding to choose this strategy as long as this interaction is considered 
in isolation. Hence, the status quo strategy is the strictly best reply for the Communist fraction 
no matter the strategy chosen by the Yeltsin fraction. On the other hand, the best strategy of 
the Yeltsin fraction depends upon the choice of the Communist fraction. If the Communist 
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fraction plays the strategy of a hybrid regime it is clearly most rewarding for the Yeltsin 
fraction to enter into the compromise outcome by following their most preferred strategy of a 
hybrid regime. This is, as earlier discussed the best outcome for the Yeltsin fraction. 
However, when the Communist fraction chooses the strategy of status quo the best strategy 
for the Yeltsin fraction will be to play the strategy of democracy because they are rewarded 
with a utility of three instead of a utility of one if they play the strategy of a hybrid regime. 
Hence, since the Communist fraction always will choose the status quo strategy the Yeltsin 
fraction will respond by playing the strategy of democracy. 
1,23,4
2,34,1
Yeltsin Fraction
Communist 
Fraction
Hybrid Regime
Hybrid Regime Democracy
Status Quo
Game of strategic interaction about constitutionFigure 6.2
 
These two strategies form the Nash-equilibrium of the game which corresponds to the 
outcome SD. In this outcome none of the actors have the initiative to unilaterally change their 
strategy. Such an action would lead to the punishment of the actor making such a change 
because the actors would then receive his worst utility. This situation makes the equilibrium a 
stable outcome with regard to unilateral change of strategy. However, the Nash-equilibrium of 
this game is as the prisoners’ dilemma game suboptimal with regard to Pareto-optimality. In 
this case, both actors could improve their utility by changing to the strategy of a hybrid 
regime.23 For this to happen, the Yeltsin fraction must first change their action from 
                                                 
23 This discussion of change in strategies depends upon the assumptions of Brams’ (1994) “theory of moves” in 
which the game has an initial state and the actors can react and counter react on each others moves before the 
game ends (Tvedt 2004: 86). Hence, they are entering into a dynamic interaction. 
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democracy to a hybrid regime. Following this change in strategy, the Yeltsin fraction must 
further either threaten or tempt the Communist fraction to make a similar change in strategy to 
further shift the equilibrium to the Pareto-optimal outcome. Without an effective threat or pact 
the Communist fraction stays with the status quo strategy and punishes the Yeltsin fraction 
with their worst payoff. The non-myopic Pareto-optimal outcome is further unstable because, 
without an effective threat or pact the Communist fraction would have the initiative to change 
their strategy back to status quo to achieve their best utility. As the following empirical 
discussion will elaborate in greater detail the Yeltsin fraction first proposed a compromise 
solution for a new constitution for the parliament. When the parliament failed to accept the 
proposal, Yeltsin set forward a threat to dissolve the parliament.  
Confrontation: The October 1993 Clash 
The conflict between Yeltsin and the Communist fraction found no solution despite the 
compromise reached in late 1993. The conflict had developed into a stalemate with direct 
confrontation between the two fractions. The choice of Yeltsin to prioritise economic reforms 
over crafting of new institutions had left the country without a coherent framework for further 
reforms. As the game between Democratic Russia and the Yeltsin fraction shows it was not 
possible to reach a compromise between the two fractions within the given framework of 
interaction. And as McFaul (2001) claims the first phase of transition was devoted to 
economic reforms. By leaving the question about constitution of new institutions unsolved 
Yeltsin entered into an economic transition without an adequate institutional framework. The 
deadlock which was created by the confrontation between the Communist fraction and the 
Yeltsin fraction did in the summer of 1993 threaten to destroy the regime as the parliament 
continued to issue counter-edicts to every presidential decision (Lapidus 1995: 22-3). 
 As Democratic Russia had eroded Yeltsin had fallen into a new conflict, this time with 
the Communist fraction. However, as the game presented earlier shows it is possible to move 
away from the suboptimal Nash-equilibrium if one of the fractions, in this case the Yeltsin 
fraction, possesses the necessary threatening power to force the Communist fraction into 
changing their dominant strategy away from status quo towards the strategy of a hybrid 
regime in order to reach the Pareto-optimal outcome. If the Yeltsin fraction has the sufficient 
threatening power to push the Communist fraction to enter into a compromise with the Yeltsin 
fraction this would solve the deadlock between the president and the parliament. For such a 
threat to be efficient it must make the target change its behaviour in accordance with the 
threatener’s desires (Hovi 1998: 13). Hence, it must make the parliament to stop issuing 
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counter-edicts to every presidential decision and enter into a compromise with Yeltsin in 
which a new institutional framework came into effect. Already during the Sixth Congress in 
April 1992 Yeltsin had threatened to hold a nationwide referendum on a new constitution, 
new elections and for the early dissolution of the parliament which term was due to end in 
March 1995 (Sakwa 2002: 49). However, the deadlock between president and parliament 
continued for more than a year.  
 Hovi (1998) have created a game theoretical framework for analysing such conflict 
situations in which threats are set forwarded. If the Communist fraction is to yield to Yeltsin’s 
threat, and it thereby become effective it must fulfil the five criteria discussed in the theory 
chapter. Hence, the threat must be relevant, severe, complete, clear and credible (Hovi 1998: 
11-17). 
In the present case the threat is considered to be relevant, because it would have been 
possible for the Communist fraction to enter into a compromise with Yeltsin by changing 
their strategy to their second most preferred of a hybrid regime. The initiative for changing 
their strategy is also present, since the compromise outcome of HH is more rewarding than 
the conflict outcome SD. By changing strategy they would be better off as long as Yeltsin also 
enters into the compromise, an action which is likely when the game is considered. Hence, the 
threat of dissolving the parliament is considered to be relevant. 
 The threat is also considered severe because such an action would harm the 
Communist fraction because the parliament is the main arena for the opposition against 
Yeltsin. Without the formal institution of the parliament intact the Communist fraction would 
have no other arena for protest and power than the streets. Or in other words it would leave 
them without any formal power. An additional argument for the threat to be severe is 
Khasbulatov’s wish for a parliamentary republic. This would probably not be possible with a 
new parliament which is to be created after the initiative of the president. The threat set 
forward by Yeltsin is regarded as being complete because Yeltsin did show an initiative to 
enter an agreement with the parliamentary fraction during the one and a half year from April 
1992 until October 1993. Nothing has shown that Yeltsin intended to carry out the threat even 
of the Communist fraction had yield to it. Finally, the threat can be considered to be clear as 
the threat was put forward during interaction about a specific issue, the constitution of new 
institutions, with the goal of changing the behaviour of the majority fraction in the parliament. 
The intention of the threat is therefore regarded to be understood by the Communist fraction. 
 However, for the threat to be efficient it must also be credible. For the threat of 
dissolution of the parliament to be credible it must be believed by the Communist fraction to 
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be carried out if they do not yield and enter into a compromise. Hence, the Communist 
fraction must be certain that Yeltsin possesses the power and the willingness to actually 
dissolve parliament. Before the October confrontation this criteria seems to be unclear. 
Constitutionally, the referendum was only allowed if one third of the congress or one million 
members of the public asked for it (Sakwa 2002: 49). And if the necessary signatures had 
been collected the Supreme Soviet would have to call for the referendum. Further, on 
December 11th 1992, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution that banned any plebiscite that 
could result in a vote of no confidence in any high state body, or which could lead to the 
dissolution before its term had expired (ibid).  In other words, Yeltsin did not possess the 
legal power to dissolve the parliament.  
An alternative to dissolving the parliament by a decree would to be to remove it by 
force. However, the balance of power between the president and the parliament was unclear 
and society in general seemed divided (McFaul 2001: 191). Yeltsin could not be certain of the 
support from neither the army nor the FSB. 24 In August the army had been reluctant towards 
using force against demonstrators and the former KGB had been a supporter of the hardliners. 
Many regional leaders were also calm towards Yeltsin and many openly supported the 
Communist fraction. On the other hand, Yeltsin did in August 1991 manage to mobilise the 
masses and outset the plotters behind the coup d'état. At that time the army at the end sided 
with the people and against the plotters. Yeltsin, together with Democratic Russia, showed 
tremendous power by these actions and he won great respect and legitimacy for defending 
Russia and the reform politics.  
Yeltsin’s popularity had partly been confirmed by the April election in which 59 
percent of the voters had shown confidence in the president (Sakwa 2002: 51). However, he 
clearly lacked the legal power to dissolve the parliament and his support amongst the 
institutions of power seemed unclear in 1992 and early 1993 therefore the credibility of the 
threat can be seen as contested. Hence, the Communist fraction cannot with certainty decide 
whether the threat is credible or not. However, it is crucial to judge if the threat is effective or 
not. If the threat is not effective Yeltsin does not have the essential threatening power to 
change the outcome of the game. 
 As the threat set forward by Yeltsin is established by the above discussion to be 
relevant, severe, complete and clear the only uncertainty connected to threat is whether or not 
it is credible. To illustrate this situation a game is created in which the threat is considered 
                                                 
24 FSB is the successor of the KGB (NKVD and Cheka) and is to deal with domestic security issues.  
 124
both to be credible and not to be credible. This uncertainty about threat is build into a game 
model by introducing the concept of nature and variable preference structure as in the nested 
game of Belarus. 
The game is a dynamic game which is opened by the Communist fraction that can 
react towards the threat set forward by Yeltsin by either yielding to the threat or by standing 
firm. If they choose to yield the game ends. In such an outcome the Communist fraction has 
given in to the Yeltsin fraction’s threat. If the Communist fraction on the other hand stands 
firm the next move of the game belongs to the Yeltsin fraction. As a reaction to this the 
Yeltsin fraction can choose to either dissolve the parliament or not to dissolve the parliament. 
By dissolving the parliament we reach a conflict outcome in which Yeltsin removes the 
Communist fraction from power either by legal means or by force. In this outcome the threat 
has shown to be effective. If the Yeltsin fraction is not able to do so they will not dissolve the 
parliament and the Communist fraction will remain in power of the parliament and the 
situation remains unsolved. In this outcome the threat has shown not to be effective. The 
Communist fraction will order the outcomes in the following way: 
Best:  Stand firm and Yeltsin fraction gives in  
Second Best: Yield and enter into compromise 
Worst:  Stand firm and the Yeltsin fraction dissolves the parliament 
The Communist fraction will be best rewarded by the outcome in which the Yeltsin fraction 
gives in as they stand firm. The second best outcome is when they choose to enter the 
compromise by following the strategy of yielding. The worst outcome for the Communist 
fraction occurs when they are punished by the Yeltsin fraction for standing firm. If the threat 
is credible and thereby effective the preferences of the Yeltsin fraction will be as follows:  
Best:  The Communist fraction yields and enters into the compromise 
Second Best: Communist fraction stands firm and the parliament is dissolved 
Worst:  Communist fraction stands firm and Yeltsin fraction gives in 
In this interaction the Yeltsin fraction possesses the necessary threatening power to change the 
outcome of the game and will be most rewarded when the Communist fraction gives in and 
enters into the compromise. Since he possesses this threatening power it would be more 
rewarding to carry out the threat than not carrying it out. If the threat on the other hand is not 
credible and thereby not effective the preferences will be as follows: 
Best:  The Communist fraction yields and enters into the compromise 
Second Best: Communist fraction stands firm and Yeltsin fraction gives in  
Worst:  Communist fraction stands firm and the parliament is dissolved 
In this game the two least preferred outcomes have swished places. This is due to the fact that 
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the Yeltsin fraction does not possess the necessary threatening power in order to press the 
Communist fraction into a compromise. In this game the outcomes are given numerical 
utilities at an interval scale to allow the estimation of uncertainties and the sub-game perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium.25 The game is outlined in the figure 6.3 below. The game to the right of 
Nature (q) is the game in which the threat is considered to be credible and therefore effective 
while the game to the left (1-q) is the one in which the threat is not regarded credible and the 
threat is not effective. 
-25,-250,0
1-q
q
Nature
Communist Fraction
Communist Fraction
YeltsinYeltsin
Dissolute parliament Dissolute parliament
Give inGive in
Yield to 
the threat
Yield to 
the threat
Stand firm Stand firm
-10, 10-25, 00,-25-10,10
The Russian threat game
Figure 6.3
   
In this game it is the Communist fraction that does not know for certain if the threat is 
credible or not. The Yeltsin fraction on the other hand knows whether he is able and willing to 
carry out the threat. It is possible to estimate the value of the quantity q in order to find out the 
Communist fractions expectation of the credibility of the threat. This is done by creating an 
expression of the expected utility of the respective strategies of “yield” and “stand firm”. 
From these expressions one creates an inequality and calculates the estimated size of the 
                                                 
25 These utilities are given empirically and assume that a defeat and a loss of face are connected to a negative 
utility while victory is connected to a positive utility. Continued conflict is granted a more neutral utility. 
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probability. 26 The quantity q is calculated to: 
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With this estimation of the quantity to be smaller or equal to .4 one can presume that the 
Communist fraction estimates the threat to be not credible. Hence, that if they stand firm to 
Yeltsin’s demand of entering into a compromise expecting that he will give in and not have 
the necessary power or not being willing to dissolve the parliament. Following this logic the 
Communist fraction will choose the action of standing firm to the threat. However, this does 
not mean that the threat is not credible, but only that the Communist fraction estimates the 
chances of it to be credible to be less than 40 percent. The equilibrium found by this technique 
is the one in which the Communist fraction stand firm and the Yeltsin fraction gives in. This 
equilibrium is a sub-game perfect equilibrium found on the right hand side of the game tree 
marked by a circle. 
 
The Deadlock 
The first real attempt to adopt a new set of rules for the political game after the 
collapse of the Democratic Russia Movement took place in April 1992. The Congress of 
Peoples Deputies failed in the Sixth Congress to adopt a new constitutional framework for 
Russia. The disagreement which had developed between the president and the parliamentarian 
majority about the economic reform programme further developed into a conflict about the 
structure, development and organisation of the Russian political system (McFaul 2001: 186). 
It was during this session of the congress that Yeltsin set forward the threat to dissolve the 
parliament. However, the first real clash between the Yeltsin fraction and the Communist 
controlled parliament did not take place before the Seventh Congress in December 1992. At 
this session the parliament tried to limit the presidential power through several constitutional 
amendments and by curtailing the president’s power to rule by decree. This power had been 
granted Yeltsin for only one year and was to expire in December 1992 (Sakwa 2002: 49).  
The parliament had seriously challenged the leading role of the president in the reform 
process and tried to hinder any further reforms. The changes would have given the parliament 
                                                 
26 For a detailed calculation of the quantity q, please refer to the appendix of this chapter. 
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expanded authority on behalf of the president. This continued confrontation with the president 
indicates that the parliament did not regard the threat set forward by Yeltsin to be credible. 
Dissolution of the parliament was not legal and the Communist fraction counted on support 
from the regions and must have doubted Yeltsin’s popularity in the population. This action 
indicates that the Communist fraction instead of yielding to the president’s demands so they 
continued to stand firm. 
The conflict between Yeltsin and the Communist fraction did first and foremost result 
in growing scepticism by the opposition toward the radical reform program which had been 
launched by Yeltsin and which was lead by his Prime Minister Gaidar. Even though, Yeltsin 
approved the replacement of the reform friendly prime minister Gaidar with the more 
restrictive Chernomyrdin he did not approve the restriction of his power (McFaul 2001). 
Yeltsin feared that the dominant Communist fraction in parliament would act as a resistor 
against further economic reforms and promote further political instability. Yeltsin saw the 
congress as an obstacle to further reforms:  
 
“In my opinion, it is an artificial, supra-parliamentary entity. Its very existence is a permanent basis 
for disrupting the balance of power between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. (Sakwa 
2002: 49) 
 
Yeltsin had lost the confidence in the Congress of Peoples Deputies and as a reaction to the 
attempts to limit his powers he threatened to call for a referendum to decide who should have 
the power to reform the economy and the political institutions. Yeltsin claimed that the 
Communist fraction had obstructed the reforms and “What they failed to achieve in August 
1991, they decided to repeat now and carry out a creeping coup.”(Sakwa 2002: 49). 
However, for the moment the Yeltsin fraction and the legislative managed to reach an 
agreement to put off the referendum until April. The April referendum was to decide the 
balance of power between the Yeltsin fraction and the Communist dominated Congress 
deciding who was to have power to control the reforms. The referendum gave stronger 
support to Yeltsin than expected, with 59 percent of the turnout expressing confidence in the 
president (Sakwa 2002: 51). The referendum also expressed confidence in the economic 
politics and called for new elections for both president and parliament. However, the demand 
for elections was not binding because they failed to reach the required 50 percent of the 
registered voters (Ibid). This referendum was at least a partial victory for Yeltsin and 
strengthened his position against the parliament.  
 Despite the result of the referendum the parliament did not yield to the president’s 
threat. The conflict only intensified during summer and radicalised the parliament. The 
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leading figures, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi used the summer to gather support from the regions 
in their struggle against the president. According to Sakwa (2002: 52) the parliament over-
estimated its strength by misinterpreting Yeltsin’s moves as signs of weakness. The 
constitutional crises turned into a struggle about power. Rutskoi openly spoke of his 
ambitions of becoming president. Yeltsin interpreted the April referendum as a renewed 
mandate from the people in the struggle against the hardliner fraction and in July he had a 
new draft for a constitution ready. However, his draft was blocked by some regional leaders. 
The Communist fraction had once again showed that they had no intentions to yield to the 
threats. It had become clear that there was no legal way of adopting a new constitution 
(Shevtsova 1995: 22). 
 As the parliament continued to stand firm and confronted the president denying 
entering a compromise the president took a risky action. He issued Decree 1400 which 
dissolved the Supreme Soviet, called for new legislative elections and a vote on the new draft 
constitution on December 12th (Shevtsova 1995: 23). However, the parliament did not give in 
to this move peacefully. Not only had they miscalculated the credibility of the president’s 
threat they did still not believe that Yeltsin had the necessary power and support to remove 
them. Supporters of the Communist fraction occupied the Russian White House for two 
weeks before they moved to storm the Moscow Mayor’s office and the radio tower in a final 
attempt to defeat the president. The next day Yeltsin reacted as army divisions finally showed 
loyalty to the president and stormed the White House after having bombed it with laser guided 
gradates. The president’s power and the credibility of his threats could no longer be 
questioned by anyone. Khasbulatov and Rutskoi were imprisoned and Yeltsin had won the 
stand off. 
 Compared to the outcome suggested by the equilibrium found by unveiling the 
Communist fraction’s estimation of the quantity q, the observed outcome seems to be 
somewhat different. As the equilibrium suggests the Communist fraction stands firm to 
Yeltsin’s threat. However, the Yeltsin fraction reacts to this by dissolving the parliament. This 
indicates that the estimation of the credibility of the threat was uncertain. This uncertainty led 
to the miscalculation of the credibility of the threat by the Communist fraction.  
 When we now have observed the outcome of the interaction it is possible through the 
application of Bayes rule to establish the probability of the credibility of the threat.  
This is done by applying Bayes rule of probability theory to the model. By applying Bayes 
rule it is possible to decide the credibility of the threat given that we observe that Yeltsin 
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carries out the threat. Mathematically this is expressed as follows:27  
A=  Yeltsin’s threat is credible 
B=  Yeltsin will dissolve parliament  
Ã= Yeltsin threat is not credible 
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This equation expresses that the probability of the treat is credible given the observation that 
Yeltsin dissolves the parliament is equal to 1. Hence, when Yeltsin dissolves the parliament 
the treat has proven to be credible and the Communist fraction has miscalculated the threat 
from the Yeltsin fraction. Therefore, the outcome of the interaction is that the Communist 
fraction stands firm and the Yeltsin fraction carries out the threat and dissolves the parliament 
and calls for new elections and a referendum on a new constitution. The dispute about the 
credibility of the Yeltsin fraction’s threat hinders a movement in the game from the sub-
optimal conflict outcome to the Pareto-optimal outcome which would have led to a 
compromise. The result is that the Yeltsin fraction wins the confrontation and may impose 
their preferences on the issue of constitution upon the other actors.  
 
The 1993 constitution 
A new Russian constitution which was to resolve the disputes between the president and the 
parliament was approved by a referendum in December 1993. According to Sheinis (2004: 
56) already then serious concerns was raised about falsification of the referendum. The 
constitution clearly strengthens the president’s position in the new institutional frame work.  
This might not be strange as the draft for a new constitution was created by the Yeltsin 
fraction in the aftermath of the victory over the Communist fraction in October. The 
constitution of Russia was in many aspects a liberal constitution. It separates the state powers, 
                                                 
27 For a detailed discussion and calculation of Bayes rule applied to the observed outcome, please refer to the 
appendix of this chapter. 
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grant basic human rights to the population, secures freedom of speech and prohibits 
censorship (Sakwa 2002). However, the constitution echoes that Yeltsin’s motivations was 
predominantly of a liberal character rather than a democratic character (Shevtsova 2000: ; 
Sakwa 2002: 61) 
Institutionally, major changes were made to the legislative branch of power while the 
executive branch remained subordinate to the president and mainly untouched by the changes. 
The president was given the power to appoint the government and only the prime minister 
needs to be approved by the parliament (Shevtsova 1998: 93). The legislative was 
transformed into a dual chamber parliament with limited power. While the president was 
granted the right to dissolve the parliament it became practically impossible to remove the 
president (Ibid). The power of the constitutional court was limited compared to earlier drafts. 
The constitution was designed to give extensive power to the president in a form of a supra 
presidential system opening for the possibility of building an authoritarian political system if 
this was the intention of the head of state. According to Reddaway and Glinski (2001: 633) 
the constitution blocked any further democratic development. The negative balance of power 
between the braches created the basis for an authoritarian regime with little counterbalance to 
presidential powers (Shevtsova 1995: 24). 
The 1993 constitution put the prospects of further democratic or authoritarian 
development in Russia solely in the intention of Yeltsin and the presidents which followed 
him. The regime rested on weak and subordinate institutions which was insufficient to control 
the presidents intentions while they still were to generate legitimacy by their democratic and 
liberal features (Shevtsova 2000). As shown by Sheinis (2004) Yeltsin showed willingness of 
manipulating the electoral process not only during transition but also in the founding election 
of December. McFaul et al (2004) points to several instances of suspected electoral 
manipulation in the post transitional elections. Yeltsin also showed willingness of 
manipulating the democratic process when he controlled the media coverage to his and the 
newly formed pro-president party “Russia’s Choice” advantages, denying other political 
groups to compete on equal terms (Shevtsova 1995). All of this points towards that the regime 
Yeltsin inserted subsequent to the October 1993 confrontation tried to extract legitimacy from 
democratic procedures and institutions while the incumbent rulers showed willingness to use 
the opportunities they were given to manipulate the system to their advantage. This 
corresponds to the characteristics given of a hybrid regime in the first chapter of this thesis. 
Hence, by winning the confrontation with the Communist fraction in October Yeltsin 
introduced a hybrid form of rule through the new constitution in Russia. 
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7. Conclusion 
The main objective I have undertaken in this thesis is to explain an observed difference in 
regime type between two structural and historical similar Slavic republics, Russia and 
Belarus. In the 1990s one could observe that Belarus moved towards a non-democratic regime 
while Russia seemed to have been consolidated in a “gray zone” between democracy and 
dictatorship. However, my goal has not only been to study the empirical outcomes, but has 
also had additional theoretical goals. First, to apply transition theory and game theory and 
create an integrated theoretical and methodological model for understanding post-Soviet 
transitions within a universal framework for understanding transitions. Secondly, to take into 
consideration the challenges which are created by multi-dimensional conflict issues about 
nation-building, state-building and economic change when they appear as conflicts during 
transition. Sub-optimality and the escape from such a situation have been central to this 
discussion. The following sections will discuss the major findings in the chapters of Belarus 
and Russia, the comparative findings and the implication for transition and regime theory. 
Finally, I will outline some further challenges which I have not undertaken in this thesis.    
 
Belarus 
Belarus met the formation of the Soviet Union with a poorly developed national 
consciousness. Long suppression from Russia and Poland, ethnic and class structures, low 
degree of urbanisation and the lack of a national conscious elite in addition to several other 
factors elaborated in chapter four had left the country with an unawake national identity. The 
nationalist trends which had been so influent in Western-Europe during the process of nation-
building in the nineteenth century had not yet had a severe impact upon Belarus. Neither had 
the process of state-building had an impact upon the country as Belarus never experienced 
real independence before the formation of the Soviet Union. 
 When the processes of nation- and state-building finally reached Belarus in the mid 
twentieth century it was in the form of constructing a Soviet state and a Soviet identity and 
not as a national state or identity. This left Belarus, as opposed to the Baltic republics and 
Russia, with a weak and underdeveloped national consciousness. As Belarus entered the 
processes of democratisation in the late 1980s there excited a strong Soviet identity in Belarus 
and strong support in favour of the union both amongst the elites and the population. I have 
argued in this thesis that these finding have had a profound impact upon the Belarusian 
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transition. By a closer examination of these factors they are believed to have created specific 
challenges for the transition.  
These assumptions build upon the suggestions by both Rustow (1970) and by Linz and 
Stephan (1996: ; 1996b). However, I have discussed in detail some factors which create 
specific challenges. The challenges are further brought into the analysis about Belarus as 
micro-level factors, not macro-level assumptions or vague concepts. The lack of national 
identity and low support for independence is a consequence of the state- and nation-building 
processes. This further affects the actor’s ability to compromise as well as their strategies 
towards both the issue of constitution of new institutions and the issues of the future nature of 
the state. By affecting the strategies and creating multi-dimensional conflicts during transition 
state- and nation-building processes have influenced the outcome of transition directly in 
Belarus. 
I have argued that the multi-dimensional conflict structure of Belarus during transition 
hindered the possibility of a compromise on the dimension of constitution of new institutions. 
Furthermore, I argue that more attention was devoted, by the softliner actor and the opposition 
actor, towards securing national independence and an unstable national pact than securing a 
regime compromise. However, the national pact proved unstable and inadequate for securing 
national independence as the hardliner actor pursued re-integration with Russia and affected a 
strategy of re-establishing of the Soviet Union.  
At the same time as the national compromise was insufficient, the softliner actor failed 
to take advantage of his position as a centric actor upon both conflict dimensions to propose a 
lasting compromise. In stead of pursuing a strategy of compromise on the question of regime 
type the softliner actor allied with the hardliners on this question while excluding the 
opposition from further influence. This strategy was followed in a hope of securing 
independence. However, as the national compromise fell apart the interaction returned to the 
sub-optimal conflict situation of a prisoners’ dilemma game. Without a pact, about either 
conflict issues, a movement away from such an outcome is impossible. Hence, it seems to be 
a prior condition for an escape from a prisoners’ dilemma game, which occurs in a nested 
conflict situation, that the prior conflict is solved before the attention is turned to other 
conflict issues. In the Belarusian setting this means that lack of a compromise about the 
national issue hindered a compromise about regime type.  
These two factors was the main reason for the failure of the Belarusian actors to reach 
the non-myopic Pareto-optimal outcome and led to a sub-optimal conflict outcome as a result 
of the Belarusian transition. Hobbes describes in the Leviathan (published 1742, by Tuck 
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1991) such a situation in which actors wish for peace but as long as they all follows individual 
rationality the result will be a conflict. Further, a life under this conflict will be “lonely, short, 
disgusting and brutal” (Midtbø 2003: 124). Therefore, the only escape from this miserable life 
will be for the people voluntarily, by contract, to submit power to an absolute ruler. Such a 
conflict situation seems to have been the outcome of the Belarusian transition. While the 
strongest party, the hardliner fraction, attempted to introduce their preferences upon the other 
actors who resisted this, the peoples used the fist opportunity to submit their sovereignty to 
the one man who promised them stability, peace and continuity, the charismatic and 
authoritarian Alexander Lukashenka.   
 In addition to the multi-dimensional conflict structures of the Belarusian transition I 
also argue that Belarus met the transition phase especially ill-prepared. A regime split on the 
national level occurred at a much later stage than on the central level and the ruling elite 
suppressed and hindered opposition during the entire phase of liberalisation. This severely 
limited the impact of liberalisation upon Belarusian society. The opposition remained an 
urban phenomena and public debate was limited. This clearly affected the development, 
strength and position of the actors so that the opposition and softliner remained weak during 
transition. The Communist Party of Belarus remained powerful throughout both liberalisation 
and transition. However, the opposition managed to mobilise support about the issues of 
Stalinist crimes, the Chernobyl disaster and the issue of the Belarusian culture and language. 
 
Russia 
The Russian transition started as the Belarusian with the breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
However, the phase of liberalisation had a much more durable impact on Russia politics. A 
clear split between hardliner and softliner fractions occurred on central level already in the 
mid 1980s when Gorbachev came to power. And at a later stage also the softliner fraction 
split into a radical fraction around Yeltsin and a moderate around Gorbachev. Furthermore, I 
create a clear division between the Yeltsin fraction as a softliner and the democratic 
opposition. By doing so, I stress the liberal character of Yeltsin’s strategies while relaxing the 
democratic nature of Yeltsin. I have found little implications for Yeltsin being neither a 
democratic nor an opposition player. Yeltsin prioritised reforms which were intended to 
overcome the challenges created by the crisis the Soviet Union and later Russia were facing. 
Full democratisation of the regime was of a lower priority. As the outcome findings confirm 
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Yeltsin’s intentions was to create a regime streamlined to introduce these liberal reforms and 
maximise his political power while maintaining a legitimate rule. These findings correspond 
to the classification of Russia as a hybrid regime and the classification by Freedom House of 
Russia as partly free. 
 The first game presented in the chapter about Russia takes place between the Yeltsin 
fraction and the Democratic Russia Movement and clearly demonstrates how a compromise 
was unattainable. This conclusion clearly differs from that of most other observers, who have 
seen this moment in the transition as a golden opportunity for reaching a democratic outcome. 
By going beyond the conclusions reached by intuition I have unveiled that such an outcome 
was much more unlikely than it appeared at first sight. The reason for this is the complication 
which arises when two actors with a close preference structure engage in interaction about the 
question of regime type. I will return to this in greater detail in the section discussing 
implications to theory.  
 The second game presented in the Russian chapter deals with two more distant actors. 
This game, unlike the first, opens the possibility for a compromise. Despite this, the initial 
Nash-equilibrium in this game is a sub-optimal conflict outcome. However, a movement away 
from this outcome towards a Pareto-optimal outcome is possible if the one of the actors 
possess the necessary threatening or tempting power. The empirical elaboration found 
evidence for a threat and a movement away from the conflict strategy by the Yeltsin fraction. 
The final game in the Russian chapter discusses the effect of this threat in order to 
illuminate whether this threat was sufficient for a movement away from sub-optimality. The 
discussion uncovered an uncertainty amongst the Communist fraction about the credibility of 
the threat. This uncertainty led to the Communist fraction’s miscalculation of the credibility 
of the threat and thereby explains the armed confrontation between Yeltsin and the 
Parliament. As I have formally shown the threat proved credible and the confrontation 
resulted in a victory for Yeltsin. Thereby, Russia failed to escape sub-optimality by the use of 
threatening power. Instead of reaching a pacted compromise between the actors fraction the 
Russian transition outcome was determined by the outcome of a conflict and a confrontation.  
Comparative findings 
Both Belarus and Russia failed to escape the sub-optimal outcomes of the interaction about 
constitution and reach the Pareto-optimal outcome. This has different causes in the two 
countries. In Belarus a compromise outcome was not reached due to the multi-dimensional 
conflicts of the transition that hindered a pacted transition about the issue of constitution. In 
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Russia a compromise was at first unattainable due to the preference structures of the relevant 
actors. Later a compromise was hindered by the miscalculation of Yeltsin’s threat. The 
possibility of a pact in Russia was ignored by the Communist fraction as they were 
overwhelmed by their own belief of their strength and support. These conclusions contradict 
the weakly theoretical founded claims by McFaul (2002) and Melville (2000) that post-Soviet 
transitions cannot be understood by transition theory due to the lack of known pacts. I have 
shown that the lack of known pacts should rather be seen as an explanatory factor towards the 
outcome than a precondition for the application of theory. Other conclusions can only be seen 
as a misinterpretation of the theoretical framework. 
 Another major comparative finding is the difference in actor constellations and the 
pressure for change which result from this. In Belarus three actor fractions have been found to 
be relevant to the transition. These are a moderate hardliner fraction, a moderate softliner 
fraction and a moderate opposition fraction. This combination of actors produced a relative 
low degree of pressure for change. Due to this only the opposition actor had democratic 
reforms as a relevant strategy and all other actors pressed for non-democratic strategies. The 
only way democracy could have been implemented in Belarus would have been through a 
victory of the opposition. This seems relatively unlikely given the balance of power and the 
relative strength of the actors. 
 In Russia I have found a different constellation of actors. Also here three actor 
fractions have been found to be relevant for the interaction. However, in Russia these are a 
moderate hardliner fraction, a radical softliner fraction and a moderate opposition fraction. 
The presence of a relative powerful moderate softliner fraction has shown to be crucial for 
implementation of reforms. The radical softliner player has democratic reforms as a relevant 
strategy. This leaves us with two actors with a democratic strategy. The combinations of 
strategies constitute a relative higher pressure for change during the interactions in Russia 
than in Belarus. This again can act as an explanatory factor, in combination with the different 
outcomes produced by the interaction, for the regime type which resulted from the interaction. 
  Furthermore, I have found that multi-dimensional conflicts are to be of decisive 
importance to the outcomes of the interaction. These findings results from bringing these 
conflicts into the micro-level analysis. Especially in Belarus the national conflict has been a 
hinder to a compromise outcome. In Russia on the other hand, the conflicts arising from the 
economic transition have been found to be a hinder for compromise. I have tested two 
different technical approaches towards these questions and will return to this in the next 
section. 
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 Even thought Russia and Belarus have many similarities they did meet the phase of 
transition with some differences as well. Russia was an old empire and had without doubt a 
special position in the Soviet Union. Russia was the centre of the political breakdown and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Belarus on the other hand was less prepared for independence 
in 1991. It had little experience of independence and occupied a peripheral position with 
regard to the breakdown of the union. 
In addition to the above findings I have briefly discussed the possible influence of the 
Ralwsin veil. Following this discussion it is my opinion that this factor has had a limited 
impact upon the outcome of transition. However, some effects came be observed. Elections in 
Russia gave an impression that the distribution of support was rather balanced or maybe 
slightly in favour of Yeltsin. In Belarus on the other hand, the electoral results give less clear 
indications on the strength of the actors due to widespread fraud and manipulation. Opinion 
pools indicate that the regime had strong support in the population and probably would have 
won a free election in this period. However, the ruling hardliners miscalculated their support 
when Lukashenka entered the race, and were clearly defeated in the founding election. A 
similar miscalculation of strength can be found in Russia where the Communist fraction over 
estimated their support both amongst elites and the population when confronting Yeltsin in 
1993.   
 
Implications for, and contributions to theory 
One of the major theoretical tasks which I have undertaken is the incorporation of the 
challenges proposed by coinciding nation-building, state-building, economic transition and 
democratisation. These factors and processes are claimed by several theorists to be a 
challenge for democratisation.28 Processes of state- and nation-building are processes still 
ongoing in most of the former Soviet Union as well as in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.29 
Regimes in this part of the world face major challenges in the coming decades with respect to 
increasing freedom combined with overcoming the obstacles of state- and nation-building. 
For further democratic progress in these parts of the world it is therefore of central importance 
to understand how and why these processes affect transitions from non-democratic regimes. 
Despite this, little attention has so far been devoted to these challenges on a micro-level. 
                                                 
28 See for instance Linz and Stepan (1996: ; 1996b), Przeworski (1991), Elster (1993) or Rustow (1970) 
29 See for instance Herland (2006) about the challenges of state- and nation-building in Syria and Libanon 
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 I have applied two approaches to the conflicts arising from simultaneous nation-
building, stat-building, economic-transition and regime change. By showing how specific 
conflict issues can be derived from these processes and how these again affect the interaction 
of the actors on the question of regime type I have created a genuine actor-approach for the 
study of multi-dimensional conflicts during transition. Furthermore, I have shown how these 
conflicts create challenges for the actor’s ability to reach compromises on the conflict of 
regime type as long as conflicts remain unsolved upon other dimensions. This hinders the 
ability of reaching pacts on all conflict issues. 
 I have demonstrated that pacts are essential for reaching compromises during 
transitions. Without pacts it is difficult for actors to escape sub-optimal outcomes of 
interaction and reach optimal compromise outcomes, even non-democratic compromises like 
hybrid regimes. When multi-dimensional conflicts hinder pacts this further hinders the ability 
to escape from sub-optimality. By introducing the importance of pacts to the discussion of the 
Belarusian and Russian transition I have contributed to further develop this concept and its 
function in transitions. Pacts can be both hidden and inexplicit. Following my arguments and 
findings it will be more fruitful to understand pacts as some sort of a non-formalised 
agreement, often unspoken and unwritten, but binding as an action guideline among the 
relevant actors during democratisation. This expands the understanding and importance of 
pacts and compromises for the outcome of democratisation. Compromise is an essential part 
of democracy, maybe even the most essential component of a democratic system. The essence 
of pacting is important to everyone who seeks compromise outcomes as a lasting solution to 
disagreement in transitions. Even though the concept of pacts are essential to understand 
transition their presence are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for a democratic 
outcome or the application of transition theory. 
Furthermore, the importance of compromise in democratisation and democracy which 
I have stressed in this work underlines a point lacking in Dahl’s (1971) conceptualisation of 
democracy. This is the central role of compromise in democracy. The concept of democracy 
should also be understood as a regime which requires willingness and possibility, which even 
encourage to compromises. A regime which includes these characteristics is one which is 
capable to both ensure the interests of the majority and the minority, the winners and the 
losers. By doing so, the regime secures stability both politically and socially. 
I have here demonstrated that the transition theory can be applied to transitions in the 
former Soviet Union, despite the lack of observable pacts. This contradicts the claims made 
by McFaul (2002: 213) that the post-communist transitions “are so different from the third 
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wave democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that they should not even be grouped 
under the same rubric”. Post-Soviet transitions are not that different from transitions in 
Southern-Europe and Latin-America that they cannot be understood by the framework of 
transition theory. This makes McFaul’s observation of a “fourth wave” of transitions, at the 
very best, inaccurate. In his proposed explanatory model McFaul (2002) introduces an 
awkward logic, as outcomes after elections are explained by the power distribution before 
elections. However, transition theory is not yet a complete theory, but more a universal model 
or a set of tools for understanding transitions. But by combining the tools of transition theory 
and game theory I have applied a model which proved to be useful for understanding post-
Soviet transitions and which I believe can be applied to transitions universally.  
 Finally, my findings in the Russian case show that actors close to each other cannot 
reach a compromise outcome as result of the social interaction. The closeness of their 
strategies creates a preference structure which hinders a compromise and promotes conflict. 
Hence, unlike what intuition suggests, close actors cannot without further ado reach a 
compromise about regime type and therefore do not enter into negotiations about regime 
outcome. This finding contradicts the findings of Hersvik and Larsen (2004: 171) who in their 
study of Portugal concluded that “…only actors close to each other will enter into 
negotiations.”. Furthermore, it is worth noticing that in this approach democracy cannot come 
about without democrats. 
 
Further challenges 
As mentioned earlier, transition theory is not a complete theory but more a model for 
understanding regime change. Further work needs to be done to create a complete model or 
theory. I contribute to understand post-Soviet and multi-dimensional conflicts by transition 
theory. However, some challenges have been beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 Amongst these are to investigate firmly and in greater detail the impact of the nation- 
and state-building processes upon the Russian transition. It seems clear that these processes 
played an important role in the breakdown of the Soviet Union and still have an impact upon 
Russian politics today. In the case of Belarus the significance of the relative closeness of the 
softliner actor and the hardliner actor should be investigated more closely to uncover possible 
negative effects on the possibility of a compromise. 
 Furthermore, additional sources can be brought into the analyse in form of interviews, 
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rapports or other material in order to even better construct the preferences and determine the 
strategies of the actors. Better estimation of the actor’s utility function would have been a 
great advantage for the application of game theory. It would have been especially useful to 
develop methods in which actors’ payoffs could be given at a higher measurement level than 
just as ordinal values. This would have expanded the possibilities to apply further 
mathematical tools from probability or decision theory to the analyses. 
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Appendix 1 
The following two games represent the Belarusian game of social interaction about 
constitution and are modelled as dynamic games. They are opened by the softliner fraction 
and the opposition fraction respectively. In both games the outcome corresponds to the 
conflict outcome of the game presented in chapter five. This demonstrates that in this 
particular game the outcome is not changed by the sequence of moves taken by the players. 
Hence, which player that opens the game has no influence upon the outcome of the game. In 
both of the following games the sub-game perfect equilibrium is the DHS sub-optimal 
outcome. 
 
The following game is opened by the Popular Front:  
 
Kebich
S. Fraction S. Fraction
Popular Front
HybridS. Quo
Hybrid Hybrid
Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
Hybrid
Status Quo Status Quo
S. Quo.S. QuoS. Quo
.
Democracy
6,7,4 3,4,6 3,3,5 1,1,7 7,2,1 5,6,3 5,5,2 4,3,6
Game of strategic interaction about constitutionFigure 8.1
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The following game is opened by the Shushkevich fraction:  
 
Kebich
S. Fraction
Popular Front
Hybrid
Status Quo
Hybrid Hybrid
Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
Hybrid
Status Quo Status Quo
Dem.Dem.Dem.Dem.
7,4,6 2,1,7 4,6,3 6,3,5 3,5,3 5,2,5 1,7,1 3,6,4
Kebich
Game of strategic interaction about constitution
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Appendix 2 
-25,-250,0
1-q
q
Nature
Communist FractionCommunist Fraction
YeltsinYeltsin
Dissolute parliament Dissolute parliament
Give inGive in
Yield to 
the threat
Yield to 
the threat
Stand firm Stand firm
-10, 10-25, 00,-25-10,10
 
The threat game estimation of q 
The following calculations show the formal estimation of the constant q in the threat game 
between the Communist fraction and the Yeltsin fraction. It must be noted that the Yeltsin 
fraction in this game is modelled (believed) to know his “type”. Hence, whether or not the 
threat he has put forward is credible or not. Yeltsin therefore knows both his own preferences 
as well as the preferences of the Communist Fraction. As the game is modelled as a dynamic 
game in which they have the last move the Yeltsin fraction also knows the preferences of the 
Communist fraction when making a possible choice. 
 
First the expected utility of yielding for the threat by the Communist fraction is: 
10)(
101010)(
)1)(10()(10)(
−=Ε
−+−=Ε
−−+−=Ε
YIELD
YIELD
YIELD
qq
qq
μ
μ
μ
 
 
Second the expected utility of stand firm to the threat by the Communist fraction is: 
q
qq
FIRMSTAND
FIRMSTAND
25)(
)1(0)(25)(
_|
_|
−=Ε
−+−=Ε
μ
μ
  
 151
 
To estimate the critical value of q the expected utilities are inserted into the following 
inequality: 
4.0
)
25
1(10)
25
1(25
1025
)()( _|
≤
−⋅−≤−⋅−
−≥−
Ε≥Ε
q
q
q
YIELDFIRMSTAND μμ
 
 
According to this estimation the Communist fraction uncovers that the probability that 
Yeltsin’s threat is credible is equal to or smaller than .4 or 40 percent. 
 
By doing so one can establish the sub-game perfect equilibrium, in which the Communist 
fraction regards the threat not to be complete with a probability of .6 or more. In this situation 
the game predicts that the outcome is to be found on the right hand side of nature. Hence, in 
the outcome in which the Communist fraction stands firm and the Yeltsin fraction gives in. 
Note that the credibility is not given with certainty, only as an estimate. Therefore this 
equilibrium does not reveal the credibility of the threat. 
Applying Bayes Rule to the threat game 
After observing the result of the interaction it is possible to decide the credibility of Yeltsin’s 
threat. To do so we can use Bayes rule. Bayes rule is introduced into game theory from 
probability theory and allows us to calculate the probability of the presumption to be true 
given a certain consequence can be observed.   
 
The equation appears as follow: 
 
)()|()()|(
)()|()|(
ÃPÃBPAPABP
APABPBAP +=  
 
 
A=  Yeltsin’s threat is credible 
B=  Yeltsin will dissolve parliament  
Ã= Yeltsin threat is not credible 
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1)|( =ABP   
0)|( =ÂBP
 
qAP =)(  
)1()( qÃP −=  
 
1)|(
)1(0)(1
)(1)|(
=
−+=
BAP
qq
qBAP
 
 
Hence, if Yeltsin dissolves the parliament the threat is credible.  
 
The credibility of the threat can be decided by observing the outcome. If the outcome is that 
Yeltsin dissolves the parliament then Yeltsin’s threat has shown to be credible. However, the 
credibility of the threat can only be decided by observing Yeltsin dissolving the parliament or 
giving in. If the Communist fraction decides to yield to the threat the credibility of the threat 
cannot be decided. Because the probability of Yeltsin dissolving the parliament given that the 
threat is credible is not known it is set to nil.   
 
0)|( =ABP   
0)|( =ÂBP
 
qAP =)(  
)1()( qÃP −=  
 
NANBAP
qq
qBAP
=
−+=
)|(
)1(0)(0
)(0)|(
 
 
Hence, as the quotient is singular the equation is unsolvable  
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Appendix 3 
The following appendix includes maps of Belarus and Russia, followed by some central facts 
about government, ethnic and religious distributions and central economic data. 
 
Map of Belarus 
The map below shows Belarus which is located in Eastern-Europe and is landlocked between 
Russia, Latvia, Lithuania Poland and Ukraine.30 
 
                                                 
30 Belarus. [Map/Still]. Retrieved February 19, 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: 
http://search.eb.com/eb/art-62233  
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Map of Russia 
The map below shows the Russian Federation.31 Russia stretches over 11 time zones, from the 
Pacific Ocean in the east through Asia and Europe to the Baltic Sea in west. Russia is the 
world’s largest country with regard to area. 
 
Facts about Belarus 
 
                                                 
31 Russia. [Map/Still]. Retrieved Febuary 19,  2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: 
http://search.eb.com/eb/art-61715 
Country name: Republic of Belarus (Respublika Byelarus') 
former: Belorussian (Byelorussian) Soviet Socialist Republic 
Population: 9,724,723  growth rate: -0.41% (2007) 
Ethnic groups: Belarusian 81.2%, Russian 11.4%, Polish 3.9%, Ukrainian 2.4%, other 1.1%  
Religions: Eastern Orthodox 80%, other 20% (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and 
Muslim)  
Languages: Belarusian, Russian, other  
Literacy: 99.6% of total population 
Capital: Minsk 
Independence: 25 August 1991 (from Soviet Union)  
Executive chief of state: President Aleksandr Lukashenka (since 20 July 1994)  
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Source: CIA World fact book 
 
Facts about Russia 
 
Country name: conventional long form: Russian Federation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya)  
former: Russian Empire, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic  
Population: 141,377,752 growth rate -0.484% (2007) 
Ethnic groups: Russian 79.8%, Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 2%, Bashkir 1.2%, Chuvash 1.1%, other  
Religions: Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2%  
Languages: Russian, many minority languages  
branch: head of government: Prime Minister Sergei Sidorskiy (since 19 December 2003); 
cabinet: Council of Ministers  
elections: president elected by popular vote for a five-year term; first election took 
place 23 June and 10 July 1994; according to the 1994 constitution, the next 
election should have been held in 1999, however, Aleksandr Lukashenka extended 
his term to 2001 via a November 1996 referendum; subsequent election held 9 
September 2001; an October 2004 referendum ended presidential term limits and 
allowed the president to run in a third election, which was held on 19 March 2006; 
prime minister and deputy prime ministers appointed by the president  
election results: Aleksandr Lukashenka reelected president; percent of vote - 
Aleksandr Lukashenka 82.6%, Aleksandr Milinkevich 6%, Aleksandr Kozulin 
2.3%; note - election marred by electoral fraud  
Legislative 
branch: 
bicameral National Assembly or Natsionalnoye Sobranie consists of the Council of 
the Republic or Soviet Respubliki (64 seats; 56 members elected by regional 
councils and eight members appointed by the president, all for four-year terms) and 
the Chamber of Representatives or Palata Predstaviteley (110 seats; members 
elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)  
elections: last held 17 and 31 October 2004; international observers widely 
denounced the elections as flawed and undemocratic, based on massive 
government falsification; pro-Lukashenka candidates won every seat after many 
opposition candidates were disqualified for technical reasons  
Judicial branch: Supreme Court (judges are appointed by the president); Constitutional Court (half 
of the judges appointed by the president and half appointed by the Chamber of 
Representatives)  
GDP $7,800 real growth rate 8.3% (2006 per. capita PPP) 
Unemployment: 1.6% officially registered unemployed; large number of underemployed workers 
(2005)  
Population below 
poverty line: 
27.1%  
Household 
income by share: 
lowest 10%: 5.1%  
highest 10%: 20%  
Trade - partners: Exports: Russia 35.8%, Netherlands 15.1%, UK 7%, Ukraine 5.7%, Poland 5.3%, 
Germany 4.4%  
Imports: Russia 60.6%, Germany 6.7%, Ukraine 5.4% 
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Literacy: 99.6% of total population:  
Capital:  Moscow 
Independence: 24 August 1991 (from Soviet Union)  
Executive 
branch: 
chief of state: President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin(Since 31 December 1999)  
head of government: Premier Mikhail Yefimovich Frradkov (since 5 March 2004)  
cabinet: Ministries of the Government or "Government" composed of the premier and 
his deputies, ministers, and selected other individuals; all are appointed by the 
president  
note: there is also a Presidential Administration (PA) that provides staff and policy 
support to the president, drafts presidential decrees, and coordinates policy among 
government agencies; a Security Council also reports directly to the president  
elections: president elected by popular vote for a four-year term (eligible for a second 
term); election last held 14 March 2004 (next to be held in March 2008);  
election results: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin reelected president; percent of vote - 
Vladimir Putin 71.2%, Nikolay Kharitonov 13.7%, other (no candidate above 5%) 
15.1%  
Legislative 
branch: 
bicameral Federal Assembly or Federalnoye Sobraniye consists of the Federation 
Council or Sovet Federatsii (178 seats; as of July 2000, members appointed by the top 
executive and legislative officials in each of the 88 federal administrative units - 
oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and the federal cities of 
Moscow and Saint Petersburg; members serve four-year terms) and the State Duma or 
Gosudarstvennaya Duma (450 seats; as of 2007, all members elected by proportional 
representation from party lists winning at least 7% of the vote; members elected by 
popular vote to serve four-year terms)  
elections: State Duma - last held 7 December 2003 (next to be held in December 2007) 
election results: State Duma - percent of vote received by parties clearing the 5% 
threshold United Russia 37.1%, CPRF 12.7%, LDPR 11.6%, Motherland 9.1%, other 
29.5%;  
Judicial branch: Constitutional Court; Supreme Court; Supreme Arbitration Court; judges for all courts 
are appointed for life by the Federation Council on the recommendation of the 
president  
GDP  $12,100 real growth rate 6.6% (2006 per capita PPP) 
Unemployment  6.6% plus considerable underemployment (2006.)  
Population 
below poverty 
line: 
17.8%  
Household 
income or share: 
lowest 10%: 1.7%  
highest 10%: 38.7%  
Trade - 
Partners: 
Exports Netherlands 10.3%, Germany 8.3%, Italy 7.9%, China 5.5%, Ukraine 5.2%, 
Turkey 4.5%, Switzerland 4.4%   
Imports Germany 13.6%, Ukraine 8%, China 7.4%, Japan 6%, Belarus 4.7%, US 4.7%, 
Italy 4.6%, South Korea 4.1% 
Source: CIA World fact book 
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